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ABSTRACT 
 
 
One of the most critical assets in most organisations is information.  It is often described 
as the lifeblood of an organisation.  For this reason, it is vital that this asset is protected 
through sound information security practices.  However, the incorrect and indifferent 
behaviour of employees often leads to information assets becoming vulnerable.  Incorrect 
employee behaviour could have an extremely negative impact on the protection of 
information.     
 
An information security solution should be a fundamental component in most 
organisations.  It is, however, possible for an organisation to have the most 
comprehensive physical and technical information security controls in place, but the 
operational controls, and associated employee behaviour, have not received much 
consideration.  Therefore, the issue of employee behaviour must be addressed in an 
organisation to assist in ensuring the protection of information assets.   
 
The corporate culture of an organisation is largely responsible for the actions and 
behaviour of employees.  Therefore, to address operational information security controls, 
the corporate culture of an organisation should be considered.  To ensure the integration 
of information security into the corporate culture of an organisation, the protection of 
information should become part of the way the employees conduct their everyday tasks – 
from senior management, right throughout the entire organisation.  Therefore, 
information security should become an integral component of the corporate culture of the 
organisation.     
 
To address the integration of information security into the corporate culture of an 
organisation, a model was developed which depicted the learning stages and modes of 
knowledge creation necessary to transform the corporate culture into one that is 
information security aware.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Prologue 
Information is a particularly significant asset to most organisations.  It is often described 
as the core of the emerging electronic economy and is vital for the successful operation of 
most organisations (Gordon, 2002, online).  It is, however, difficult to measure the exact 
value of the information that an organisation possesses.  Nonetheless, it is apparent that 
any breach in the confidentiality, integrity or availability of information could result in 
harmful consequences for an organisation (Gordon & Glickson LLC, 2001, online).   
 
Therefore, information security controls, which include physical, technical and 
operational controls, should be implemented and managed in an organisation to ensure 
that the information is kept secure (Krige, 1999, p 7).  However, there are many 
challenges facing the implementation of information security practices in to 
organisations.  One of the greatest challenges hindering successful information security 
practices in an organisation is the human element and the associated operational controls.  
Employees’ behaviour and actions often represent the weakest link in the information 
security process.  Although an organisation may have the best physical and technical 
controls, employees may, maliciously or unintentionally, circumvent these controls and 
compromise information assets (Martins & Eloff, 2002, p 203).  Therefore, the issue that 
should be addressed to assist in the successful implementation of information security 
practices in to an organisation is that of employee behaviour and actions.  
 
A decisive influence on the behaviour and actions of employees in an organisation is the 
corporate culture.  Corporate culture is the outcome of all the collective, taken-for-
granted assumptions that a group has learned throughout an organisation’s history.  
Corporate culture is generally defined as values that are shared by everyone in an 
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organisation, including fundamental beliefs, principles and practices.  These collective 
assumptions and beliefs will influence and determine the actions of employees (Schein, 
1999, pp 15-17, 29).  Thus, the corporate culture of an organisation largely influences the 
behaviour and actions of employees, and, as was detailed previously, it is the incorrect 
behaviour and actions of employees that often impede information security.  Therefore, it 
follows that the corporate culture of an organisation should ideally be shaped and 
modified to influence the behaviour of employees appropriately towards the effective 
protection of information assets. 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘senior management’ will be used to include the 
Board of Directors, the CEO and directors.  This term will be used for all occurrences of 
management, including corporate culture.  It is acknowledged, however, that in terms of 
corporate culture, even though the term ‘senior management’ is used, corporate culture 
can be influenced and shaped by all levels of management in an organisation.   
 
1.2 Identification of the Problem Area 
As described in the previous section, the successful protection of information assets, 
through information security practices, is highly dependent on the behaviour and actions 
of employees in an organisation.  Further, the behaviour and actions of employees are 
largely influenced by the corporate culture of an organisation.   
 
To be successful, information security should become part of the way the employees 
conduct their everyday tasks, from senior management, right throughout the entire 
organisation.  Therefore, information security should become an integral part of the 
corporate culture of the organisation.  It is possible for the correct information security 
actions and practices to be enforced in an organisation through rewards and 
consequences.  However, this is not ideal because, without strict enforcement, employees 
may stray from the correct information security practices.  To be truly effective, the 
correct information security practices should become second-nature to employees and 
part of the corporate culture.  Further, as information security is very much reliant on the 
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correct behaviour of users, the corporate culture should contribute towards the fact that 
the de facto behaviour of users is indeed what senior management envisaged as 
acceptable behaviour in terms of information security (Thomson & von Solms, 2004, pp 
19-31). 
 
In many organisations, the information security vision or focus of senior management 
and that of the employees is immensely disparate, resulting in senior management and 
employees actually working in ‘opposing directions’, as indicated in Figure 1.1.  The 
consequence of this is that minimal achievement of organisational goals is evident in an 
organisation and information security is, therefore, not successfully integrated into the 
organisational corporate culture. 
 
Figure 1.1: Minimal organisational goal achievement 
Source: Accel-Team, 2000, online 
 
Employees’ lack of understanding and support for the vision of senior management is 
most often demonstrated in erroneous behaviour and a small degree of goal congruence is 
evident in many of the information security implementations of organisations.  Even 
though the corporate culture influences the behaviour of employees, it is estimated that 
only five per cent of organisations have a definable culture, where senior management 
takes an active role in the shaping of the culture (Atkinson, 1997, p 17).  Therefore, only 
Organisational Goal Achievement 
Management Focus 
Employee Focus 
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in a minority of organisations is senior management aware and active in positively 
influencing the behaviour of employees.   
 
The challenge in most organisations is to ensure that the information security vision or 
focus of senior management is essentially supported by the employees, primarily through 
their behaviour.  This should result in senior management and employees having the 
same focus and working towards the same organisational goals.  The closer the focus of 
senior management and employees are aligned, the greater the chance of the achievement 
of the organisational goals, as indicated in Figure 1.2.   
 
 
Figure 1.2: Increased organisational goal achievement 
Source: Accel-Team, 2000, online 
 
In order to begin the alignment of the focus of management and employees, senior 
management should ensure that its vision is outlined and communicated to employees.  
Senior management should preferably detail its information security vision in the 
Corporate Information Security Policy.  The main aim of any policy, including the 
Corporate Information Security Policy, is to influence and determine the decisions and 
actions of employees by specifying what behaviour is acceptable and what behaviour is 
unacceptable within the context of corporate culture (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p 194).  
By developing a Corporate Information Security Policy, senior management is exhibiting 
its vision and commitment to the protection of information assets and detailing what 
should be expected from employees. 
 
Management Focus 
Employee Focus 
Organisational Goal Achievement 
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Equally as important as the development of the Corporate Information Security Policy is 
the communication of that policy to employees.  Further, if it is communicated in the 
correct manner, the Corporate Information Security Policy should play a vital role in 
changing the corporate culture.  Employees should be made aware of the role they ought 
to be playing in the protection of information assets.  Further to this, employees must be 
trained in information security practices and educated to gain a deeper understanding of 
the importance of information assets.     
 
However, senior management is frequently unsuccessful in the communication of the 
information security vision to its employees and ineffective in aligning management and 
employee information security goals.  Employees are, therefore, often apathetic and 
nonchalant towards the information security goals of senior management.  Only once 
management and employee goals are aligned and, consequently, everyone in the 
organisation is working towards the same vision, will an information security conscious 
corporate culture begin to emerge. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement  
Effective information security calls for extensive human interaction which involves all 
employees in the organisation.  As part of its corporate governance duties, it is vital for 
senior management to provide guidance and direction towards the protection of 
information assets.  However, the necessary leadership from senior management, in most 
cases, is lacking and the goals and direction of senior management is not communicated 
properly to employees.  Employees, therefore, often do not have an accurate 
understanding of their role in information security.  The fundamental beliefs and values 
of employees regarding information security, shaped by the corporate culture of the 
organisation, are not necessarily aligned with the wishes and information security vision 
of senior management.  
 
Employees fail to get the necessary guidance from senior management to integrate 
information security procedures and practices into the corporate culture of their 
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organisation.  As a result, one of the principal problems facing the successful 
implementation of information security practices in to organisations is the apathy and 
incorrect actions and behaviour of employees exacerbated by the lack of leadership from 
senior management.   
 
Employees often do not understand the importance of, and the role they should play in, 
the protection of information assets in an organisation.  This is as a result of the fact 
that the goals of employees in an organisation are often not aligned with the goals of 
management.  As a result, employees’ behaviour and actions with regard to 
information assets frequently reflects the apathy they feel and results in inadequate 
information security practices in an organisation.  
 
1.4 Objectives 
The primary objective of this research study is to develop a model that will assist in the 
integration of information security practices into an organisation.  To achieve this 
primary objective, a number of secondary objectives are defined. 
 
These secondary objectives include: 
 an investigation into the role that management should play in the integration of 
information security into an organisation 
 an examination of the impact that employee behaviour could have on the 
successful implementation of information security practices in to an organisation 
 a study of the theories and concepts underlying corporate culture and determining 
how corporate culture could influence the employees in an organisation 
 an investigation into management’s role in corporate culture and the influence of 
management policies in shaping the corporate culture 
 determining the role of the Corporate Information Security Policy in aligning 
management’s information security vision with the behaviour of employees 
 a study of the knowledge creation process in an organisation and the learning 
process of employees 
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 an investigation into the relationship that should exist between information 
security, corporate culture and corporate governance 
 
The integration of the aspects addressed in the secondary objectives should contribute 
towards the successful development and motivation of the eventual model. 
 
1.5 Research Paradigms and Methodology 
Paradigms are generally defined as “universally recognised scientific achievements that 
for a time provide model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners”.  They 
offer a structure of accepted sets of theories, methods and ways of defining data (Collis & 
Hussey, 2003, pp 46-47). 
 
There are two main research paradigms or philosophies, which are classified as 
phenomenological and positivist.  The phenomenological and positivistic paradigms are 
on either ends of the gamut and very little research is conducted within their pure forms 
(Collis & Hussey, 2003, pp 47, 51).  Therefore, most research cannot be termed entirely 
phenomenological or positivistic, but some combination of the two.  So, too, does this 
thesis utilise aspects of both the phenomenological and positivist paradigms, as will be 
detailed later in this section. 
 
The phenomenological paradigm is concerned with the comprehension of human 
behaviour from an individual’s own frame of reference.  This approach stresses the 
subjective aspects of human behaviour by focusing on the meaning and implication, 
rather than the measurement, of social phenomena.  The phenomenological paradigm is, 
therefore, often referred to as qualitative (Collis & Hussey, 2003, pp 47, 53). 
 
The positivistic paradigm seeks the causes of social phenomena, with little regard to the 
subjective state of the individual.  Thus, logical reasoning is applied to the research so 
that precision and objectivity replace hunches and intuition as the means of exploring 
research problems.  Positivism is based on the belief that the study of human behaviour 
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should be conducted in the same way as studies conducted in the natural sciences.  The 
positivist paradigm is, therefore, often referred to as quantitative (Collis & Hussey, 2003, 
pp 47, 52).   
 
There are various assumptions within the two main research paradigms.  The assumptions 
pertinent to this research are ontological, epistemological, and methodological (Collis & 
Hussey, 2003, pp 48-50).  The following paragraphs will detail these assumptions in 
terms of the qualitative and quantitative approaches, and how they relate to this thesis. 
 
The ontological assumption is concerned with the nature of reality.  In terms of the 
qualitative paradigm, reality is socially constructed and can only be understood by 
examining the acuity of the human actors.  In terms of the quantitative paradigm, reality 
is objective and external to the researcher.  In the context of this research, from an 
ontological perspective, reality is seen as a pattern of symbolic relationships sustained 
through a process of human action and interaction.  Further, reality is believed to be 
created by individuals through actions and routines.  These assumptions place the greater 
part of this research resolutely on the phenomenological, or qualitative, side.  However, 
in the milieu of this research, reality could also be seen as derived from the 
communication of information which leads to constantly shifting forms and behaviours.    
This assumption leans more toward the positivistic paradigm. 
 
The epistemological assumption is concerned with the study of knowledge and what is 
accepted as legitimate knowledge.  In terms of the qualitative paradigm, the researcher 
interacts with that being researched to attempt to minimise the distance between the 
researcher and what is being researched.  In terms of the quantitative paradigm, 
researchers believe that only phenomena which are observable and measurable can be 
validly regarded as knowledge, and the researcher is independent from that being 
researched.  In this thesis, the researcher will be independent and not directly involved 
with that which is being researched.  However, the research data itself will be qualitative 
and not quantitative.   
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The methodological assumption is concerned with the process of research.  In terms of 
the qualitative paradigm, a number of different research methods will be used to obtain 
different perceptions of the phenomena to attempt to understand what is happening in a 
situation and looking for patterns which may be repeated in similar situations.  In terms 
of the quantitative paradigm, concepts should be described in such a way that they can be 
measured.  Large samples should be used and the phenomena will be reduced to their 
simplest parts.   
 
Therefore, as can be seen from these assumptions, and as stated previously in this section 
regarding most research, this research study can not be compartmentalized into purely 
phenomenological or positivistic.  Rather, this research draws on certain aspects from 
both paradigms and involves theory building and critical thinking through an inductive 
process to build knowledge.   
 
In terms of the research methodology, an extensive literature study was conducted where 
every endeavor was made to ensure the content is as current as possible and the literature 
was selected from respected authorities in the relevant fields.  This research study utilises 
an inductive process and uses solid arguments and theory building to argue towards the 
Model for Information Security Shared Tacit Espoused Values or MISSTEV.  The 
various components of information security, corporate culture and organisational 
learning, uncovered through the literature study, will be integrated into MISSTEV using 
modeling techniques to assist in its presentation.  MISSTEV will illustrate the learning 
process of employees from the time they are made aware of their information security 
responsibilities until information security becomes part of the corporate culture.   
 
Additionally there were five papers written where the research components and results of 
this study were documented through publications.  Three of these papers were published 
in accredited journals and two presented at subject specific conferences and published in 
the conference proceedings (see appendices A-E). 
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1.6 Chapter Road Map 
This thesis consists of nine chapters, with Chapters 2, 3 and 4 mainly conducting a 
literature study.  From Chapter 5 onwards preliminary solution components from 
MISSTEV will be argued.   
 
The first chapter is an introduction, which includes identification of the problem area, 
outlining the research objectives and research methodology.  Chapter 2 explores the 
discipline of corporate culture.  The definition of corporate culture will be discussed and 
the Three Levels of Culture, as defined by Schein, will be detailed.  The various 
classifications of culture and forms of power in an organisation will be discussed, as well 
as how to maintain the corporate culture.  The third chapter expands on a few of the 
concepts from Chapter 2 by exploring senior management’s role in corporate culture.  
The symptoms of a corporate culture that could be detrimental to an organisation, where 
senior management is not taking an active role in shaping the culture, will be detailed, 
together with the types of organisational environments that could exist in an organisation 
based on the style of management.  The vital role that policies play in shaping the culture 
and the factors that would influence a culture change will be examined.   
 
The fourth chapter will detail both the management and human dimensions of 
information security.  The aim of information security in an organisation will be 
examined, as well as the impact that the human element has on the success of information 
security in an organisation.  The integration of information security in the corporate 
culture of an organisation and the role that senior management should play in shaping 
that culture will be detailed.   
 
The first of the components forming part of the solution will be discussed in Chapter 5 as 
it will tie together the discussions from the previous chapters into the relationship that 
should exist between information security, corporate culture and corporate governance.  
The Three Levels of Corporate Culture and the organisational environments, discussed in 
previous chapters, and the links that exist between them will also be evaluated. 
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The knowledge creation processes within an organisation, for both tacit and explicit 
knowledge, will be studied in Chapter 6.  This chapter will also include a study of the 
organisational learning process where single- and double-loop learning will be detailed.   
 
A further solution component that will be relevant in the construction of MISSTEV will 
be investigated in the seventh chapter.  The importance of awareness, training and 
education in terms of information security will be detailed and the learning process of 
employees will be examined.   
 
The penultimate chapter, Chapter 8, is a solution chapter and will discuss the proposed 
Model for Information Security Shared Tacit Espoused Values or MISSTEV.  The 
solution components from previous chapters will be integrated and merged to form 
MISSTEV.  The final chapter provides a cumulative conclusion and will evaluate the 
research to determine whether the research objectives have been met.  This chapter will 
also include a discussion for further research.  The chapter road map, as seen in Figure 
1.3, illustrates the logical order of the research of this thesis. 
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Figure 1.3: Chapter road map 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CORPORATE CULTURE CONCEPTUALISED 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate culture is a particularly intricate aspect of any organisation.  Culture exists in 
an organisation whether management and employees are aware of it or not.  In many 
cases, however, a corporate culture simply exists and does nothing to positively influence 
the organisation.  The influence of corporate culture on the actions and behaviour of 
employees, and the various features and characteristics of corporate culture, if understood 
and utilized properly, could possibly enhance the operations of an organisation.   
 
The objective of this chapter is to explore different facets of corporate culture in order to 
gain a deeper understanding of this complex concept.  Various definitions of culture, the 
three levels of culture and the types of power that influence these levels will be explored.  
The four classifications of corporate culture that could be found in organisations, and the 
relationship between dominant cultures, sub-cultures and counter-cultures will also be 
examined.  The chapter will conclude with a synopsis of how a corporate culture can be 
maintained. 
 
2.2 Conceptualising Corporate Culture 
Culture is the sum total of all the shared, taken-for-granted assumptions that a group has 
learned throughout history, and culture provides people with a common viewpoint that 
ties them together as a group (Sathe, 1983, pp 6-7; Schein, 1999, pp 28-29).  It is a 
powerful, underlying and often unconscious set of forces that determines both individual 
and group behaviour, thought patterns and values (Schein, 1999, p 14).  Culture can be 
likened to personality.  Like personality, culture affects in predictable ways how people 
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conduct themselves when no one is instructing them on what to do (Hellriegel, Jackson, 
Slocum, Staude, Amos, Klopper, Louw & Oosthuizen, 2004, p 357).  Further, the concept 
of corporate culture can be a powerful analytical tool in the examination and 
interpretation of human action within complex organisations (Meek, 1988, p 454). 
 
Corporate culture has a number of important implications in an organisation as it offers 
an interpretation of an organisation’s history that employees can use to interpret how they 
will be expected to behave in future.  In addition, corporate culture can generate 
commitment to corporate values or management’s vision so that employees feel they are 
working for something they believe in.  Another implication is that corporate culture 
serves as an organisational control mechanism, unofficially encouraging or discouraging 
certain patterns of behaviour.  Corporate culture has the potential to enhance 
organisational performance and provides a sense of certainty about how problems are to 
be handled in an organisation (Martin & Siehl, 1983, p 52; Hellriegel et al, 2004, p 368).   
 
Corporate culture provides meaning and direction for an organisation and is often 
described as the social or cultural energy that moves an organisation into action 
(Kilmann, Saxton, Serpa and Associates, 1985, pp 353-354).  Cultural assumptions in 
organisations develop around how people in the organisation relate to each other.  
However, this is only a fraction of what culture covers.  Corporate culture drives strategy, 
goals and decision making in organisations (Schein, 1999, pp 14, 28-29).         
 
Every organisation develops a culture, whether it attempts to or not, and this culture 
operates at both a conscious and subconscious level (Hagberg Consulting Group, 2002, 
online).  It is important to note that no culture is wrong in itself, only inappropriate to its 
circumstances (Handy, 1978, p 26).  Therefore, there is no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ culture – 
except in relation to what the organisation is trying to achieve, as well as the environment 
in which it operates (Schein, 1999, p 21).  In many organisations, the ‘cultural energy’, 
mentioned earlier, has scarcely been tapped.  The energy is not mobilized towards 
anything, and employees seem apathetic towards their jobs (Kilmann et al, 1985, p 353).  
In other organisations, the energy is actively flowing, but it is moving employees in the 
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wrong direction.  The resulting behaviour is working against the organisation and is not 
in line with the wishes of management (Kilmann et al, 1985, p 354). 
 
Therefore, as suggested by Kilmann et al, “to understand the essence or soul of the 
organisation requires that we travel below the charts, rulebooks, machines, and buildings 
into the underground world of corporate culture” (1985, p 351).  In order to gain a deeper 
understanding of corporate culture, it is essential to understand the different levels that 
can be identified as defined by Edgar H. Schein’s Three Levels of Corporate Culture.  
 
2.3 Three Levels of Corporate Culture Defined 
One of the challenges when trying to understand corporate culture is to oversimplify this 
complex concept.  Stated simply, culture could be seen as “the way things are done 
around here” – but it is far more than this.  Culture should be regarded as something that 
an organisation ‘is’, not as something that an organisation ‘has’.  Culture is an 
abstraction, and, as a result, it only has use in relation to the interpretation of the observed 
tangible behaviour (Meek, 1988, p 470).  Consequently, a far better way of thinking is to 
realise that culture exists at several levels.  According to Edgar H. Schein, these levels 
range from the very visible and tangible to the tacit and invisible.  Furthermore, it is 
imperative that these levels are managed and understood (Schein, 1999, p 15).  The 
following sub-sections address the existence of corporate culture at various levels in an 
organisation.  
 
2.3.1 Level 1:  Artifacts 
The first and most visible expression of culture observed in an 
organisation is that of artifacts (Hagberg Consulting Group, 2002, online).  
Artifacts can be described as observed concrete behaviour, or what an 
individual can see, hear and feel as they observe an organisation (Schein, 
1999, p 15).  These include the architecture and decor, the clothing people 
wear and organisational practices. Other tangible expressions of culture 
are found in commonly used language and jargon, logos, brochures, 
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organisational slogans and narratives.  An outsider can often spot these 
artifacts easily upon entering an organisation. For employees, however, 
these artifacts have often become part of their subconscious thinking 
(Hagberg Consulting Group, 2002, online). 
 
It is not, however, reliable to base the judgment of an organisation’s 
culture on simply observing the artifacts.  By doing this, all that is known 
is that the organisation has particular ways of presenting itself and dealing 
with customers and employees.  It is still unclear as to what all these 
observations mean.  In other words, at the level of artifacts, the corporate 
culture is clear and has an immediate emotional impact.  The behaviour of 
individuals is clear, but it still is not clear why the employees of an 
organisation are behaving in a certain way, and why each organisation is 
constructed as it is.   
 
The observations of the actions and behaviour of individuals that have 
been made should be further explored by talking to employees to attempt 
to gain an understanding of their perceptions about the artifacts and 
culture.  The questioning of the employees in this regard leads to the next 
level of culture – the espoused values (Schein, 1999, pp 15-17). 
 
2.3.2 Level 2:  Espoused Values 
The second level of culture is the espoused values of an organisation.  
‘Espouse’ means to adopt or support a cause (Oxford Dictionary of 
Current English, 1993, p 295).  Therefore, the espoused values of an 
organisation should be those that the organisation is supporting.  This level 
of culture requires questions to be asked about the organisation’s artifacts, 
especially those artifacts that seem somehow inconsistent with what 
would be expected.  For this purpose, employees who can explain the 
organisation need to be found.  Anthropologists refer to these employees 
as ‘informants’ and depend heavily on such conversations to understand 
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what is going on in an organisation.  Examples of espoused values are 
teamwork and good communication. 
 
In many cases, organisations that advocate the same values can have very 
different physical layouts, working styles and artifacts.  By only 
examining espoused values, organisations cannot be categorised into a 
specific ‘typology’ as these organisations are still not understood at the 
deeper cultural level. 
 
There could be obvious inconsistencies between some of the espoused 
values and the visible behaviour of the employees of an organisation.  
Organisations may espouse teamwork, yet seem to reward and promote 
initiatives that are highly competitive and individualistic.  An organisation 
may also espouse customer orientation, for example, and yet does not 
employ people who seem very polite or service-oriented. 
 
What these inconsistencies indicate is that a deeper level of thought and 
perception is driving the obvious behaviour.  What an organisation strives 
to do, and the values it hopes to endorse, may be different from the values, 
beliefs, and norms expressed in the actual practices and behaviour of the 
organisation (Hagberg Consulting Group, 2002, online).  The deeper level 
of culture may or may not be consistent with the values and principles that 
are espoused by the organisation.  Therefore, to truly understand the 
culture of an organisation, one must understand what is happening at the 
deeper level of shared tacit assumptions (Schein, 1999, pp 17-19). 
  
2.3.3 Level 3:  Shared Tacit Assumptions 
‘Tacit’ means something that is understood or implied without being 
stated (Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 1993, p 927).  Shared tacit 
assumptions, therefore, are unspoken assumptions that are shared by a 
group of people.  Shared tacit assumptions are the underlying thoughts 
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and feelings that members of a culture take for granted and believe to be 
true (Hellriegel et al, 2004, p 358).  To understand this deepest level of 
shared tacit assumptions, the history of an organisation needs to be 
examined.  What were the values and beliefs of the founders that 
contributed towards the success of the organisation?  Organisations are 
initiated and managed by individuals or small teams who originally 
impress their own beliefs, values and assumptions on employees.  As the 
organisation progresses successfully in its life cycle, the established 
beliefs, values and assumptions of the founder (s) become shared amongst 
employees and taken for granted.  They become tacit assumptions about 
the nature of the organisation’s environment and how to succeed in it.  As 
a result, the established values, beliefs and assumptions guide the 
observable behaviour of employees in their daily activities. 
 
Corporate culture is, therefore, mutually learned values, beliefs and 
assumptions that become taken for granted as an organisation continues to 
grow (Schein, 1999, pp 19-20). 
 
After examining the Three Levels of Corporate Culture, as defined by Edgar Schein, it is 
evident that it is the learned, shared tacit assumptions on which people base their daily 
behaviour (Schein, 1999, p 24).  Several of the most important elements of culture are 
essentially tacit or invisible (Schein, 1999, p 21).  It is essential that the levels of culture 
are recognised by management to fully appreciate the depth of culture in the organisation.   
 
The ‘culture iceberg’, represented n Figure 2.1, illustrates that values, beliefs and 
assumptions form the base of corporate culture, but cannot be observed in an organisation 
as they are lying ‘under the surface’.  Corporate culture can be inferred from the more 
visible and observable elements in an organisation – its practices, language, narratives 
and slogans, as represented in Figure 2.1 (Hellriegel et al, 2004, p 357). 
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Figure 2.1: The culture iceberg 
Source: Adapted from Hellriegel, Jackson and Slocum, 2002, p 487 
 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates that many of the more crucial aspects of corporate culture are 
essentially invisible.  The values, beliefs and assumptions of the employees in an 
organisation form the foundation for corporate culture.   
 
A contributing factor that influences the corporate culture in an organisation, and, 
consequently, the Three Levels of Corporate Culture, is the distribution of power in an 
organisation.  In most organisations, power is held by senior management and should be 
used by management to direct employees’ behaviour.  There are typically three types of 
power that can exist in organisations.  The types of power, namely; condign, 
compensatory and conditioned power, and the effect they have on an organisation and its 
employees are discussed in the following section. 
 
 
 
Observable Elements of Culture 
Non-Observable Elements of Culture 
Assumptions 
Beliefs 
Values 
Language 
Narratives 
Practices 
Slogans 
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2.4 The Influence of Power on the Three Levels of Corporate Culture 
Power is often, mistakenly, seen as no more than domination, conflict, violence and 
hierarchy.  However, power is both the ability to make changes and control or guide 
(Gjerstad, 2005, online).  Organisations, for example, exert power in society through their 
ability to condition their own employees (Galbraith, 1983, p 23).  The type of power 
exercised in an organisation strongly influences the corporate culture, and its three levels 
discussed in the previous section. 
 
Organisations have access to three primary instruments of power: 
i.) Condign power (physical) 
ii.) Compensatory power (economic) 
iii.) Conditioned power (belief) 
 
Organisations may impose or enforce their will through the use of condign or 
compensatory power.  Condign power (physical) refers to consequences or punishment, 
whereas compensatory power (economic) wields power by offering rewards.  Condign 
power and compensatory power have one similarity - in both cases obedience is obtained 
through submission.  These two types of power should primarily influence the artifacts 
level, or visible behaviour, of employees.  Through condign or compensatory power, it is 
the overt behaviour of employees that should be manipulated and not their beliefs and 
values at the shared tacit assumptions level.   
 
Of the three types of power, conditioned power (belief) is the most important in society, 
and an organisation should be the embodiment of conditioned power.  It is through 
persuasion, education and social commitment to what seems natural or right that the 
organisation causes the individual to submit to the will of others.  Power should be 
exercised through changing the beliefs and values of the obedient person, or, in other 
words, the shared tacit assumptions level of corporate culture. 
 
There is a symmetric relationship between how power is exercised and how it is 
challenged: condign power could be met with violence, compensatory power, or 
 21
economic power could be met with the regulation of the market and conditioned power 
could be met with contradicting beliefs and ideologies (Galbraith, 1983, p 23). 
 
The way that power is distributed in an organisation will result in different types of 
corporate culture, depending on the type of power that is exercised.  The following 
section will describe these different corporate culture types, namely; Creative, Quality, 
Supportive and Productive.  It is important to note that, regardless of the type of 
corporate culture evident in an organisation, each type of culture exists at the Three 
Levels of Corporate Culture discussed in the previous section. 
 
2.5 Classifications of Corporate Culture 
Usually, when an organisation is first started, it can be described as a group of people 
with a common purpose.  There is a unique culture that is necessary for the group to 
survive and progress.  As the group evolves, the original culture that served all of the 
members in earlier times becomes less practical as the group becomes an organisation 
(Beach, 1993, p 18).  As time progresses, the culture may develop into one of the 
classifications of corporate culture that have been identified, or a combination thereof.   
 
As can be seen in Table 2.1, there are many classifications of corporate culture, as 
suggested by various sources.  Despite the many classifications that exist, they all share 
certain commonalities.  For this reason, not all the classifications of corporate culture will 
be discussed in detail.  This is because the description of the Creative classification, for 
example, shares commonalities with the Prospectors, High risk/fast feedback, 
Achievement and Entrepreneurial classifications.  The classifications as suggested by 
Rowe, Mason, Dickel, Mann and Mockler (1994) will be outlined in depth in Sections 
2.5.1 to 2.5.4.  The various classifications of corporate culture and how they relate to one 
another are illustrated in Table 2.1.      
 
 
 
 
 22
Miles & 
Snow 
(1978) 
Deal & 
Kennedy 
(1982) 
Harrison 
(1993) 
Rowe et al. 
(1994) 
Hellriegel et 
al. 
(2004) 
Prospectors: 
innovative 
High risk / fast 
feedback 
Achievement: 
based on 
competence 
Creative: 
initiates change 
Entrepreneurial: 
risk-taking, 
creativity 
Analysers: in 
search of 
efficiencies 
High risk / slow 
feedback 
Role: based on 
structure 
Productive: 
resists change 
Market: 
competitiveness 
 
Defenders: 
conservative 
beliefs 
Low risk / fast 
feedback 
Support: based 
on relationships 
Supportive: 
responds to 
change 
Clan: tradition, 
loyalty, 
socialization 
Reactors: forced 
to adjust 
Low risk / slow 
feedback 
Power: based on 
strength 
Quality: accepts 
change 
Bureaucratic: 
hierarchical 
coordination, 
rules  
 
Table 2.1 Classifications of corporate culture 
 
 
The four classifications of corporate cultures, namely; Creative, Productive, Supportive 
and Quality, as suggested by Rowe et al. (1994), will be discussed in the following sub-
sections. 
 
  2.5.1 Creative Culture 
In the Creative Culture, employees have a high internal motivation, which 
leads to innovation and entrepreneurialism.  In this culture, the inclination 
is towards risk taking as employees work towards mutually valued goals.  
The Creative Culture initiates change and promotes rapid learning and 
adaptation to change.  The darker side of an achievement culture is that 
employees become competitive towards one another and, for many tasks, 
the end justifies the means.  This often encourages employees to operate 
outside their rules and responsibilities to accomplish the necessary tasks. 
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  2.5.2 Quality Culture 
The Quality Culture is based on effective planning and problem solving.  
Efficient operations are promoted and the time taken to learn a new job is 
reduced by well-designed structures and systems.  Authority and 
responsibility is clearly defined and reduces the need for individual 
decision making.  In a Quality Culture, change is accepted.   
 
  2.5.3 Supportive Culture 
The Supportive Culture is based on relationships and has good internal 
communication and commitment to decisions.  High levels of trust exist 
between individuals and the organisation and this culture is characterized 
by teamwork, cooperation and reinforcement.  A Supportive Culture 
readily accepts change.  A shortcoming of the Supportive Culture is that 
there is a tendency to put the needs of individuals ahead of the needs of 
the organisation 
 
  2.5.4 Productive Culture 
The Productive Culture concentrates on efficiency and consistency.  
Individual efforts are unified behind the vision of the leaders and 
management.  The Productive Culture tends to employ rigid procedures 
and rules and, thereby, reduces conflict within an organisation.  However, 
the downside of a Productive Culture is that dynamic change is often 
stifled and this culture is resistant to change (Rowe, Mason, Dickel, Mann 
& Mockler, 1994, pp 473-474).   
 
It must be emphasized, once more, that despite the classification of corporate culture 
evident in an organisation, it exists at the artifacts, espoused values and shared tacit 
assumptions levels.  As stated previously, there is no correct or incorrect culture, or mix 
of cultures, in an organisation – there is no generically correct culture (Hagberg 
Consulting Group, 2002, online).  It is rather about ensuring that the most suitable culture 
for an organisation is guiding the behaviour of employees.  Typically, one of the 
classifications of corporate culture described in this section is the dominant culture in the 
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organisation.  Together with the dominant culture, it is likely that a few sub-cultures 
could exist in an organisation.  In addition, it is always possible that a counter-culture 
exists that opposes many of the core components of the dominant culture.  The 
relationship between the dominant, sub-cultures and counter-cultures will be explored in 
the following section. 
 
2.6 Dominant Cultures, Sub-cultures and Counter-cultures 
Most organisations have a dominant or central corporate culture that unifies employees.  
In addition to this, it is possible that sub-cultures can coexist with one dominant culture 
and counter-cultures.  The following section will detail dominant, sub-cultures and 
counter-cultures. 
 
Through artifacts, a dominant corporate culture expresses core values that are shared by a 
majority of the organisation’s members (Martin & Siehl, 1983, p 53).  It is pervasive 
throughout the organisation and indicates a high level of cultural integration (Hagberg 
Consulting Group, 2002, online).  A dominant corporate culture exerts a stabilizing force 
on an organisation by encouraging cohesion and organisational commitment among 
employees (Boisnier & Chatman, 2002, online).   
 
Sub-cultures emerge from the dominant corporate culture’s values.  Some of a sub-
culture’s values may conflict with the dominant culture’s values while others may not.  
Sub-cultures represent accepted differences that do not upset the commonality of the 
dominant corporate culture’s values.  Three types of sub-cultures are enhancing, 
orthogonal and counter-culture (Boisnier & Chatman, 2002, online). 
 
Employees who are part of enhancing sub-cultures adhere to dominant corporate culture 
values more enthusiastically than other employees in the rest of the organisation.  
Employees are concerned with fundamental values that are in line with the dominant 
corporate culture. 
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In an orthogonal sub-culture, the employees would simultaneously accept the core values 
of the dominant culture, as well as a set of distinct, but unconflicting values.  Employees 
embrace the essential organisational values but also hold values that are peripheral to 
those of the overarching culture.  
 
However, in contrast to sub-cultures, members of counter-cultures hold opposing values 
and could resist certain aspects of the dominant corporate culture.  In counter-culture 
some core values of the counter-culture present a direct challenge to the core values of a 
dominant corporate culture.  Counter-culture employees hold values that are in conflict 
with the fundamental or pivotal values of the dominant culture and could, ultimately, 
threaten the strength of the overall corporate culture (Martin & Siehl, 1983, pp 53-54).   
 
It may be undesirable and unrealistic to attempt to assimilate all values and beliefs into 
one dominant corporate culture.  It is, therefore, acceptable for sub-cultures to exist in an 
organisation.  However, it is important that a core set of values is common to all sub-
cultures (Hagberg Consulting Group, 2002, online).  If all sub-cultures in an organisation 
have a common set of values, and the culture is beneficial to the organisation, it is 
imperative that this corporate culture is maintained. 
 
2.7 Maintaining a Corporate Culture 
As mentioned previously, corporate culture develops in an organisation over time.  Once 
a corporate culture has developed, there are factors within an organisation that interact to 
maintain it by giving employees a similar set of experiences.  These experiences ensure 
that those hired fit in with the culture, reward those who support it and reprimand those 
who challenge it (Robbins, 1993, p 610).  
 
There are three factors that play an important part in maintaining a culture, namely; the 
selection process, the actions of top management and socialization.  These three factors 
will be discussed in the following sections. 
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The first factor is the selection process.  The explicit goal of the selection process is to 
identify and employ individuals who have the knowledge, skills and abilities to perform 
the jobs within the organisation successfully.  But, typically, more than one candidate 
will be identified who meets any given job’s requirements.  The final decision as to who 
will be employed will be significantly influenced by the decision maker’s judgment of 
how well the candidates will fit into the organisation’s corporate culture. 
 
This attempt to ensure a proper match, whether intentionally or unintentionally, results in 
the employing of people who have values essentially consistent with those of the 
organisation, or, at least, a good portion of those values.  Additionally, the selection 
process provides information to applicants about the organisation and its culture.  
Candidates learn about the corporate culture, and, if they perceive a conflict between 
their values and those of the organisation, they can self-select themselves out of the 
application pool. 
 
Selection, therefore, allows either employer or applicant to discontinue the relationship if 
there appears to be a mismatch in beliefs or values.  In this way, the selection process 
maintains an organisation’s culture by not selecting those individuals who might 
undermine its core values (Robbins, 1993, p 610). 
 
The second factor is the actions of top management.  The actions of top management also 
have a major impact on the organisation’s culture.  Through what is expressed and its 
actions, senior management establishes norms that filter down through the organisation 
(Robbins, 1993, p 611).  The role of senior management in corporate culture will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
The final factor is socialization.  Employees, who have been chosen through the selection 
process, are not, as yet, fully indoctrinated in the organisation’s corporate culture.  New 
employees are likely to disturb the beliefs and customs that are in place.  The 
organisation will, therefore, want to help new employees adapt to its culture.  This 
adaptation process is called socialization (Robbins, 1993, p 612). 
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The most critical socialization stage is at the time of entry into the organisation.  
However, the organisation will be socializing every employee, though maybe not as 
explicitly, throughout his or her entire career in the organisation.  This further contributes 
to sustaining the culture. 
 
Socialization can be further divided into a three-stage process: pre-arrival, encounter and 
metamorphosis.  The first stage, pre-arrival, encompasses all the learning that occurs 
before a new member joins the organisation.  In the second stage, encounter, the new 
employee sees what the organisation is really like and confronts the possibility that 
expectations and reality may be different.  If expectations prove to have been more or less 
accurate, the encounter stage merely provides for a reaffirmation of the perceptions 
gained earlier. 
 
Where expectations and reality differ, the new employees should undergo socialization 
that will detach them from their previous assumptions and replace them with another set 
that the organisation deems desirable.  This leads to the metamorphosis stage.  In this 
third stage, the relatively long-lasting changes take place.  The new employees master the 
skills required for their job and successfully perform their new roles.   
 
The metamorphosis stage of the socialization process impacts on the new employee’s 
work productivity, commitment to the organisation’s objectives and eventual decision to 
stay with the organisation.  The metamorphosis and the entry socialization processes are 
complete when the new member has become comfortable with the organisation and his or 
her job (Robbins, 1993, pp 612-613).   
 
2.8 Conclusion 
Corporate culture is a powerful, underlying, but often misunderstood, force within all 
organisations that contributes to the actions and behaviour of its employees.  In order to 
gain a better insight into corporate culture, various definitions of corporate culture and 
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the types of power found in organisations were examined.  In addition, it was seen that 
diverse classifications of culture exist, but regardless of the classifications of culture, 
each culture exists at the Three Levels of Corporate Culture.  
 
It is vital that the senior management of an organisation understands, and is involved in, 
the shaping of the corporate culture, as it is the corporate culture that helps give the 
organisation its meaning and direction.  It is also vitally important that a corporate culture 
that is contributing to the success of an organisation should be maintained. 
 
The following chapter will investigate the role that management should play in the 
corporate culture of an organisation.  The extent to which senior management should be 
responsible for shaping and moulding the corporate culture will be investigated, as well 
as what management should do to actively supervise the behaviour of employees through 
the corporate culture. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MANAGING THE CORPORATE CULTURE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As stated by Schwartz and Davis, “Getting one’s hand around a company’s culture is like 
putting one’s hands into a cloud”.  Yet, this is what senior management should strive to 
do – understand the corporate culture in its organisation (1981, p 47).   
 
In the previous chapter a comprehensive look was taken at corporate culture and the role 
that it plays in an organisation.  Corporate culture was defined, the Three Levels of 
Corporate Culture were explained, as well as the dominant, sub- and counter-cultures that 
could exist in an organisation.  This chapter will further explore corporate culture by 
investigating the contribution that senior management should be making in the shaping of 
a culture in its organisation. 
 
This chapter will begin by examining the effects of a detrimental corporate culture and 
what management’s role should be in an organisation.  The different management styles 
that result in different organisational environments will be explored, as well as the role 
that policies should play in influencing a corporate culture.  
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, an organisation develops a corporate culture 
whether it is aware of it or not.  An organisation’s culture and its current traditions, and 
general way of doing things are largely due to what it has done before, and the degree of 
success it has had with those endeavors.  As a result, the ultimate source of an 
organisation’s culture is its founders (Robbins, 1993, p 609). 
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When an organisation is first established, the founders and managers are concerned with 
establishing a particular corporate culture.  In the early stages, the organisation’s 
corporate culture is not, as yet, well established and mature and the founders have the 
most impact on an organisation’s early corporate culture.  This is because the founders 
have a vision of what the organisation should be and they are unconstrained by previous 
customs or ideologies.  The founders’ objectives, principles, values and behaviour 
provide important clues as to what is required from employees.  The small size that 
typically characterizes new organisations further facilitates the founders’ imposition of 
their vision on all employees.  Over time, these cultural values and beliefs, established in 
the foundation of the organisation, become embedded in the daily routines of employees.   
 
As the culture continues to evolve, the founders continue to attempt to entrench their own 
assumptions and beliefs in the organisation.  This becomes more and more difficult for 
the founders as, increasingly, the learning process becomes shared amongst all 
employees.  The cultural assumptions begin to reflect, not only the founders’ initial 
assumptions, but also the total group’s experiences.  As such, strong leadership is 
required to sustain a corporate culture that enhances the successful running of an 
organisation (Quick, 1992, p 54; Kilmann, 1985, pp 62-63; Robbins, 1993, pp 609-610; 
Schein, 1990, p 115). 
 
Therefore, management has a vital role to play in the shaping of a corporate culture in its 
organisation.  Corporate culture will become an asset when shared beliefs and values 
generate a high degree of cooperation and commitment that would not necessarily be 
possible otherwise.  This makes the organisation efficient.  However, efficiency does not 
necessarily mean effectiveness.  Efficiency is when something can be done with a 
minimum overhead of resources or with the least waste of effort.  Effectiveness, however, 
is the degree to which the task that is being done is the appropriate or correct thing to do.  
Culture could, therefore, become a liability if it guides behaviour in inappropriate ways 
and there is efficiency but not effectiveness (Sathe, 1983, pp 5, 9-10).    
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3.2 Perpetuation of a Detrimental Corporate Culture 
Unfortunately, in many organisations, senior management does not fully understand the 
culture in its organisation and, consequently, does not play an active role in shaping the 
corporate culture.  Without a comprehensive understanding of the existing culture in its 
organisation, it can be very difficult for management to effectively evaluate whether new 
policies and strategies will be compatible with its corporate culture (Bettinger, 1989, p 
38).   
 
If the culture is not understood by management and, consequently, not managed properly, 
the corporate culture could actually be working against the goals of an organisation and 
could be detrimental to the organisation.  Aspects of a corporate culture that could be 
detrimental to an organisation include, but are not limited to, miscommunication, lack of 
cooperation from employees, lack of commitment to the organisation and a great sense of 
complacency about the organisation’s performance (Sathe, 1983, p 10; Tan, 2001, 
online).   
 
Miscommunication is a common factor in everyday life and becomes even more complex 
in organisations.  Miscommunication could occur between employees, but more 
importantly, between management and its employees.  Even though establishing a 
corporate culture will not eliminate miscommunication completely, it does reduce the 
possibility that the members of an organisation will misunderstand one another.  
Corporate culture enables this in two ways.  Firstly, there is no need to communicate 
things about which shared beliefs and values exist.  Secondly, shared beliefs and values 
assist employees in interpreting the messages from senior management in the same way 
(Sathe, 1983, p 10).      
 
A lack of cooperation from employees is a further sign of an unfavorable corporate 
culture.  Management may force employees to comply with its policies through 
rewarding correct behaviour and disciplining incorrect behaviours.  While this approach 
may succeed in trying to change or shape the culture, as will be discussed in Section 3.6, 
management cannot anticipate all the contingencies that could arise in its organisation.  
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When an unexpected contingency arises, management should rely on the cooperation of 
the employee to adhere to what is best for the organisation.  The degree of true 
cooperation on the part of employees is influenced by shared beliefs and values, or, in 
other words, the corporate culture (Sathe, 1983, pp 10-11). 
 
Another indicator of a detrimental corporate culture is where employees have a lack of 
commitment to their organisation.  Employees will only feel a sense of commitment to 
management’s vision and objectives if they identify with them.  The shared beliefs and 
values of a corporate culture help develop this identification and sense of commitment to 
an organisation (Sathe, 1983, p 11).  Factors that further encourage the commitment of 
employees to an organisation will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
In an organisation with a corporate culture that is potentially detrimental, employees are 
reactive, taking little initiative to change and improve, and they adopt the ‘wait for the 
top’ attitude, while senior management is slow in taking action against non-performers in 
the organisation.  A significant indicator of a detrimental corporate culture is where 
senior management is apathetic towards the corporate culture and does not implement 
change (Tan, 2001, online). 
 
If management is apathetic, the employees will exhibit a sense of complacency as well.  
Management may have a vision, but because of complacency, this vision remains part of 
the espoused values of the organisation and not the shared tacit assumptions.  To instill a 
more beneficial corporate culture in an organisation, the espoused values and shared tacit 
assumptions should be aligned with one another.  However, if nothing is done to achieve 
the alignment of the espoused values and shared tacit assumptions levels of corporate 
culture, the detrimental corporate culture will be perpetuated through socialization.  
Therefore, as discussed in Chapter 2, new employees joining the organisation will, 
through socialization, be indoctrinated into the detrimental corporate culture and the 
miscommunication, lack of cooperation from employees, lack of commitment to the 
organisation and complacency will be continued. 
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Therefore, it is vital for the vision and goals of senior management, expressed at the 
espoused values level, to be aligned with the beliefs and values of employees, expressed 
at the shared tacit assumptions level.  Furthermore, senior management should have the 
influence and authority to achieve the alignment of these two levels.  To achieve this 
alignment, senior management has certain tasks to perform.  The next section will focus 
on these tasks that senior management should execute in its organisation.  
 
3.3 Management’s Role in an Organisation 
The alignment of the espoused values and shared tacit assumptions levels of corporate 
culture should be undertaken by the management of an organisation.  These levels should 
be aligned to ensure that the vision of senior management becomes part of the corporate 
culture.  As will be discussed in the following section, creating the vision for an 
organisation is a corporate governance duty of senior management.  The senior 
management of an organisation has many responsibilities as part of its corporate 
governance duties in increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of its organisation.  
These duties, the pillars of corporate governance and risk management will be discussed 
in the following section. 
 
Corporate governance is a modern expression for an issue which organisations have faced 
for decades – that of ‘accountability’.  At its most basic level, corporate governance is 
about how those entrusted with day-to-day management of an organisation’s affairs are 
held to account for their decisions and actions and whether the organisation has the 
appropriate corporate structures to strengthen accountability.  Accountability is an 
essential pillar in building and supporting corporate governance in an organisation.  
Together with accountability, three other pillars, equally essential to corporate 
governance, are recommended by South Africa’s King II Report.  These are 
responsibility, fairness and transparency (Brooks, 1997, online; King Report, 2001, p 17) 
and will be discussed briefly. 
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The first pillar of accountability ensures that individuals or groups in an organisation who 
make decisions and take actions are answerable for them.  Mechanisms must exist in an 
organisation to allow for accountability.  This provides investors with the means to 
question and evaluate the actions and decisions of senior management (King Report, 
2001, p 14).  The second pillar of responsibility, with regard to senior management, 
allows corrective action and counteracts mismanagement and misconduct.  Responsible 
senior management would, when required, put in place what it would take to provide the 
guidance necessary in making the organisation effective and efficient.  While the Board is 
answerable to the organisation, it must act responsively to and with responsibility 
towards all shareholders of the organisation.  The third pillar of fairness ensures that 
systems within an organisation are balanced and take into account all those that have an 
interest in the organisation.  The rights of various groups must be acknowledged and 
respected for fairness to be evident in an organisation.  The final pillar of transparency is 
a measure of how good senior management is at making essential information available 
in an accurate and opportune manner.  Transparency reflects whether or not investors 
attain a factual picture of what is happening inside the organisation (King Report, 2001, p 
14). 
 
One of the main duties of the managing director, together with senior management, is to 
set a clear vision and strategic direction for the organisation in a responsible manner that 
is accountable to stakeholders and ensures the protection of the assets and the reputation 
of its organisation (King Report, 2001, pp 45-47).  According to the King II Report on 
corporate governance, senior management must lead its organisation through ‘direction-
giving’ and strategy implementation.  ‘Direction-giving’ is achieved through the creation 
and implementation of management policies (Planting, 2001, online; King Report, 2001, 
p 46).  Consequently, senior management should ensure that policies and procedures are 
in place in the organisation to provide direction and the protection of assets.  In doing so, 
the principles of corporate governance are adhered to.  Management policies and their 
effect on corporate culture will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.4.   
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In addition, an organisation’s policies should assist in management’s corporate 
governance duty of risk management.  Corporate governance can be viewed as an 
organisation’s strategic reaction to mitigating unavoidable risks, in exchange for 
measurable rewards.  As mentioned previously, senior management should provide 
strategic direction, while being mindful of the restraining forces that hinder the 
realisation of the vision (Charlton, 2000, p 42).  These restraining forces are known as 
risks.  A risk is an uncertainty about a potential event, or the possibility that a negative 
event is going to occur without an organisation being equipped to handle it (The Alliance, 
2001, online; King Report, 2001, p 96).  Risk management is necessary to mitigate the 
risks that an organisation could face.  These risks may impede the attainment of the 
vision expressed at the espoused values level of corporate culture.  Risk management can 
be defined as the identification and assessment of potential risks facing an organisation 
and encompasses all the collective processes used to decide what risks to avoid, control 
or accept.  It is management’s responsibility to establish the acceptable level of risk 
necessary to pursue the growth of its organisation (King Report, 2001, p 97).   
 
This section detailed the essential functions that senior management should perform in 
the organisation as part of its good corporate governance duties.  As discussed in this 
section, an organisation’s policies should assist senior management in the achievement of 
acceptable corporate governance in an organisation.  The role of policies in an 
organisation is discussed in the following section.  
 
3.4 The Role of Policies in an Organisation 
As discussed in the previous section, senior management should be held accountable for 
developing and communicating a clear and concise vision of the future for an 
organisation.  The vision, and associated strategic direction, should also enable the 
organisation to compete.  This vision might imply that, currently, the existing corporate 
culture does not require any change, as a natural evolution of the corporate culture will be 
sufficient to realise senior management’s vision.  Conversely, the vision might 
necessitate a slight, or extensive, change in the corporate culture of an organisation 
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(Beach, 1993, p 17; Charlton, 2000, p 42; Tan, 2001, online).  Further, senior 
management’s vision is implemented through the policies of an organisation. 
 
The core objective of any policy, and the resulting procedures, is to influence and 
determine the decisions, actions and behaviour of employees by specifying what 
behaviour is acceptable and what behaviour is unacceptable (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, 
p 194).  As such, organisational policies and procedures are necessary as guidelines to 
help employees do a consistently good job for their organisation (Drennan, 1992, p 23).     
 
An organisation’s corporate culture should be an important consideration for senior 
management when developing policies.  For example, policies with substantial 
restrictions in an ‘open’ corporate culture will most likely encounter resistance from 
employees.  The workplace is more than merely a place where people work.  It is a place 
where people congregate, not only to perform their assigned work, but to socialise and 
exchange ideas about their jobs and their lives (Hare, 2004, p 925).  Therefore, corporate 
culture should be a concern of senior management when developing policies.  The role of 
senior management should, however, go beyond setting the vision and developing 
policies for the organisation.  Management should communicate and change the mindsets 
of employees to win their commitment towards the change, or new direction, of the 
organisation.  Management should address the critical shared values and beliefs the 
employees must possess in order to achieve the organisation’s vision.  By changing the 
shared values and beliefs of employees, senior management should address the shared 
tacit assumptions level of employees and, ultimately, the behaviour of employees (Tan, 
2001, online). 
 
As seen in Chapter 2, corporate culture should be maintained through the socialization 
process.  New employees move through the pre-arrival stage, where the espoused values 
of the organisation are described in detail to them and on to the encounter stage.  In the 
encounter stage, these new employees are exposed to the reality of the organisation and 
the behaviour of their peers, which may or may not agree with the organisation’s 
espoused values.  If the actions of fellow employees match the espoused values and 
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related policies of the organisation, this contributes to sustaining the corporate culture as 
the new employees will ‘take their cue’ from their peers.  Likewise, if fellow employees’ 
behaviour does not match the organisation’s policies, the new employees will soon match 
the behaviour that is in contradiction to the organisation’s policies.  Similarly, senior 
management’s attitude towards the policies of the organisation plays a large part in the 
acceptance of the policies.  This is because employee behaviour is essentially driven by 
the urge to conform to expectations.  If senior management treats policies and procedures 
as being inconsequential then the employee will treat the process with the same contempt.  
On the other hand, if management expressly describes what is expected in detail and 
continually expresses how imperative the policies and procedures are, then employees 
should follow suit (Drennan, 1992, p 17). 
 
The actions and behaviour of employees will also be affected by the organisational 
environment evident in an organisation.  The three general organisational environments 
that could exist within an organisation’s corporate culture, namely; Coercive, Utilitarian 
and Goal Consensus, will be detailed in the following section. 
 
3.5 Organisational Environments within an Organisation’s Corporate 
Culture 
There are generally three key environments that could exist in organisations.  These 
environments dictate how the organisation is run and how employees react in certain 
circumstances.  These environments are Coercive, Utilitarian and Goal Consensus 
Environments (Schein, 1992, online).   
  
The Coercive Environment is one where employees feel alienated in their environment 
and seek to leave it if possible.  Typically, it is condign power that is exerted in the 
Coercive Environment.  As a result, peer relationships in this environment develop in 
defence of the authority in the organisation, in other words, senior management.  These 
employees perform tasks because they are obliged to do so, rather than because they 
agree with the actions and decisions of senior management (Schein, 1992, online).   
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The Utilitarian Environment is one where employees participate in their organisation by 
evolving workgroups based on an incentive system.  In this environment, employees will 
do as senior management wishes because of the rewards that they will receive as a result 
of compensatory power.  They still do not necessarily agree with senior management 
(Schein, 1992, online).   
 
The third organisational environment, the Goal Consensus Environment, is one where 
employees are morally involved with the organisation.  They identify with the 
organisation, share the same beliefs and values of senior management and they are 
striving towards the vision of senior management.  In this environment, employees’ 
actions are not as a result of being forced to do so or because of a reward, but because 
they are in agreement with the way things are done in the organisation (Schein, 1992, 
online).  Conditioned power is predominant in this environment.  This Goal Consensus 
Environment could be seen as a corporate culture which is in line with the vision of 
senior management.  This would mean that ‘right’ decisions and actions of employees 
become second-nature and part of their culture (Schein, 1999, pp 15-17).   
 
These organisational environments affect the entire organisation and influence the 
behaviour of employees and will be discussed further in relation to the Three Levels of 
Corporate Culture in Chapter 5.  The alignment of the corporate culture with the vision of 
senior management, as is evident in the Goal Consensus Environment, is easier said than 
done, however.  As mentioned in Chapter 2, many of the essential components of 
corporate culture are, in essence, invisible and particularly complex to change.  The 
subsequent section will detail the fundamental components of corporate culture that must 
be addressed to encourage culture change. 
 
3.6 Changing the Corporate Culture 
Employee attitudes are fundamentally an artifact or result of the corporate culture 
environment in which they work.  External conditions may have an influence on the 
behaviour and attitude of employees as well.  For example, if unemployment is on the 
increase and employees feel they need to protect their jobs, they may provisionally 
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become more amenable and supportive.  Nevertheless, the environment which has the 
most influence on employee attitude and behaviour is the internal environment.  
Therefore, the power to change corporate culture is largely senior management’s 
responsibility (Drennan, 1992, pp 3-4). 
 
One of the most stable aspects of an organisation is the corporate culture, and because of 
this, transforming it is a complex task.  Corporate culture cannot be addressed directly by 
simply issuing slogans or making speeches.  Changing the culture involves having to 
unlearn beliefs and assumptions and learn new ones.  The attitudes, values and behaviour 
of employees in an organisation should also change to foster the development of the 
culture.  Employees, however, are opposed to change because unlearning is 
uncomfortable and creates apprehension.  Further, employees prefer structure and a 
known framework within which to work, so that they can adapt their behaviour to 
manage their environment successfully.  Anxiety will arise if this framework requires 
change.  Employees can be coerced into changing their overt behaviour, but such 
behaviour change is not stable unless the deeper levels undergo transformation (Schein, 
1999, p 26; Drennan, 1992, p 4).  Therefore, it is vital that the shared tacit assumptions 
level of corporate culture, detailed in Chapter 2, is addressed when attempting culture 
change. 
 
Both the articulation and communication of a clear vision for an organisation is essential 
in developing a strategy for change.  Until senior management formulates a clear vision 
and persuades employees to be dedicated to that vision, they will not be able to generate 
the enthusiasm and resources needed for significant cultural change (Hellriegel et al, 
2004, p 372). 
 
Once the vision has been formulated, senior management’s role in changing corporate 
culture, at a minimum, should be to demonstrate clear, visible actions in support of the 
organisation’s cultural values.  Employees need to know what is important, and one way 
for employees to gain this information is to observe and pay attention to those in higher 
positions.  The culture of an organisation is not formed by what management preaches or 
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publishes, but what it accepts in practice.  When senior management not only espouses 
that something is important, but also consistently behaves to support this message, 
employees will begin to believe what is espoused (Drennan, 1992, p 3).    
  
An additional means to change and shape the corporate culture is to instill a 
comprehensive reward system in an organisation.  Many organisations have a system of 
punishing divergent behaviour that is not in line with organisational policies.  The focus 
is on negative reinforcement.  Other organisations identify behaviour that supports the 
organisation’s objectives and rewards that behaviour in positive ways.  The focus is on 
positive reinforcement.  It is generally considered that positive reinforcement is far more 
effective than negative reinforcement.  However, this reward system should not merely 
be monetary rewards, but should rather focus on acknowledgment and approval of correct 
behaviour.  There should not be any ambiguity about what management espouses and 
what behaviour is rewarded, as is often the case.  For example, management might 
espouse that it supports innovation, but even the slightest failure is punished, which does 
not encourage innovation at all.  Therefore, if there are inconsistencies between what 
senior management espouses and what is actually rewarded, employees will be confused 
(Bettinger, 1989, p 40).      
 
Even though changing an organisation’s culture is extremely difficult, the corporate 
culture can be changed.  Culture change is most likely to take place when one or more of 
the following conditions exist (Robbins, 1993, p 625): 
    
• Dramatic crisis  
A dramatic crisis is a shock that undermines the status quo of the organisation 
and questions the relevance of the current corporate culture.  The existing 
corporate culture is seen as inadequate, and management and employees see a 
need for a more suitable corporate culture.  A crisis could include an 
unforeseen financial setback or loss of a major customer.   
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• Turnover in leadership  
As discussed previously, senior management should play a large role in 
shaping the corporate culture of its organisation.  Usually, if there is a change 
in the management of an organisation, there is a shift in its vision and values.  
It is possible that the new management may be perceived as more capable 
than previous leadership, and the new vision and values are accepted. 
 
• Young and small organisation  
The corporate culture of an organisation will be less entrenched if an 
organisation is still in its formative years.  The younger the organisation, the 
simpler it will be to change the trajectory of the corporate culture.  Similarly, 
it is easier for management to communicate its vision and values to employees 
when the organisation is small. 
 
• Weak culture  
Over time, a corporate culture stabilises and becomes embedded in the 
organisation.  The more widely held a culture is, and the higher the agreement 
among members on its values, the more difficult it will be to change.  
Conversely, weak cultures are more amenable to change than strong ones. 
 
In addition to these conditions, a culture change may be forced in organisations if a 
merger occurs between two organisations with two distinct corporate cultures.  
Unfortunately, the compatibility of the two organisations’ corporate cultures usually only 
becomes a consideration once the merger has taken place.  The failure to successfully 
integrate two differing cultures could cause the financial results to fall below expectations 
(Bettinger, 1989, p 38).   
 
This leads, in many cases, to what Schein refers to as cultural ‘indigestion’ and to 
corporate cultures that cannot successfully be integrated.  When merging, organisations 
must avoid reaching agreement at the artifacts and espoused values level only, while 
disagreeing at the shared tacit assumptions level.  However, even if the shared tacit 
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assumptions are mostly in agreement, conflict is inevitable when the corporate culture of 
two organisations merge.  Each culture must change to some extent, and the process of 
adjusting to the merger is known as acculturation (Schein, 1990, p 117; Malekzadeh & 
Nahavandi, 1990, p 56).  There are four general methods of acculturation: namely, 
Integration, Assimilation, Separation and Deculturation (Malekzadeh & Nahavandi, 
1990, pp 56-57), which will be discussed in the following subsections. 
  
• Integration 
This first method of acculturation is integration.  With this method, there is a 
rather balanced exchange of cultural and managerial practices between the 
merger partners, and neither of the two corporate cultures is imposed on the 
other.  This method is common when the two organisations have much in 
common.   
 
• Assimilation 
The second method of acculturation is assimilation.  This method results in 
one organisation’s corporate culture dominating the other – but the 
domination is not forced.  Instead it is welcomed by the employees of the non-
dominant organisation, who may believe that their current corporate culture 
and practices are not favourable for success.  In other words, the non-
dominant organisation has a weak culture and, as mentioned previously, weak 
cultures are more open to change. 
 
• Separation 
The third method of acculturation is separation.  With this method, the 
corporate cultures of both organisations remain separate with restricted 
cultural and managerial exchange.  The key for the separation method to 
succeed is for the organisation that is acquiring the other to allow its 
acquisition a high degree of independence and only enforce essential cultural 
features. 
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• Deculturation 
The fourth method of acculturation is deculturation.  Of all the methods, it is 
this one that is the most destructive.  Unfortunately, it is also the method that 
is used most often.  This method involves the disintegration of one of the 
organisation’s corporate cultures, as a result of intense pressure from the 
dominant organisation to conform to its culture and practices.  This method is 
usually accompanied by a high amount of confusion and conflict. 
 
Regardless of the ultimate goal, changing the corporate culture of an organisation takes 
dedication and time.  There must be commitment at all levels of the organisation, from 
management to employees, in order for change to be accomplished.  If nothing changes in 
the procedures of the organisation, or the attitudes of its management, employee attitudes 
will not change either (Drennan, 1992, p 3).  The most profound culture change takes 
place when employees buy into the vision and strategies of senior management. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
Senior management has a significant role to play in shaping the corporate culture in its 
organisation.  In order to address the corporate culture, senior management must ensure 
that correct corporate governance practices are entrenched in its organisation.  The pillars 
of accountability, responsibility, fairness and transparency are necessary to ensure good 
corporate governance.  In addition, as part of management’s duties, an organisational 
vision must be expressed in management policies.  These policies should be enforced to 
assist management in curbing incorrect behaviour in its organisation and, ultimately, 
change the corporate culture.   
 
Transforming the corporate culture, however, takes time and perseverance.  Unlearning 
beliefs and changing the attitudes of employees can be a painful process.  Further, it is 
senior management’s task to lead this transformation in attitude by setting an example, so 
that the change can ‘filter down’ throughout the organisation.  If management 
demonstrates that the need for changing the ‘way things are done’ is vital to the 
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sustainability of the organisation, it will highlight and encourage the change in corporate 
culture. 
 
The sustainability of many organisations is largely dependent on the protection of its 
information assets.  The subsequent chapter will detail the realities of information 
security in many organisations and both the human and management aspects of 
information security. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE MANAGEMENT AND THE HUMAN 
DIMENSION OF INFORMATION SECURITY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Thomas Jefferson stated that maintaining freedom requires ‘eternal vigilance’.  When it 
comes to a society where information is its lifeblood, maintaining privacy and security of 
information requires no less (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p 103; Gordon, 2002, online). 
 
The previous chapter examined the role that the senior management of an organisation 
should play in shaping the corporate culture in its organisation.  The foundation and 
evolution of a corporate culture was investigated and the influence that the corporate 
culture has on the behaviour and actions of employees was explored.  
    
This chapter will investigate the realities of information security in most organisations 
and the important role that information security should be playing in protecting one of the 
most essential assets of an organisation.  Moreover the crucial effect that employee 
behaviour and actions have on the success of information security in an organisation will 
be analyzed.  The role of senior management in the development of a Corporate 
Information Security Policy, and the effect it should have on an information security 
culture will be explored, as well as the common misconceptions that senior management 
has concerning information security. 
 
4.2 Information Security Facts 
“Many UK businesses are a long way from having a security-aware culture”.  This is 
according to PriceWaterhouseCoopers’ Information Security Breaches Survey (ISBS) 
2006.  In numerous organisations, very little emphasis is placed on the protection of 
information and the expenditure on security is low.  Two-fifths of organisations spend 
 46
less than one percent of their IT budget on information security.  Further, even though 
three times as many organisations have security policies than six years ago, three-fifths of 
all organisations are still without an overall security policy.  There does, however, seem 
to be a correlation between the priority senior management gives to information security 
and the existence of a Corporate Information Security Policy.  In 55 percent of 
organisations where senior management views security as having a high priority, a policy 
exists, whereas only 13 percent of those organisations that see security as a low priority 
have a policy.  The role of senior management in information security will be explored in 
more detail later in this chapter.    
 
Information security should be a senior management concern as an organisation and its 
reputation can be severely tarnished if its information security procedures are perceived 
as being inadequate or unsatisfactory (Freeman, 2004, p 917).  The average cost of the 
worst security incident for large organisations ranged from £65,000 to £130,000, while 
smaller organisations’ cost ranged from £8,000 to £17,000.  Of this total cost, £5,000 to 
£10,000 in large organisations, and £100 to £400 in smaller organisations, was as a result 
of damage to reputation.  Overall, the cost of security breaches in United Kingdom 
organisations has increased over the past two years and is in the order of ten billion 
pounds (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2006, online). 
 
When it comes to the human side of information security, one in eight organisations does 
nothing to educate their employees about security responsibilities.  In addition, 
recruitment processes at a quarter of the organisations do not include any background 
checks on potential employees and, of those organisations that believe security is a very 
high priority, 19 percent do not perform background checks (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 
2006, online).  These facts emphasise the impact that information security breaches could 
have on an organisation and the often insufficient attention that is paid to the human side 
of information security.   
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4.3 The Protection of Information Assets 
Where once computers and technology were regarded with trepidation and mistrust, they 
are now firmly embedded in the structure of industry and commerce.  It is now 
understood that there are two keys to effective technology use.  One is managing the 
information.  The other is ensuring that information remains secure.  The value of 
information to an organisation cannot be overemphasised, especially in a contemporary 
knowledge based economy.  Information is probably the most valuable asset of most 
organisations (Sharp, 2004, p 768). 
 
As one of the most important assets of an organisation, information must be properly 
protected.  Although there are six pillars of information security as defined by the ISO 
standard, namely: confidentiality, integrity, availability, nonrepudiation, assurance and 
auditing, the focus of this research will be on the more traditional ones, i.e. 
confidentiality, integrity and availability.  These three pillars of confidentiality, integrity 
and availability are briefly described in the following subsections. 
 
4.3.1 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality, with regards to information security, is concerned with 
ensuring that information of a specific classification is not distributed to 
persons outside the category for which it is classified.  Confidentiality 
ensures that sensitive information is prevented from being disclosed to 
unauthorised parties (Krige, 1999, p 8; Bruce & Dempsey, 1997, pp 36-
37). 
 
4.3.2 Integrity 
Integrity is concerned with the quality and reliability of information, such 
that management can be assured that information on which decisions are 
based has not been modified dishonestly or otherwise.  Integrity means 
that an asset or information can only be modified by authorised parties or 
only in authorised ways (Krige, 1999, p 9; Bruce & Dempsey, 1997, p 37). 
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4.3.3 Availability 
Availability is concerned with guaranteeing the availability of systems and 
information on a timely basis such that strategic and business decisions 
can be effected as rapidly as possible.  In the event that systems or data are 
unavailable, opportunities may be lost, deadlines missed or commitments 
defaulted.  Even if the information is exactly what is needed to meet 
business requirements, it must be available to complete the task in a 
reasonable time (Bruce & Dempsey, 1997, p 41). 
 
It is vital that these three pillars are ensured as the protection of the information assets of 
an organisation takes on a slightly different dimension compared to other assets.  When 
money or goods are stolen, somebody will notice they are gone.  When information is 
stolen, most of the time no one will notice because the information is still in their 
possession (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p 140).  It is difficult to estimate the exact value of 
the information assets of an organisation.  However, if the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information are not protected, it could lead to the depreciation of shares, 
loss of customer confidence in the organisation and irreversible damage to the 
organisation’s reputation (Zylt, 2001, online).  Therefore, the protection of information 
should lead to the protection of the organisation as a whole.  An aspect of information 
security that must be considered is that security breaches do not only occur from external 
sources.  Many security incidents occur within an organisation due to careless internal 
security or because organisations have the incorrect impression that all employees are 
adhering to the correct information security practices (Zylt, 2001, online).   
   
The aim of information security should never be to secure an organisation absolutely, as 
this will almost always lead to failure.  The aim of information security should be to 
ensure an adequate level of information security that is sustainable, such that information 
assets are protected and kept safe, and to ensure information is valuable to the 
organisation (Deloitte & Touche, 2002, online).  Further, information is valuable in 
proportion to its timely availability and, in most cases, to its secure availability (Sharp, 
2004, p 768). 
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However - even if the best physical and technical controls have been put in place in an 
organisation to ensure the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the information – it 
is not guaranteed that the information will be secure.  As Kevin D. Mitnick says in his 
book ‘The Art of Deception – Controlling the Human Element of Security’ (2002, p 79) – 
“Don’t rely on network safeguards and firewalls to protect your information.  Look to 
your most vulnerable spot.  You’ll usually find that vulnerability lies in your people”.   
 
4.4 Human Factor of Information Security 
An organisation’s employees are considered a corporate resource and asset, requiring 
constant care and management in their daily activities.  For the majority of these 
employees, their first priority at work is to get the job done.  As a result of the pressure 
related to an employee’s job, any tasks that are not deemed essential to ‘getting things 
done’ are often overlooked or regarded as hindrances.  Therefore, if employees see 
security as something that is an obstacle to their work, they might not take on proper 
responsibilities, and worse, might go out of their way to find a ‘workaround’ to any 
security measure they do not consider necessary (Freeman, 2004, p 917; Mitnick & 
Simon, 2002, p 72; Shorten, 2004, p 924). 
 
In addition, the security industry appears to have overlooked the fact that computers and 
related technologies are simply tools, and that it is humans that are using, configuring, 
installing and, often, abusing these tools.  This is because the security industry has mainly 
been focused on hardware, software and technical aspects of security (Berti & Rogers, 
2004, p 147).  Technologists have systematically developed information security 
solutions to minimise the risks connected with the use of computers.  However, they have 
not sufficiently addressed the most important vulnerability, the human factor.  The human 
part of any information security solution is the most essential.  Almost all information 
security solutions rely on the human element to a large degree and employees continue to 
be the most severe threat to information security (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p 8; Berti and 
Rogers, 2004, pp 150-151).  Therefore, information security should be more than just 
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implementing an assortment of technical controls.  It should also address the behaviour 
and resulting actions of employees (Berti & Rogers, 2004, p 147).   
 
In order to safeguard its information assets it is imperative for organisations to stimulate a 
corporate culture that promotes employee loyalty, high morale, and job satisfaction.  
Through the corporate culture, employees should be aware of the need for protecting 
information and of the ways inappropriate actions could affect the organisation’s success 
(Freeman, 2004, p 922).  It is vital to get employees committed to and knowledgeable 
about their roles and responsibilities with regard to information assets.  Further, it is 
imperative for senior management to create, enforce and commit to a sound security 
program (Henry, 2004, p 663).  
 
Instilling a sound security program and making employees knowledgeable about their 
information security responsibilities will, in most cases, make employees more aware of 
the threats facing the information assets.  If employees are unaware of their security 
responsibilities and are not alert to the threats facing information assets, this human 
vulnerability could be exploited.  An example of this exploitation is social engineering.  
The widely accepted definition of social engineering is “successful or unsuccessful 
attempts to influence a person(s) into either revealing information or acting in a manner 
that would result in unauthorized access, unauthorized use, or unauthorized disclosure, to 
an information system, network or data” (Berti & Rogers, 2004, p 148). 
 
It is often said that the only secure computer is an unplugged one.  However, through 
skillful, clever techniques, a social engineer could persuade someone to plug the 
computer in and switch it on.  Social engineering concentrates on the weakest link in the 
information security chain and, as a result, the computer, and the information it houses, is 
still vulnerable.  The more aware employees are, however, the less likely a social 
engineer will succeed.   
 
Becoming a victim of a social engineering attack has nothing to do with intelligence, but 
has everything to do with being human and not having the correct mindset and training to 
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recognise this type of attack (Berti & Rogers, 2004, p 148).  In addition to human nature, 
rapid advances in technology have made the business environment favourable for social 
engineering attacks.  It is not unusual to have never met the people that one deals with on 
a regular basis and face-to-face communication is becoming more scarce.  In addition to 
this, people are usually trusting, cooperative and eager to help.  However, it is often this 
eagerness to help out a co-worker with a problem that is an issue.  On the one hand, this 
cooperation and aid is part of what ensures successful business practices.  While, on the 
other hand, this helpfulness can be a major vulnerability that a social engineer will 
attempt to exploit (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p 89; Berti & Rogers, 2004, p 148).  It is 
vital, therefore, that employees know their information security responsibilities and are 
alert to any potential attacks or attempted security breaches. 
 
Since information security in an organisation is only as good as the people implementing 
it, senior management needs to enlist the support of every employee in the organisation.  
Much of this support can be accomplished through understanding.  When employees 
understand why security is needed the atmosphere and environment will lead to greater 
security and trust (Henry, 2004, p 675).  In other words, the corporate culture in an 
organisation should evolve to become more security conscious to ensure employees are 
no longer a significant threat to information assets. 
 
4.5 Information Security as Part of the Corporate Culture 
As seen in the previous section, it is often the behaviour and actions of employees that 
are the weakest link in the information security chain in an organisation.  Furthermore, 
given that even seemingly innocuous information in the hands of a malicious person 
could be exploited to obtain the key to an organisation’s most valued secrets, employees 
should be alert to possible threats to an organisation’s information (Martins & Eloff, 
2002, p 204; Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p 29).  
 
Many information technology professionals have the mistaken belief that their 
organisations are impervious to attack as they have deployed security features such as 
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authentication, intrusion detection and firewalls.  Likewise, as many aspects of 
information security involve technology, many employees believe that security issues are 
being handled by firewalls and other security technologies deployed by the information 
technology professionals at their organisation.  However, the reality is that most 
employees are the ‘front line’ required to protect the overall security of the organisation 
(Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p 250).   
 
Employees must learn to fully appreciate that a severe loss of sensitive corporate 
information could not only jeopardise the organisation, but their own personal 
information and jobs as well.  It is vital that employees realise the importance of 
protecting information assets and the role that they should be playing in the security of 
information.  Employees who do not fully understand their roles are very often apathetic 
to information security and may be enticed to overlook or simply ignore their security 
responsibilities.      
 
To be genuinely effective information security needs to become part of the way every 
employee conducts his or her daily business (Deloitte & Touche, 2002, online).  
Information security should become an organisational lifestyle that is driven from the top.       
 
In order for information security to become part of the daily activities of an organisation, 
it is imperative that information security concepts and practices become part of an 
organisation’s corporate culture.  Senior management has an important part to play in 
cultivating the corporate culture in its organisation.  This topic is discussed in the 
following section. 
 
4.6 Management’s Role in Shaping an Information Security 
Conscious Corporate Culture 
One of the common complaints from security professionals is related to the fact that they 
feel management does not understand, or properly appreciate, the problems related to 
ensuring the protection of an organisation’s information (Hall, 2001, online).  This could 
be as a result of the fact that senior management can normally only allocate a limited 
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amount of time and consideration to information security.  As a consequence, 
management’s attention is often limited to a small set of acute threats and 
countermeasures that relate to the issues of the day.  More comprehensive security 
measures are often not paid the attention they deserve as management is not aware of 
their importance to the organisation (Buren, van der Meer, Shahim, Barnhoorn & Roos 
Lindgreen, 1999, p 76).   
 
However, as emphasised by Deloitte & Touche, “Information security requires a whole-
hearted organisational commitment of resources (financial, human and technological) to 
an enterprise-wide program designed to evolve and adapt to new dangers” (2002, online).  
Therefore, senior management should not just be made aware of the need to protect 
information.  The organisational commitment to information security should be driven by 
senior management and a great deal of emphasis should be placed on the employees of an 
organisation to highlight their role in protecting information. 
 
Conscientious and suitably educated employees can be one of the strongest links in an 
organisation’s information security infrastructure.  Employees can respond rapidly, 
absorb new information and react in inventive ways to new situations, whereas a 
machine, and the related technology, is constrained by the rules which it has been given.  
Conversely, a machine will enforce a rule it does not understand, while employees will 
not implement a rule they do not believe in (Henry, 2004, p 663).  This is an important 
consideration for senior management when attempting to shape an Information Security 
Conscious Corporate Culture in its organisation.  
 
As described in Chapter 3, corporate policies play a large role in shaping the corporate 
culture in an organisation.  Policies are instrumental in forming a ‘rules of behaviour’ for 
employees as they define what is allowed and what is not allowed in the corporate 
context.  It follows that the Corporate Information Security Policy should do exactly that.  
The policy, and associated procedures, must clearly define appropriate and inappropriate 
behaviour in the context of protecting information assets (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p 73; 
Fenton & Wolfe, 2004, p 888).  
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A Corporate Information Security Policy needs to be created in order to provide 
guidelines for the correct handling and release of information considered critical and 
sensitive within an organisation.  A Corporate Information Security Policy should also 
make management’s attitude to any actions that threaten the security of information 
assets explicit (Robiette, 2001, online; Berti & Rogers, 2004, p 154).  The Corporate 
Information Security Policy, and the related procedures, should outline for employees 
what actions are permissible, what actions are not permissible, what they must do, and 
what their responsibilities are towards information assets (Shorten, 2004, p 917).  If an 
organisation’s Corporate Information Security Policy leaves an issue unaddressed, 
employees may use the ‘path of least resistance’ and take whatever action is most 
convenient for them (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p 193). 
 
To be effective, information security must span the entire organisation — from the top to 
the bottom, from the managers to the end users.  A successful Corporate Information 
Security Policy requires the leadership, commitment, and active participation of senior 
management (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p 7; Berti & Rogers, 2004, p 152).  As a result, 
senior management has specific responsibilities in the development and the 
implementation of the Corporate Information Security Policy.  Firstly, senior 
management must clearly articulate its vision for information security in the policy.  As 
seen in Chapter 3, the foundation for any policy is the vision of senior management.  This 
is particularly true in the case of information security.  An information security vision 
should not be unattainable or unrealistic, but should rather be to achieve an adequate 
level of information protection that is sustainable.  Complete, 100 percent security is not, 
and never should be, the goal – this vision will never be realised (Henry, 2004, p 664; 
Deloitte & Touche, 2002, online).  Secondly, senior management must explicitly 
communicate the policy to the entire organisation.  Communication is, arguably, the key 
to the accomplishment of a thriving information security infrastructure.  The Corporate 
Information Security Policy should convey the corporate attitude towards information 
security and senior management must ensure that it is leading by example in information 
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security practices.  Lastly, senior management must ensure that the necessary resources 
are available for the implementation of the policy (Hare, 2004, p 926).  
 
If the Corporate Information Security Policy is communicated properly to employees, so 
that the appropriate behaviour described in the policy is implemented on a daily basis, the 
result should be an organisation that is more vigilant at all levels, and an organisation 
comprised of employees who believe they are ‘contributing’ to the well-being of the 
overall organisation (Berti & Rogers, 2004, p 152).  A successful Corporate Information 
Security Policy should generate a high degree of consensus amongst all of those 
involved, and should foster a positive attitude towards security in terms of its benefits to 
the organisation.  In addition, a successful policy can foster a corporate culture that is 
essential to leverage advantages while limiting the risk to information assets (Robiette, 
2001, online; Gordon & Glickson, 2001, online).  
 
However, even though there are clear benefits to incorporating information security 
practices into the corporate culture; the senior management of many organisations still 
has mistaken beliefs regarding information security and the role of senior management in 
its implementation, which hinders the creation of an Information Security Conscious 
Corporate Culture. 
 
4.7 Management Myths about Information Security 
For numerous organisations’ senior management, information security may seem like a 
cavernous blackhole into which huge amounts of cash are poured with few measurable 
outcomes.  In addition, in many organisations, senior management has erroneous beliefs 
regarding information security.  This contributes to poor enforcement of information 
security standards and practices in organisations as senior management does not fully 
understand or appreciate the role of information security in its organisation.  The 
consequences for an organisation’s financial health and reputation could be devastating if 
information is accidentally or deliberately disclosed to the wrong people, falsified or 
corrupted or rendered unavailable for a period of time (Gordon, 2002, online).  The 
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following subsections will describe a few of the common myths of senior management 
with regard to information security that could impede the implementation of a 
comprehensive information security infrastructure. 
     
• All problems will be solved with physical and technical controls 
In the past, physical and technical controls may have been sufficient to protect 
the information assets of an organisation, but in contemporary organisations 
these are no longer enough.  Hardware, software and technologies are only a 
few of the components in the overall security program.  Physical and technical 
controls are tangible and are easier to enforce and, consequently, usually 
receive more attention from management than the operational controls needed 
to sustain information security in an organisation.  Operational controls 
determine the actions employees must use in order to sufficiently protect 
information.  The effectiveness of information security controls largely 
depends on the competency and dependability of the people who are 
implementing and using them.  Management must have a vision for how 
information security will be addressed and must recognise that something 
more than physical controls and hardware and software solutions are 
necessary to provide a holistic information security solution.  As detailed 
earlier in the chapter, the human element is a fundamental component of an 
information security solution, which management often overlooks (Shaurette, 
2004, p 650).  
 
• Information security has been accomplished once the policy has been 
written  
The Corporate Information Security Policy should be the foundation for a 
comprehensive information security implementation and not the ultimate goal.  
Information security has not been accomplished once the policy has been 
written, as it is not enough for senior management to merely outline the vision 
for information security in the Corporate Information Security Policy.  Once a 
policy has been created, the organisation should begin striving towards the 
 57
vision outlined in the policy.  If a Corporate Information Security Policy is 
written but never implemented or enforced, or if the policy is enforced 
inconsistently, it is almost certainly worse than if no policy existed at all.  As 
detailed previously, policies inspire what behaviour is acceptable and what 
behaviour is unacceptable and it is through procedures that the behaviour is 
prescribed.  Therefore, as described in Chapter 3, policies and procedures 
must be decisively implemented in an organisation to be effective.  Over time, 
the behaviour prescribed in procedures should become a way of life in the 
organisation.  If employees do not understand the importance of acceptable 
information security practices, or have the belief that information is not 
significant to the organisation, they may be apathetic in their information 
security practices and procedures.  Therefore, the communication of the policy 
to the employees of an organisation becomes essential (Shaurette, 2004, p 
651).     
 
• All employees will comply once the policy is published 
However, even once the Corporate Information Security Policy has been 
published and communicated to employees, there is still no guarantee that 
they will comply with what is written.  It should be ensured that employees 
understand the policy and the part they must play in the protection of 
information.  Simply publishing the policy will not guarantee that employees 
will comply with it.  Simply making employees aware is also not enough – 
this will most likely lead to superficial security.  In fact, Information Security 
Awareness alone could have a negative effect by teaching employees how to 
avoid information security in their activities.  Information Security Awareness 
will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7.  It is likely that employees will 
find a way to circumvent security measures if they do not fully comprehend 
the benefits of protecting information.  Employees must be educated about the 
Corporate Information Security Policy, and the corresponding procedures, in 
order for them to fully understand their roles and responsibilities in the 
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protection of information.  In addition, there must be motivation for 
complying with the policy (Shaurette, 2004, p 652).   
 
These myths represent three of the major areas of information security that need to be 
addressed in organisations.  Firstly, information security cannot be successful with only 
physical and technical controls.  The human aspect of information security, as described 
previously, must be addressed in an organisation.  Secondly, even though a Corporate 
Information Security Policy may exist on paper in organisations, very often this policy is 
never enforced and has no influence in an organisation.  And, thirdly, even if a Corporate 
Information Security Policy is published and employees are made aware of the policy, it 
does not mean that employees will adhere to what is written in the policy. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
In a holistic view, information security should be a triad of people, process, and 
technology. Appropriate technology must be combined with management and employee 
support to ensure the protection of information.  A clear Corporate Information Security 
Policy, which outlines the vision that senior management has for information security, 
must be drafted.  However, it is not enough for the policy just to be created.  Through the 
policy, employees must begin to understand their roles and responsibilities towards the 
protection of information.  It is through understanding that employees will begin to 
incorporate the correct information security practices into their daily behaviour.  Further, 
as these information security practices become part of the everyday activities of 
employees, an Information Security Conscious Corporate Culture will begin to emerge.  
As seen from this chapter, however, senior management’s incorrect perceptions 
concerning information security often hinder the implementation of effective information 
security practices in an organisation. 
 
It is imperative that the misconceptions are overcome and that senior management’s 
attitude towards information security is supportive and that management helps shape the 
corporate culture.  By cultivating an Information Security Conscious Corporate Culture, 
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diligent and security conscious employees can become the strongest link in an 
organisation’s security infrastructure. 
 
The following chapter will explore the relationship that should exist between corporate 
culture, corporate governance and information security.  The term Corporate Information 
Security Obedience will be defined and the link between the organisational environments 
detailed in Chapter 3 and the Three Levels of Corporate Culture will be explored. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CORPORATE INFORMATION SECURITY 
OBEDIENCE 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, the relationships between corporate culture, corporate governance 
and information security have been explored.  The Three Levels of Corporate Culture of 
which all cultures consist, and the importance thereof, were investigated.  The 
distribution of power and the three types of power in organisations were looked at, as 
well as the classifications of culture that could be found in organisations.  The roles of 
sub- and counter-cultures in organisations and how best to maintain a corporate culture 
were also investigated. 
 
Further, the role that senior management should play in shaping the culture in its 
organisation was explored.  The indicators of a corporate culture that could be 
detrimental to an organisation and the various organisational environments, which result 
from different management styles, were investigated.  In addition, the vital role that 
corporate policies play in shaping the corporate culture was explored.  
 
Additionally, the management and human dimensions of information security were 
examined.  The importance of the human factor in the protection of information security 
and why information security should become part of the corporate culture were 
highlighted.  Management’s role in shaping an Information Security Conscious Corporate 
Culture, and the myths often held by senior management regarding information security 
were also investigated. 
 
The first three sections of this chapter will reiterate the relationships expressed in 
previous chapters between, firstly, corporate culture and corporate governance, secondly, 
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information security and corporate governance and, thirdly, corporate culture and 
information security.  Subsequently, this chapter will synthesise the three disciplines of 
corporate culture, corporate governance and information security and define the 
relationship that should exist between these three fields to promote the protection of the 
information assets of an organisation.  This relationship will be defined as Corporate 
Information Security Obedience.  
 
5.2 Relationship between Corporate Culture and Corporate 
Governance 
As described in Chapter 3, senior management has an imperative role to play in shaping 
the corporate culture of its organisation and strong leadership is required to ensure the 
organisation continues to be successful.   
 
Through its corporate governance duties, senior management must set a clear vision and 
strategic direction for the organisation.  This vision should manifest in the corporate 
policies of an organisation.  The corporate culture of an organisation should be a key 
concern of management when developing the policies for its organisation as the culture 
will largely influence the response the employees will have to a policy once approved and 
introduced.  Further, the main objective of a policy, together with the consequential 
procedures, is to determine the actions and behaviour of employees by outlining what 
should be and what should not be done in an organisation.  However, simply developing 
and publishing a policy will not necessarily positively influence the behaviour of 
employees and the resulting corporate culture.  The corporate governance duties of senior 
management, however, should go beyond setting the vision for an organisation and policy 
development.   
 
Management should effectively communicate the vision and corporate policies to 
employees, and even more importantly, lead by example.  Employees will, most often, 
not react to what is preached by senior management, but rather to its attitude and actions.  
Thus, if senior management treats corporate policies and procedures as ‘window 
dressing’ and negligible then employees will usually adopt the same attitude.  
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Alternatively, if management stresses the importance of adhering to corporate policies 
employees are more likely to follow corporate procedures and adhere to the correct 
behaviour.  Therefore, the power to change the behaviour of employees, and the resulting 
change in corporate culture, lies largely in the hands of senior management.  The 
relationship that should exist between corporate governance and corporate culture is 
represented in Figure 5.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The relationship between corporate governance and corporate culture 
 
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates that it is through senior management’s corporate governance duty of 
directing that the corporate culture should be changed.  These management policies must 
then be communicated to employees to be truly effective.  Figure 5.1 further illustrates 
that one of the most effective ways that management can communicate the corporate 
policies to employees is through its own actions and behaviour. 
   
5.3 Relationship between Information Security and Corporate 
Governance 
Part of senior management’s corporate governance duties, as discussed in Chapter 3, 
includes both accountability and responsibility for the protection of the assets and 
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necessary policies and procedures are in place in its organisation to guarantee the 
protection of assets.   
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, information is often described as the lifeblood of an 
organisation and is one of the most essential assets of any organisation.  It follows, 
therefore, that one of the most significant corporate governance duties of senior 
management should be the protection of information.  One of the main complaints from 
security professionals is the lack of support from senior management when it comes to 
ensuring the protection of information.  In addition, as seen in Chapter 4, there does seem 
to be a close connection between the priority senior management gives to information 
security and the existence of a Corporate Information Security Policy.  The higher 
management’s priority of protecting information, the more likely a policy will exist.   
 
It is of vital importance that senior management commits to an information security 
program in its organisation.  One way to demonstrate such commitment is through the 
creation and dissemination of a Corporate Information Security Policy.  This policy, and 
its procedures, must clearly define what is expected from employees in the protection of 
information assets.  It is imperative that the Corporate Information Security Policy makes 
senior management’s vision for information security clear.  In addition, senior 
management should lead by example in the protection of information assets and must 
ensure that the resources required are available for the Corporate Information Security 
Policy to be implemented.  The relationship that should exist between information 
security and corporate governance is represented in Figure 5.2.  
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Figure 5.2: The relationship between corporate governance and information security 
 
 
Figure 5.2 illustrates that senior management has a crucial role to play in the relationship 
between information security and corporate governance.  Senior management should 
demonstrate its commitment to information security by setting a vision for information 
security through the Corporate Information Security Policy.  This policy must be 
effectively communicated to employees and management should demonstrate the correct 
behaviour outlined in the policy. 
 
5.4 Relationship between Corporate Culture and Information 
Security 
As highlighted in Chapter 4, employees are repeatedly singled out as the weakest link in 
many information security environments.  Further, almost all information security 
solutions rely on the human element to a large extent, but the human factor of 
information security is often left unaddressed.  Employees are often unaware of their 
responsibilities towards the protection of information assets and, as such, a security 
vulnerability is created.  However, employees must not only be aware of the need to 
protect information assets, but they must be able to fully comprehend their role in 
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information security.  Employees who do not fully understand their roles are often 
indifferent to information security and may neglect their security responsibilities as they 
do not realise the importance thereof. 
 
The corporate culture of an organisation, as described in Chapter 2, is largely responsible 
for the actions and behaviour of employees.  Further, as it is the actions and behaviour of 
employees that are often the weakest link in information security, it follows that 
information security should become part of the way employees conduct their daily 
activities.  As pointed out in Chapter 3, an organisation’s corporate policies largely 
influence the behaviour of employees.  As it is the incorrect behaviour and actions of 
employees that are often an issue in protecting information assets, a Corporate 
Information Security Policy should be developed to influence the behaviour of 
employees.   
 
Therefore, in order to be truly effective, information security must become part of the 
corporate culture of an organisation.  Diligent, and properly educated, employees can 
then become one of the strongest links in an information security environment.  The 
resultant relationship that should exist between corporate culture and information security 
is represented in Figure 5.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: The relationship between information security and corporate culture 
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Figure 5.3 illustrates that in order to build a successful and effective relationship between 
information security and corporate culture, a Corporate Information Security Policy must 
be created to serve as the foundation.  The Corporate Information Security Policy, and its 
resulting procedures, should be used to stipulate the actions and behaviour required of 
employees to successfully protect information assets.   
 
5.5 Relationship between Corporate Culture, Corporate Governance 
and Information Security 
In Chapters 2, 3 and 4 the three fields of corporate culture, corporate governance and 
information security have been studied.  The previous sections of this chapter, explored 
the relationships between corporate governance and information security, corporate 
governance and corporate culture, and information security and corporate culture.  All of 
these relationships were represented through figures in previous sections.  These figures 
can be combined into one integrated figure that represents all relationships between the 
three fields, as detailed in this chapter.  This combination is represented by Figure 5.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: The relationships between corporate culture, corporate governance and 
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The relationship that should exist between information security and corporate 
governance, represented by ‘A’ in Figure 5.4, is best described by the following quote 
from Michael Cangemi, President of the Etienne Aigner Group Inc.  He states, “The 
information possessed by an organisation is among its most valuable assets and is critical 
to its success. The Board of Directors, which is ultimately accountable for the 
organisation's success, is therefore responsible for the protection of its information. The 
protection of this information can be achieved only through effective management and 
assured only through effective board oversight” (March 2000, online).  This highlights 
that there should be a very strong relationship between the fields of information security 
and corporate governance.     
 
As explained in Chapter 4, information security is often seen as an overhead, and not as 
an investment.  The senior management of an organisation tends to view information 
security as a technical problem that the Information Technology department should be 
concerned with.  However, the information that resides on an organisation’s systems is 
owned by the organisation as a whole, not the IT manager.  Therefore, it is the senior 
management of organisations that needs to direct the approach to protecting the 
information.   
 
Senior management must provide clear directives as to exactly what it expects from its 
employees as far as information security is concerned.  Employees require guidelines and 
direction for information security practices to shape their behaviour and actions.  The 
Corporate Information Security Policy can address both these issues.  Thus, one of the 
best ways to develop the relationship between information security and corporate 
governance is for senior management to implement and sustain information security 
practices through the Corporate Information Security Policy.   
 
The relationship, represented by ‘B’ in Figure 5.4, represents the relationship between 
information security and corporate culture.  When investigating information security, it is 
often seen that the procedures employees use in their daily work and their behaviour 
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represents the weakest link in information security.  In addition, it has been pointed out 
that the corporate culture of an organisation, to a large extent, determines the behaviour 
and actions of employees.  Therefore, the corporate culture in an organisation should be 
used to influence the behaviour of the employees towards information security in a 
positive way.  Understanding the corporate culture in terms of information security is 
crucial, and assessing employees’ awareness and commitment determines the best 
method for the implementation and distribution of the Corporate Information Security 
Policy.   
 
The Corporate Information Security Policy, and resulting procedures, should outline the 
behaviour expected from employees with regard to protecting information.  Employees 
must adhere to this acceptable behaviour, which should then begin shaping the corporate 
culture into one that is more security conscious.  A Corporate Information Security Policy 
should assist in cultivating a corporate culture in which the actions and behaviour of 
employees are in line with the policy.  Therefore, as information security is highly 
dependent on the behaviour of the users of information, the behaviour should preferably 
be instilled through corporate culture to ensure that acceptable behaviour becomes the de 
facto behaviour of the employees. 
      
The relationship between corporate governance and corporate culture is represented by 
‘C’ in Figure 5.4.  This relationship should be one where senior management creates 
general management policies using effective corporate governance strategies.  These 
policies should play a primary role in shaping the culture in the organisation by 
specifying the acceptable and unacceptable behaviour for the employees.  These 
guidelines are crucial in cultivating a beneficial corporate culture for an organisation.  
However, the culture in an organisation is not determined solely by what management 
stipulates in the policies, but rather by the example set by management.   
 
Therefore, the behaviour senior management accepts in the organisation should be the 
behaviour reflected in its corporate policies.  The policies created by senior management 
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should influence and, ultimately, alter the behaviour of the employees in an organisation 
and should, therefore, start to change the corporate culture in that organisation.   
 
The relationship represented by ‘D’ in Figure 5.4 represents the incorporation of all three 
fields of corporate governance, information security and corporate culture.  Corporate 
culture, to a large extent, determines the actions and behaviour of the employees of an 
organisation.  As seen in Chapter 3, the power to change the corporate culture of an 
organisation resides, to a large extent, with senior management.  Therefore, senior 
management should be able to influence the behaviour of the employees in the 
organisation into behaviour that will benefit the organisation.  As it is the behaviour of 
employees that is often the weakest link in information security practices, senior 
management should be able to influence the behaviour of employees into behaviour that 
will promote proper information security practices.  Ideally, to protect information, the de 
facto behaviour of employees should reflect the desire to protect information.  In other 
words, the shared tacit assumptions level of culture, which influences the artifacts level 
of culture, should be aligned with the espoused values level of corporate culture.  If the 
alignment of the Three Levels of Corporate Culture has been achieved, where the 
espoused values of senior management are reflected in both the shared tacit assumptions 
of employees, and their resultant behaviour at the artifacts level, then a Goal Consensus 
Environment has been achieved.  The three possible organisational environments, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, and their relation to the Three Levels of Corporate Culture will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section.      
 
As discussed previously, to be successful, information security needs to become part of 
the way the employees conduct their daily tasks, from senior management, right 
throughout the entire organisation.  Therefore, information security should become an 
intricate part of the corporate culture of the organisation, as it is the culture that 
determines how employees conduct their daily tasks.  This relationship should represent 
the situation whereby senior management’s vision for the protection of information in the 
organisation is conveyed through the Corporate Information Security Policy.  This policy 
should be drafted, advocated and implemented in such a way that it positively influences 
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the corporate culture with regard to information security.  The related procedures of the 
policy must outline the behaviour that employees should adhere to in protecting 
information assets.  Further, as information security is highly dependent on the correct 
behaviour of users, the corporate culture should contribute towards changing the de facto 
behaviour of employees to ensure this behaviour is indeed what senior management 
envisaged as acceptable behaviour.   
 
The relationship between corporate culture, corporate governance and information 
security, represented by ‘D’ in Figure 5.4, can be encompassed by the term ‘Corporate 
Information Security Obedience’.  In assessing the acceptability of the term ‘Corporate 
Information Security Obedience’, several people expressed concern over the negative 
implications of the term ‘obedience’.  The view is that when using the term ‘obedience’, 
a ‘master/slave’ relationship exists, where employees would be forced to submit to the 
authority of senior management.  This, however, is not the case, as is detailed in the 
following paragraphs.   
 
Obedience is defined as “compliance with that which is required by authority” 
(Dictionary.com, 2003, online).  The authority in this case is the senior management of 
the organisation, striving towards effective corporate governance.  Senior management 
should create a Corporate Information Security Policy to outline exactly what employees 
should comply with.  Another definition is, “words or actions denoting submission to 
authority” (Dictionary.com, 2003, online).  These words or actions translate into the 
practices and behaviour of employees, which senior management should have deemed 
acceptable or unacceptable.  As detailed previously, the practices and behaviour of 
employees are, to a large extent, determined by the corporate culture in an organisation.   
 
Therefore, by using the term ‘Corporate Information Security Obedience’, it binds 
together all three fields of corporate culture, corporate governance and information 
security.  The term does this by stating that the actions of the employees must comply 
with that which is required by senior management in terms of information security.  
‘Corporate Information Security Obedience’ is not something that should be forced on 
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the employees of an organisation, but should rather become part of the overall corporate 
culture.  Therefore, ‘Corporate Information Security Obedience’ is defined, for the 
purpose of this thesis, as “de facto user behaviour complying with the vision of senior 
management as defined in the Corporate Information Security Policy”.  
 
It must be highlighted, however, that even though Corporate Information Security 
Obedience should become part of the way of life in an organisation, it is likely that not all 
employees will conform.  As in society, there will always be employees who ‘operate 
outside the rules’.  As such, consequences should exist for failure to comply with 
information security best practices.  However, the majority of employees would adhere to 
the correct behaviour as it is part of the corporate culture and not because of 
consequences or rewards. 
 
As Corporate Information Security Obedience evolves in an organisation, the 
organisational environment, as detailed in Chapter 3, is prone to evolve as well.  An 
organisation that begins as a Coercive or Utilitarian Environment should evolve into one 
that is focused on Goal Consensus in order to become Information Security Obedient.  
The next section will explore the organisational environments in relation to the Three 
Levels of Corporate Culture.   
 
5.6 Organisational Environments and the Three Levels of Corporate 
Culture 
The Three Levels of Corporate Culture, as seen in Chapter 2, range from explicit actions 
and behaviour at the artifacts level of culture to the invisible beliefs and values found at 
the shared tacit assumptions level.  It is often found that the espoused values and shared 
tacit assumptions levels of corporate culture are not aligned with one another.  Thus, the 
vision of senior management for its organisation is not being realised.  As described in 
Chapter 3, generally one of possibly three key environments could exist in an 
organisation.  In the Coercive Environment employees feel isolated and seek to leave the 
environment if possible.  Employees in this environment conduct their daily activities 
because it is mandatory, rather than because they agree with or understand the wishes of 
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senior management.  The Utilitarian Environment is one where employees conduct their 
daily activities mainly because of an incentive system in the organisation.  Employees do 
not necessarily agree with or understand the wishes of senior management, but adhere to 
the correct behaviour because of the rewards they will receive.  In the Goal Consensus 
Environment employees identify with and feel a sense of loyalty towards the 
organisation.  Employees share the same beliefs and values as senior management and 
they fully understand the role they should play in the success of the organisation.  In the 
Goal Consensus Environment senior management and employees are striving towards the 
same goals.  It does not mean that rewards and consequences do not exist in this 
environment, but that they are not the driving factor in adhering to correct behaviour. 
 
This section will investigate the possible effect that an organisational environment could 
have on the corporate culture of an organisation.  The three organisational environments 
will, therefore, be examined in relation to the Three Levels of Corporate Culture. 
 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the Coercive and Utilitarian Environments mapped onto the Three 
Levels of Corporate Culture.  It shows that, in the Coercive and Utilitarian Environments, 
the artifacts level of both management and employees are in concurrence with one 
another.  In the Coercive Environment this indicates that there is stringent management 
control and employees adhere to the behaviour specified by management, or else harsh 
corrective action will be taken against them.  In the Utilitarian Environment this 
concurrence indicates that employees will do as management wishes in return for a 
reward.  However, as indicated in the Figure 5.5, the shared tacit assumptions level in 
both environments is not aligned at all – the beliefs and values of management and 
employees are not the same.  Without either strict management or incentives, the correct 
behaviour of employees would fade.  
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Figure 5.5: The coercive and utilitarian environments and the three levels of corporate 
culture 
 
 
From an information security point of view, in Figure 5.5 the Corporate Information 
Security Policy can be positioned at the espoused values level of the Three Levels of 
Corporate Culture and it is situated on the Management side.  This indicates that the 
contents of the policy reflect senior management’s vision for information security and the 
policy is in agreement with what management wishes.  However, the Corporate 
Information Security Policy is clearly an autocratic management policy, and not at all in 
line with the beliefs and values of the employees.   
 
It is vital that employees are in agreement with their work policies, as it is indicated that 
productivity and performance in an organisation could increase by 30 percent to 40 
percent if employees are satisfied with the corporate policies (Schafer, 2003, online).  
One of the policies that employees should be in agreement with is the Corporate 
Information Security Policy.  If the Corporate Information Security Policy is not 
supported, evaluated and fully understood by management and employees, the policy is 
in danger of remaining a ‘piece of paper’.  The benefit to adhering to the Corporate 
Information Security Policy should also be highlighted for employees.  If the 
environment in which employees work is changing and employees do not keep pace with 
the changes around them, they may find themselves on the ‘endangered species’ list 
(Charlton, 2000, p 22). 
Artifacts 
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Figure 5.6: The goal consensus environment and the three levels of corporate culture 
 
 
Figure 5.6 illustrates that in the Goal Consensus Environment, all three levels of 
corporate culture are aligned with one another.  This is an ideal corporate culture, in 
terms of information security, as the information security vision expressed through the 
Corporate Information Security Policy at the espoused values level by senior 
management is supported by the actions and behaviour of employees at the artifacts 
level.  Further, as the artifacts level of corporate culture is determined by the shared tacit 
assumptions level of corporate culture, this would indicate that the espoused values and 
shared tacit assumptions levels are aligned.  In Figure 5.6, the Corporate Information 
Security Policy is found at the intersection of management and employees.  This indicates 
that the beliefs and values of the employees are in agreement with senior management’s 
vision for information security.  A situation of Corporate Information Security 
Obedience, therefore, can be observed in an organisation, as all three levels of corporate 
culture are aligned (Thomson & von Solms, 2005, p 74).    
 
5.7 Conclusion 
For information security practices and procedures to be truly effective in an organisation, 
a situation of Corporate Information Security Obedience should evolve in an organisation 
Management Employee  
Artifacts 
Espoused Values 
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Information 
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Corporate Information Security Obedience 
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and describe the relationship that exists between the three fields of corporate culture, 
corporate governance and information security.  
 
Through this relationship, senior management is both accountable and responsible for the 
information assets in its organisation.  As such, a Corporate Information Security Policy 
should be developed to outline the vision that senior management has for information 
security in its organisation.  As corporate policies, and the related procedures, influence 
and dictate the actions and behaviour of employees, the Corporate Information Security 
Policy should influence the actions and behaviour, and underlying beliefs and values, of 
employees in the protection of information assets.  As employees’ beliefs towards the 
importance of information change and they begin to understand their role in protecting 
information assets, so too will the corporate culture of an organisation change into one 
that is more information security conscious.  
 
As beliefs and values begin to change, employees will need to create new knowledge to 
accommodate the new beliefs.  The following chapter will detail how knowledge is 
created in an organisation and organisational learning processes.  The Modes of 
Knowledge Creation, as suggested by Nonaka, and the interaction between tacit and 
explicit knowledge will be detailed.  Further, the relationship between the Modes of 
Knowledge Creation and the Three Levels of Corporate Culture, as discussed in Chapter 
2, will be examined. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
KNOWLEDGE CREATION 
 
6.1 Introduction 
“Knowledge is power”, as stated by Francis Bacon, while Confucius stated that “real 
knowledge is to know the extent of one’s ignorance” (The Quotations Page, 2006, 
online).  There is constant pressure on any given corporate culture to change and grow, 
and, as such, organisations create and propagate knowledge on a daily basis.  The rapid 
creation and circulation of knowledge should be a key concern of senior management, as 
knowledge can be a source of competitive advantage for organisations (von Krogh, 1998, 
p 133).  
 
As new knowledge is propagated throughout an organisation, the culture must adapt to 
incorporate it.  In addition, a key factor in the creation of knowledge is to distinguish the 
areas in which an organisation is ignorant and take measures to surmount this lack of 
knowledge (Schein, 1990, p 116; Argyris & Schon, 1978, p 9).   
 
In order to survive, organisations must change and adapt to the often unpredictable 
conditions, both internal and external to it.  Essential to change in an organisation is the 
development of both tacit and explicit knowledge, and the interaction between the two.  
Explicit knowledge refers to knowledge that is transmittable in formal, organised 
language.  Explicit knowledge can be likened to the espoused values level of corporate 
culture.  Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, has a personal quality, which makes it 
difficult to formalise and communicate.  Tacit knowledge drives action, commitment, and 
involvement in an organisation.  Tacit knowledge can be likened to the shared tacit 
assumptions level of corporate culture (Nonaka, 1994, p 16).   
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This chapter will investigate both tacit and explicit knowledge in more detail.  
Organisational learning, and the concepts of single- and double-loop learning, as 
proposed by Argyris and Schon (1978), will be discussed.  Further, the theory of 
knowledge creation within organisations will be detailed.  The Modes of Knowledge 
Creation, as proposed by Nonaka, and the concepts of socialization, externalization, 
combination and internalization will be explored.  The chapter will conclude by 
examining the Modes of Knowledge Creation in relation to the Three Levels of Corporate 
Culture. 
 
6.2  Organisational Learning 
Organisations are not merely collections of individuals, but there is no organisation 
without such collections.  Likewise, organisational learning is not simply individual 
learning, yet organisations learn only through the experience and actions of individuals 
(Argyris & Schon, 1978, p 9).  Organisational learning entails both the detection and 
correction of error in an organisation.  The following section will detail concepts of 
organisational learning, including single- and double-loop learning. 
 
There are two important concepts relevant to organisational learning that must be 
explored.  These are theory-in-use and theory of action.  Organisational theory-in-use is 
derived from the observation of organisational behaviour, or, in other words, 
organisational decisions and actions.  The decisions and actions carried out by individuals 
are organisational if they are governed by the organisation’s rules for decisions and 
actions (Argyris & Schon, 1978, p 15).  The theory-in-use of an organisation is often tacit 
and correlates with the shared tacit assumptions level of corporate culture.  Alternatively, 
theory of action is reflected in formal corporate documents, such as organisation policies 
and charts (Argyris & Schon, 1978, p 15).  Theory of action is often referred to as the 
espoused theory of an organisation and correlates to the espoused values level of 
corporate culture. 
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Every employee in an organisation constructs his or her own depiction, or image, of the 
theory-in-use in an organisation.  It is this image that employees use to understand 
themselves in the context of the organisation, and these images are private to an 
employee.  However, the continuity and stability of an organisation cannot rely on the 
employees’ private images.  Essential to organisational continuity is the public 
representation of an organisation’s theory-in-use, which is referred to as organisational 
maps.  These are the shared descriptions of an organisation which employees jointly 
construct and use to guide them.  Organisational maps have a dual function – they 
describe actual patterns of activity, and they are guides for future action.  Therefore, 
organisational theory-in-use, which is largely tacit, is ‘encoded’ in private images and 
public maps.  The public maps of employees in an organisation are often in conflict with 
the theory of action.  This is essentially the same as the conflicting espoused values and 
shared tacit assumptions levels of the Three Levels of Corporate Culture, as discussed in 
Chapter 2.      
 
The private images and public maps of employees are continuously modified to adjust to 
changing conditions in their environment, and this brings about changes in organisational 
theory-in-use.  The changes in organisational theory-in-use are referred to as 
organisational learning (Argyris & Schon, 1978, p 17). 
 
The two primary methods for organisational learning are single- and double-loop 
learning.  Single-loop learning occurs when the detection and corrections of errors allows 
an organisation to continue with its current policies and procedures.  Double-loop 
learning occurs when the detection and correction of errors requires the modification of 
an organisation’s policies and procedures.  These two learning methods will be explored 
in greater detail in the following sub-sections. 
 
 6.2.1 Single-loop Learning   
With single-loop learning, employees respond to changes in the internal 
and external environments of the organisation by detecting errors or faults 
in these environments.  These errors can then be corrected to maintain the 
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central features of the organisational theory-in-use.  Single-loop learning 
is sufficient where error correction can proceed by changing 
organisational strategies within a constant framework of norms or 
assumptions.  Single-loop learning is concerned mainly with effectiveness.  
In other words, how best to achieve existing goals and objectives as 
specified by existing organisational norms (Argyris & Schon, 1978, pp 18, 
21).  Therefore, single-loop learning ensures the existing goals and 
objectives of an organisation remain intact, whereas the approach to 
achieving these goals may need to be modified through the single-loop 
learning process. 
  
 6.2.2 Double-loop learning 
There may be cases, however, where error correction requires a learning 
cycle in the organisation in which the organisational assumptions 
themselves must be changed.  In such cases, a double feedback loop 
connects the detection of error not only to strategies, but to the underlying 
norms and assumptions in an organisation.  The organisation may require 
a restructuring of its norms and assumptions, as well as a restructuring of 
organisational strategies.  These new strategies and associated 
assumptions should be embedded into the images and maps which encode 
the tacit organisational theory-in-use.  Double-loop learning will occur 
when differences between the actual and desired states are corrected by 
first examining and altering the governing variables and then taking 
action.  These governing variables are not the values people espouse.  
They are the underlying beliefs that can be inferred, by observing the 
actions of individuals, to drive and guide their actions (Argos Press, 1999, 
online; Argyris & Schon, 1978, pp 21-22).   
 
Double-loop learning, however, should not be a method that needs to be ‘put into 
practice’ in an organisation.  It should be part of the daily activities of an organisation.  
Organisations are continuously creating new knowledge by reconstructing existing 
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perspectives and assumptions on a day-to-day basis.  Therefore, the double-loop learning 
ability should be ‘built into’ the knowledge creation model of an organisation (Nonaka, 
1994, p 19).  The following section will discuss knowledge and the process of 
organisational knowledge creation. 
 
6.3 Theory of Knowledge and Knowledge Creation 
To understand knowledge creation, it is necessary to have a comprehensive 
understanding of the term ‘knowledge’.  Knowledge is considered a personal ‘belief’ and, 
equally important, is the ‘justification’ of that belief.  Information and knowledge are 
often used interchangeably, but there is a clear distinction between information and 
knowledge.  Information is a flow of messages, while knowledge is created by this flow 
of information and manipulated by the commitment and beliefs of its holder (Nonaka, 
1994, p 15).  
 
There are two leading views on knowledge – the ‘cognitivist’ and ‘constructionist’ 
perspectives.  The cognitivist perspective sees cognition, or conscience, as a ‘machine’ 
for information processing and logical reasoning.  Two cognitive systems should reach 
the same conclusions or representations of an event or object.  ‘Learning’, from the 
cognitivist perspective, implies developing increasingly comprehensive representations of 
objects and events.  In addition, cognitivist knowledge is seen as explicit, capable of 
being encoded and stored, and easy to transmit to others (von Krogh, 1998, p 134). 
 
The constructionist perspective sees cognition as an act of construction or creation, and 
not representation.  Knowledge resides in a person’s body and is closely tied to a person’s 
senses and prior experiences.  Therefore, individuals see the environment from their own 
unique viewpoint.  However, in an organisation, knowledge creation is a social process 
where more than one employee is involved.  From the constructionist perspective, some 
knowledge is explicit, but some is tacit, not easily expressed and is complex to share with 
others (von Krogh, 1998, p 134). 
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As mentioned previously, at a fundamental level, knowledge is created by employees and 
an organisation cannot create knowledge without employees.  Employees are constantly 
committed to recreating their environment in accordance with their own perspectives, and 
commitment underlies human knowledge creating activities.  Therefore, commitment is a 
significant component for encouraging the creation of new knowledge within an 
organisation (Nonaka, 1994, p 17).    
 
There are three factors, inter alia, that encourage individual commitment in an 
organisation and, ultimately, will lead to knowledge creation.  These three factors are 
‘intention’, ‘autonomy’ and a certain level of environmental ‘fluctuation’.  The following 
subsections will discuss these three factors. 
 
 6.3.1 Intention 
Intention is concerned with how individuals shape their approach to the 
world and try to make sense of their environment.  Intention involves the 
process of obtaining information for better adaptation to their 
environment.  The meaning of information differs according to what an 
individual aims to do with the information.  Therefore, without intention, 
it would be impossible to judge the value of the information or knowledge 
created (Nonaka, 1994, p 17). 
 
 6.3.2 Autonomy 
Individuals within an organisation may have different intentions as every 
individual has his or her own personality.  By allowing employees to act 
autonomously, an organisation is more likely to maintain greater 
flexibility in obtaining and interpreting information.  Individual autonomy 
increases the possibility that individuals will motivate themselves to create 
new knowledge (Nonaka, 1994, p 18). 
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6.3.3 Fluctuation   
While intention is internal to the individual, knowledge creation at the 
individual level involves constant interaction with the external world.  The 
interaction with the external environment often leads to ‘breakdowns’ in 
an individual’s perception.  A breakdown refers to the disruption of an 
individual’s comfortable, existing ‘state-of-being’.  When breakdowns 
occur, individuals question the value of habits and beliefs, which might 
lead to a realignment of commitments.  When employees face a 
breakdown of their perceptions, they have an opportunity to reassess their 
thinking and attitudes (Nonaka, 1994, p 18). 
 
Effective knowledge creation places particular demands on the way employees relate to 
each other in an organisation.  For example, untrustworthy behaviour, constant 
competition and apathetic, lacklustre attitudes, endanger effective sharing of tacit 
knowledge.  On the other hand, constructive and helpful relations speed up the 
communication process and enable employees to share their personal knowledge.  Senior 
management plays a critical role in revealing tacit knowledge held by employees and 
provide the environment for a ‘spiral of knowledge’ creation through the Modes of 
socialization, combination, externalization, and internalization.  These four Modes of 
Knowledge Creation will be discussed in the subsequent section (von Krogh, 1998, p 
136; Nonaka, 1994, p 34).   
 
6.4  Modes of Knowledge Creation 
As discussed previously, tacit, or implicit, knowledge is subjective and experience based.  
This knowledge is difficult to formalise and communicate and includes beliefs, attitudes 
and intuition, as well as technical skills.  Knowledge in the tacit form is actionable, or can 
be used, by the owner.  Tacit knowledge is found at the shared tacit assumptions level of 
corporate culture and influences the artifacts level.  Explicit, or overt, knowledge, on the 
other hand, is objective and rational knowledge that can be communicated in words and 
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sentences and includes theoretical approaches and problem solving.  Explicit knowledge 
is found at the espoused values level of corporate culture (Nonaka, 1994, p 16).   
 
There are four different processes of interaction, suggested by Nonaka, between tacit 
knowledge and explicit knowledge.  These four processes are represented in the Modes of 
Knowledge Creation, the purpose of which is to identify existing knowledge and 
‘convert’ it to new knowledge.  These processes are classified as socialization, 
externalization, combination and internalization (Nonaka, 1994, p 18). 
 
6.4.1 Socialization 
The key initiator in the process of organisational knowledge creation is the 
individual.  An individual’s knowledge must be broadened and amplified 
to be translated into organisational knowledge.  This process should begin 
with socialization.  Socialization is the process whereby one person’s tacit 
knowledge is transferred to tacit knowledge in another person through 
interaction between these individuals.  Socialization involves capturing 
knowledge through direct interaction with individuals both inside and 
outside an organisation, and employees can acquire tacit knowledge 
without language.  For example, apprentices work with their tutors and 
learn skills, not through language, but by observation, imitation and 
practice. 
 
Socialization depends on having shared experience, and results in acquired 
skills and common mental models.  The key to acquiring tacit knowledge 
is experience.  Without some form of shared experience, it is extremely 
difficult for people to share each others’ thinking processes.  Shared 
experience facilitates the creation of ‘common perspectives’ which can be 
shared by individuals as a part of their respective bodies of tacit 
knowledge.  Individuals bring their own perspectives to an organisation, 
and this tacit knowledge is converted through co-experience to form a 
common base for understanding (Nonaka, 1994, pp 19, 21, 24).     
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6.4.2 Externalization 
Once a common, implicit perspective has been formed through a shared 
experience, the employees need to articulate the perspective.  
Externalization is the process whereby tacit knowledge is made explicit.  
One way to do this is through ‘articulation’ of tacit knowledge by 
expressing beliefs and values in words, metaphors or analogies.  A second 
way is through ‘eliciting and translating’ the tacit knowledge of others into 
an understandable form or explicit knowledge.  Dialogue and discussion 
are important means for both methods.  During such communication, 
people share beliefs and can learn how to better articulate their thinking.  
Externalization is a process among individuals within a group (Nonaka, 
1994, pp 19, 25). 
 
6.4.3 Internalization 
Internalization is the process of understanding and absorbing explicit 
knowledge into the tacit knowledge held by an individual.  Internalization 
is largely practical as explicit knowledge is transferred to tacit through the 
actual doing of a task or skill or through simulations.  The internalization 
process transfers organisational explicit knowledge to the individual 
employee.  This process is often referred to as crystallization.  In other 
words, the explicit knowledge created must be crystallized into a form that 
can be internalized (Nonaka, 1994, p 20). 
 
6.4.4 Combination 
Once knowledge has become explicit, it can be transferred to explicit 
knowledge of many through a process Nonaka calls combination.  This 
involves the use of social processes to combine different bodies of explicit 
knowledge held by individuals.  Explicit knowledge can be exchanged, 
combined and conveyed in, for example, documents and email, as well as 
through meetings and training.  The collection and dissemination of 
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relevant information becomes very significant in this process.  
Combination should utilise the double-loop learning process of 
organisational learning, as double-loop learning requires the modification 
of an organisation’s strategies or policies.  These policies are espoused 
values or explicit knowledge that must be transferred, through 
combination, to many.  Combination allows knowledge transfer among 
groups across organisations (Nonaka, 1994, pp 19-20). 
 
The four processes of interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge are represented in 
Figure 6.1.  It shows that the socialization process transfers tacit knowledge to tacit 
knowledge.  The externalization process transfers tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge.  
The internalization process transfers explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge.  And the 
combination process transfers explicit knowledge to explicit knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Figure 6.1: Nonaka’s modes of knowledge creation 
Source: Nonaka, 1994, p 19 
 
 
The interaction of the four Modes of Knowledge Creation is encouraged by what Nonaka 
terms ‘enablers’ within an organisation.  These enablers will trigger the knowledge 
creation and conversion process within an organisation.  Nonaka identifies five enablers 
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for knowledge creation within an organisation: vision, strategy, structure, system and 
staff (1997, online). 
 
The first enabler, a knowledge vision, is a working premise for knowledge.  For example, 
Walt Disney’s vision is “continuous progress via creativity, dreams and imagination.  No 
cynicism allowed”.  This vision stimulates ingenuity and knowledge creation.  The 
second enabler, strategy, conceptualises what knowledge to develop.  Knowledge 
strategy identifies core knowledge and results in efficient new product development.  
Knowledge strategy focuses on disseminating knowledge. 
 
The third enabler, system, is described as networking communities of knowledge, which 
include competitors, customers and related industries.  The fourth enabler is structure.  
According to Nonaka (1997), there are two forms of organisations that management must 
strike a balance between – fractal organisation and bureaucracy.  Fractal organisation is 
largely self-organising, flexible and extremely adept at socialization and externalization.  
Bureaucracy has a hierarchy, division of labour and combination and internalization 
flourish.  The final enabler of knowledge creation in an organisation is staff.  Nonaka 
stresses the importance of middle management in the knowledge creation process.  The 
role of middle managers is to initiate, support, and complete the knowledge spiral. They 
play the critical role between the vision from the top, and what the reality is. 
   
While each of the four Modes of Knowledge Creation can create new knowledge 
independently, the success of the model of organisational knowledge creation relies on 
the dynamic interaction between the different Modes of Knowledge Creation.  
Organisational learning, discussed in section 6.2, can be compared to internalization and 
combination, which are just two of the four Modes of Knowledge Creation.  
Organisational learning has limited, static implications, whereas organisational 
knowledge creation is a more dynamic concept.  Organisational learning is one aspect of 
the knowledge creation process within an organisation.  Organisational knowledge 
creation focuses on creating both tacit and explicit knowledge and, more significantly, on 
the exchange between these types of knowledge through internalization and 
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externalization.  Therefore, while tacit knowledge held by individuals lies at the heart of 
the knowledge creation process, realizing the practical benefits of that knowledge relies 
on its externalization and amplification through dynamic interactions between all four 
Modes of Knowledge Creation (Nonaka, 1994, pp 20, 34). 
 
The interactions between tacit and explicit knowledge will have a tendency to become 
more frequent and occur faster as more employees in and around the organisation become 
involved.  The process of organisational knowledge creation is an infinite, circular 
process.  Accordingly, organisational knowledge creation can be viewed as an upward 
spiral process, starting at the individual level, moving up to the collective or group level, 
and then to the organizational level (Nonaka, 1994, pp 20, 27).  It must be noted that this 
is a spiral process, not a cycle, because as learning is achieved, understanding moves to 
deeper and deeper levels. 
 
6.5 Relationship between Modes of Knowledge Creation and the 
Three Levels of Corporate Culture 
As discussed in section 6.4, the Modes of Knowledge Creation detail how knowledge can 
be created and converted in organisations through the interaction of tacit and explicit 
knowledge.  As seen in Chapter 2, the Three Levels of Corporate Culture also entail the 
interaction of tacit and explicit knowledge.  This section will explore a comparison of the 
Modes of Knowledge Creation and the Three Levels of Corporate Culture.   
 
The Three Levels of Corporate Culture are the artifacts, espoused values and shared tacit 
assumptions levels.  The shared tacit assumptions level consists of the collective tacit 
knowledge of all employees in an organisation.  The espoused values level consists of the 
values that an organisation states it is supporting.  These values are articulated in 
organisational policies and are, therefore, explicit knowledge.  The artifacts level consists 
of observed, visible behaviour which has its roots in the shared tacit assumptions of 
employees.   
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The first of the Modes of Knowledge Creation is the process of socialization.  
Socialization transfers tacit knowledge from one individual to another.  As this process 
only involves tacit knowledge, socialization impacts employees at the shared tacit 
assumptions level of corporate culture.  In terms of corporate culture, socialization, as 
described in Chapter 2, is necessary to perpetuate a corporate culture.  Socialization in 
this context is not only the transfer of implicit knowledge among individuals, but it is the 
development of the collective shared tacit assumptions level of corporate culture. 
 
The second Mode of Knowledge Creation, combination, transfers explicit knowledge to 
the explicit knowledge of many.  The explicit knowledge or espoused values of an 
organisation are conveyed to employees through management policies.  Initially these 
values will become the espoused values of employees before becoming tacit knowledge.  
Therefore, the combination process only involves explicit knowledge as it only impacts 
the espoused values level of corporate culture.  The third Mode of Knowledge Creation, 
externalization, transfers tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge.  As both tacit and 
explicit knowledge are utilised, it follows that the externalization process involves both 
the shared tacit assumptions and espoused values levels of corporate culture.  When 
externalization takes place, tacit knowledge is translated into espoused values.  The final 
Mode of internalization transfers explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge.  Once again, 
both the shared tacit assumptions level and the espoused values level are involved in the 
process.  When internalization takes place, explicit knowledge is translated into shared 
tacit assumptions level of corporate culture.  The relationship between the Three Levels 
of Corporate Culture and the Modes of Knowledge Creation is depicted in Figure 6.2. 
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Figure 6.2: Three levels of corporate culture and modes of knowledge creation 
 
 
As can be seen from Figure 6.2, socialization is solely concerned with the tacit 
knowledge at the shared tacit assumptions level of corporate culture.  Combination, on 
the other hand, is concerned purely with the espoused values of an organisation.  Both 
externalization and internalization rely on the interaction between the espoused values 
level and the shared tacit assumptions level.  All of the Modes of Knowledge Creation 
are vital in the development of knowledge within an organisation. 
    
6.6 Conclusion 
Knowledge creation is an essential part of any organisation and, as such, all organisations 
must adapt to changing conditions both in their internal and external environments.  
Without the creation and effective use of new knowledge, organisations would, most 
likely, lose their competitive edge.  As new knowledge is disseminated throughout an 
organisation, the corporate culture must change and adapt to this freshly acquired 
knowledge.  
 
The four Modes of Knowledge Creation proposed by Nonaka are the processes used by 
organisations to create fresh knowledge.  The ultimate goal for knowledge creation, in the 
context of corporate culture, would be for the four Modes of socialization, combination, 
Artifacts 
Espoused Values 
Shared Tacit Assumptions Socialization 
Externalization 
Combination 
Internalization 
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externalization and internalization to result in all employees sharing the same espoused 
values, or explicit knowledge, which aligns with the tacit knowledge at the shared tacit 
assumptions level.  It must be emphasised that knowledge creation is a spiral process that 
leads to a deeper understanding of the knowledge that has been created or shared. 
   
As employees create new knowledge and learn new skills related to information security 
they will progress through the four stages of the Information Security Competence 
Maturity Model.  The next chapter will explore this Model, as well as the Information 
Security Awareness, Training and Education Programs needed to move employees 
through the four stages. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
THE INFORMATION SECURITY COMPETENCE 
MATURITY MODEL 
 
7.1 Introduction 
“An education isn’t how much you have committed to memory, or even how much you 
know.  It’s being able to differentiate between what you do know and what you don’t”.  
This quote from Anatole France underlines a key factor in the learning or education of a 
new skill or task (The Quotations Page, 2006, online).  A person should become 
conscious of what they do not know, and only then can he or she begin the learning 
process.  In other words, once people become aware of the need for certain skills that 
they do not possess, the learning process is initiated. 
 
However, in terms of information security, awareness is simply not enough.  As 
discussed in Chapter 4, by only making employees aware of information security 
practices, and not affording them a deeper comprehension of information security, 
employees may find ways of evading their information security responsibilities.  
Employees will take the ‘path of least resistance’ to getting their jobs done, without 
appreciating the consequences for information security.  When asking employees to do 
something different and develop new skills and attitudes, the focus should be on the 
people themselves and their learning experiences – technology should be an adjunct 
(Charlton, 2000, p 7). 
 
This chapter will begin by detailing Information Security Awareness, Training and 
Education Programs.  The significance of using all three Programs in an organisation to 
emphasise the importance of information security, and promote understanding, will also 
be highlighted.  The Conscious Competence Learning Matrix, which describes the natural 
progression of people in learning a new skill, will be explored in detail.   
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Following this, an Information Security Competence Maturity Model will be proposed.  
This Model will encompass the learning stages that employees of an organisation should 
progress through in order to learn information security skills and practices, as well as 
how employees should move from Stage to Stage leading to Corporate Information 
Security Obedience. 
 
7.2  Information Security Awareness, Training and Education 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the protection of information assets through information 
security practices is essential for the well-being of an organisation.  There is a necessity 
for a Corporate Information Security Policy, and the associated procedures, to detail the 
vision for information security and the expected behaviour required to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information assets.  It is the responsibility of 
senior management to ensure that this policy is effectively communicated to all 
employees throughout the organisation.  As a foundation for this communication, an 
Information Security Awareness Program is required.  Many organisations disregard an 
Awareness Program altogether.  However, an Information Security Awareness Program is 
an essential requirement to help mitigate security breaches (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p 
286).  This section will investigate not only Information Security Awareness, but 
Information Security Training and Education as well. 
 
Some authorities propose that 40 per cent of an organisation’s overall information 
security budget be targeted to making employees aware of the role they should play in 
protecting information assets (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p 246).  However, developing and 
circulating a Corporate Information Security Policy, or directing employees to an intranet 
page that details security procedures will, alone, not diminish the threats to information 
assets.  An Information Security Awareness Program is necessary.  The purpose of an 
Information Security Awareness Program should be to focus employees’ attention on 
information security.  Through an Information Security Awareness Program employees 
usually play a passive role as they are the recipients of information and knowledge, and 
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they should learn to recognise threats to information assets.  The central goal of any 
Information Security Awareness Program is to influence employees to change their 
beliefs and attitudes at the shared tacit assumptions level (and eventually their actions at 
the artifacts level) by convincing all employees that they are responsible for the 
protection of information assets (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p 249; National Institute of 
Science and Technology Special Publication 800-16, 1998, p 15). 
 
An Information Security Awareness Program should be designed bearing in mind that 
employees will most likely have a fairly short attention span and often ‘tune out’ the 
knowledge that is being given to them through a process called acclimation.  In other 
words, if the same stimulus is used repeatedly to convey a concept, employees are prone 
to ignore the stimulus.  Furthermore, it is often found that learning through an Awareness 
Program is immediate, short-term and specific and the learning objectives of an 
Information Security Awareness Program should be recognition and retention.  Examples 
of Information Security Awareness components are awareness presentations, videos, 
posters and inspirational information security slogans (National Institute of Science and 
Technology Special Publication 800-16, 1998, pp 15, 18).     
 
While Awareness relies on reaching a wide range of people, Information Security 
Training is more formal.  Information Security Training has the goal of building 
knowledge and the necessary skills for employees to successfully protect information 
assets.  Organisations cannot protect the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
information without ensuring that all employees understand their roles and 
responsibilities and are sufficiently trained to perform them (National Institute of Science 
and Technology Special Publication 800-16, 1998, p 15).   
 
Through an Information Security Training Program employees should gain the 
knowledge about how to defend against attacks on information assets, for example from 
social engineers, and employees should develop the appropriate skills necessary for the 
protection of information assets.  Further, while this knowledge is important, it will only 
be effective if the Training focuses greatly on encouraging and motivating employees to 
 94
use that knowledge (National Institute of Science and Technology Special Publication 
800-16, 1998, p 16; Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p 250).   
 
As a minimum, all employees should receive basic Training in information security 
practices.  The National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) (1998) recommends 
three levels of Training: Beginning, Intermediate and Advanced, with each level linked to 
the roles and responsibilities of the employees.  Therefore, Training should be tailored 
based on job responsibilities and needs (pp 5, 18, 43).  Further to this, Information 
Security Training needs to be relevant to the job functions and risks of the employees.  
Training should not be a ‘do not do this’ program.  The learning objectives of an 
Information Security Training Program should be skills to support the Corporate 
Information Security Policy.  Training should promote the Corporate Information 
Security Policy, and procedures, but, in addition, Training should be an activity designed 
to instill a concept of best practice and understanding in employees.  The organisation 
can consider the Program successful if all employees completing the Training are entirely 
convinced and motivated by one fundamental belief: that information security is part of 
their responsibilities and that they have the skills to fulfill these responsibilities (National 
Institute of Science and Technology Special Publication 800-16, 1998, p 16; Mitnick & 
Simon, 2002, p 250).   
 
Once employees have acquired the necessary information security skills through 
Training, they should move on to an Information Security Education Program.  This 
Education Program should enhance the insight of employees as to why the skills they 
learnt through the Training Program are necessary.  The learning objective of an 
Information Security Education Program is a comprehensive understanding of 
information security practices and procedures.   
 
An Information Security Education Program is essential for employees to become fully 
committed to information security given that, as discussed in Chapter 4, employees will 
not implement rules that they do not fully understand.  The understanding developed in 
the Information Security Awareness and Training Programs should be used as a 
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foundation to establish an even deeper understanding of information security through the 
Information Security Education Program.  Once people realise the reasons behind 
procedures and required behaviour, they will be more inclined to adhere to the correct 
behaviour than they would have if they were pressured into a firm set of rules (Henry, 
2004, p 666).  Together with Education, and in order for information security practices to 
become part of the daily routine and activities of employees, Experience is necessary for 
employees to become comfortable with their newly acquired skills.  Once employees 
become experienced in information security procedures and practices these practices 
should become intrinsic to them (National Institute of Science and Technology Special 
Publication 800-16, 1998, p 18).   
 
Information Security Awareness, Training, Education and, over time, relevant 
Experience, are essential programs that employees should move through in order to 
change their beliefs, attitudes and behaviour positively towards protecting information 
assets.  As emphasised by Mitnick “If you don’t have trained and alert employees 
following well-thought-out procedures, it’s not a matter of if, but when you will lose 
valuable information” (2002, p 246). 
 
7.3 Conscious Competence Learning Matrix  
The Conscious Competence Learning Matrix details the learning process that people 
should go through whenever a new skill is learnt.  For the purposes of this research, the 
Conscious Competence Learning Matrix will detail the learning process of employees in 
an organisation.  Whenever a new skill or behaviour is learnt by employees, they move 
through certain phases or stages in mastering the change; referred to as the Conscious 
Competence Learning Matrix.  The Stages are Unconscious Incompetence, Conscious 
Incompetence, Conscious Competence and Unconscious Competence (Charlton, 2000, p 
7; Chapman, 2001, online).  This section will detail the progression of employees through 
these four Stages as they adapt to change. 
 
Stage 1 of the Conscious Competence Learning Matrix is Unconscious Incompetence.  At 
this Stage, employees are not aware of the existence or relevance of a skill set.  More 
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importantly, employees are not aware of the necessity for them to master that skill set and 
often deny the usefulness of the skills.  In order for any learning to take place, employees 
must become conscious of their deficiency in skills, ideally, through the demonstration of 
the skill set. 
 
Once employees are conscious of the skills needed, they can progress to Stage 2, or 
Conscious Incompetence.  However, even though employees are aware of the skills 
needed, they still do not know how to implement these skills.  Preferably at this Stage, 
employees should have an idea of the extent of their deficiency in the relevant skill and 
the employee must make a commitment to learning the new skill to progress to Stage 3. 
 
Stage 3 of the Matrix, Conscious Competence, is reached when employees can perform 
the relevant skills without assistance.  However, the skills are not yet second-nature to the 
employees and require concentration to perform the tasks reliably.  In due course, as 
employees practice and become more experienced in these skills, they will progress to 
Stage 4 of the Matrix. 
 
Unconscious Competence, Stage 4, is the ultimate Stage in the Conscious Competence 
Learning Matrix.  At this Stage, employees have become so comfortable and experienced 
in the particular skills that the skills enter the subconscious thinking of employees and 
become second-nature to them.  It is very likely that, having reached Unconscious 
Competency, employees may find it difficult to teach others the skills as the skills have 
become mostly instinctual.   
 
The Conscious Competence Learning Matrix can be clarified using an everyday example.  
Any person wishing to learn how to drive a motor vehicle will have to progress through 
the learning stages as described by the Conscious Competence Learning Matrix.  In the 
beginning, the person is unaware of the skills required for driving a motor vehicle (Stage 
1).  In addition, the person is not aware of the acceptable behaviour required when 
adhering to the rules of the road.  Once the person has studied for and passed the 
Learner’s Driving Licence test, he/she has the theory behind driving a motor vehicle.  
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The person has progressed to Stage 2 as he/she now knows what skills are required to 
drive a motor vehicle and the rules of the road.  However, the theory of the road is not 
enough as the person still does not possess the skills required for driving a motor vehicle.   
 
In order to do so, the person should attend driving lessons, or be taught by someone, to 
learn the skills essential for driving a motor vehicle.  Once these skills have been 
developed, the person is now capable of driving a motor vehicle, but the person still 
requires a great deal of concentration and driving is by no means habitual (Stage 3).  
Over time, however, as the person drives regularly, becomes comfortable and develops 
into an experienced driver, the skills required will, largely, become automatic and the 
person will no longer require such intense concentration in driving a motor vehicle as in 
the beginning.  The person will have progressed to the final learning stage, Stage 4, in the 
Conscious Competence Learning Matrix.   
 
7.4 Information Security Competence Maturity Model 
Chapter 5 detailed the concept of Corporate Information Security Obedience and why it 
should be strived for in an organisation.  Section 7.2 detailed the requirement for 
Information Security Awareness, Training and Education Programs necessary in 
organisations for employees to learn and understand information security practices.  
Section 7.3 described the generally accepted Conscious Competence Maturity Matrix, 
detailing the Stages people go through in order to develop a new skill or behaviour.  This 
section will combine the concepts from the three sections into the Information Security 
Competence Maturity Model. 
 
As detailed in Chapter 4, employees often misguidedly believe that information assets are 
being taken care of and protected by firewalls and other physical and technical controls.  
They do not acknowledge or understand the role they should be playing in information 
security.  As a result, when it comes to information security procedures and practices, 
most employees are incompetent and unskilled.  Therefore, these employees are at Stage 
1, or Unconscious Incompetence Stage, of the Information Security Competence Maturity 
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Model.  At Stage 1, employees are unaware of their responsibilities towards protecting 
information assets and are ignorant of the skills needed to successfully execute 
information security practices.  Employees at this Stage are oblivious to the need for 
information security practices in the organisation.  Their behaviour could, consequently, 
be conflicting with what is needed for the protection of information assets without them 
even realising.   
 
As seen in a previous section, an Information Security Awareness Program is necessary 
to focus the attention of the organisation on information security.  An Awareness 
Program should broadcast to all employees, most of whom are at the Unconscious 
Incompetence Stage, the importance of information assets.  The basic beliefs of 
employees towards information should be positively altered and the main aim of the 
Program should be to ensure employees are fervent in their desire to protect information 
assets.     
 
Once employees have successfully completed an Information Security Awareness 
Program they should, at least, be aware of their information security responsibilities.  The 
espoused values level of corporate culture has been impacted as the contents of the 
Corporate Information Security Policy, and related procedures, have now been made 
known to employees.  Once employees can acknowledge that they have a role to play in 
protecting information assets, they move to the Conscious Incompetence Stage of the 
Information Security Competence Maturity Model.  At this Stage, employees should 
understand the importance of information assets to the organisation and how information 
security benefits the entire organisation.  Employees realise what is required of them, but, 
as yet, do not have the skills necessary to effectively protect information assets and are, 
therefore, still incompetent.   
 
In order for employees to acquire these skills, it is necessary for them to attend an 
Information Security Training Program.  As detailed in a previous section, all employees 
should receive a basic level of Training in information security skills and practices.  
Further to this basic Training, employees should receive additional Training, if 
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necessary, that is customised specifically to their job responsibilities.  Through an 
Information Security Training Program, employees should learn how to most effectively 
protect information assets and recognise potential threats.  Through the Training 
Program, the correct information security practices, actions and behaviour of employees, 
which should be observed at the artifacts level of corporate culture, will be shaped.  As a 
result of the Training Program, employees should progress to Stage 3 of the Information 
Security Competence Maturity Model. 
 
Stage 3 of the Model is Conscious Competence.  At this Stage, employees have gained 
the crucial skills for information security practices.  The employees are fully aware of 
what is desired from them in terms of information security and can complete any 
information security tasks assigned to them.  However, the completion of these tasks 
requires a conscious effort on the part of the employees.  The information security 
practices demand a high degree of concentration to be accomplished and they are by no 
means second-nature to employees.  Furthermore, it is not uncommon for employees to 
be forgetful or negligent about things that seem peripheral to getting their jobs done.  
Therefore, even though employees know and understand what is expected of them they 
need to be reminded over and over again, in different ways, about their information 
security responsibilities (Mitnick & Simon, 2002, p 104).  Therefore, the correct 
information security practices and procedures are in place in the organisation, but they 
are not part of the corporate culture as yet. 
 
For the corporate culture of an organisation to begin to evolve and for employees to 
progress from Stage 3 to Stage 4 of the Model, a combination of techniques can be used.  
An Information Security Education Program, as discussed previously, will be effective in 
achieving Unconscious Competence.  For employees to gain a deeper understanding of 
why information security is so vital to an organisation they should take part in an 
Information Security Education Program which will address the shared tacit assumptions 
level of corporate culture.  Information Security Education provides insight to employees 
about the intricacy of information security practices and their responsibilities.    
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However, an Information Security Education Program alone is not enough.  In addition to 
an Information Security Education Program, positive reinforcement could help in the 
advancement of employees from Stage 3 to Stage 4.  Reinforcement should be used as 
validation that employees are performing the correct information security practices.  
These reinforcements or incentives that are used to motivate employees do not have to be 
financial.  Positive reinforcement is widely used in behaviour modification in 
organisations, and it has been found that praise and social reinforcers are more common, 
and effective, than financial reinforcers (Arnold, Cooper & Robertson, 1998, p 232).  
Employees will only be able to justifiably advance to Stage 4, Unconscious Competence, 
when they can innately apply the information security skills and procedures they have 
learnt.  Therefore, the employees, through Information Security Awareness, Training and 
Education, should aim to reach Stage 4.  Employees should then be Unconsciously 
Competent in the significant information security practices which support the information 
security vision of senior management.   
 
However, the ultimate goal should be for Corporate Information Security Obedience to 
be evident in an organisation.  As the information security practices learnt by employees 
support the information security vision of senior management, they should become part 
of the de facto employee behaviour and, therefore, ultimately part of the corporate 
culture.  Over time, through the Experience of performing the information security 
practices continuously, these information security practices will become de facto and 
employees will advance to Corporate Information Security Obedience through the 
Experience they have gained.   
 
The progression of employees from Stage 1, Unconscious Incompetence, to Corporate 
Information Security Obedience is depicted in the Information Security Competence 
Maturity Model in Figure 7.1.  
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Figure 7.1: Information security competence maturity model 
 
 
The majority of employees, having no information security knowledge, or skills, will be 
positioned at Stage 1, or Unconscious Incompetence.  As depicted in Figure 7.1, in order 
for employees to advance to Stage 2 of the Model an Information Security Awareness 
Program is required which will affect the espoused values level of corporate culture.  
Through this, employees will be made conscious of the importance of information and 
what will be required from them.   
 
Once employees have completed an Information Security Awareness Program, and are 
conscious of their information security responsibilities, they move to Stage 2, Conscious 
Incompetence.  Employees are now conscious of what is expected from them in the 
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protection of information, but do not, as yet, have the skills to do so.  For employees to 
move to the next Stage in the Model, they will have to complete an Information Security 
Training Program.  Through this Program, employees will be taught the information 
security skills and practices necessary in their jobs and these skills and practices will 
impact the artifacts level of culture.  Employees will, therefore, become competent in 
information security practices and will advance to Stage 3 or Conscious Competence. 
 
Employees at Stage 3 possess the essential skills needed for the successful protection of 
information assets.  Applying these skills, though, still requires a conscious effort on the 
part of the employee and the skills have not become part of the daily routine of 
employees.  For the skills to become part of the daily routines and, eventually, the 
corporate culture of an organisation, an Information Security Education Program must be 
attended by employees.  It is through the deeper understanding gained in the Education 
Program that employees will begin to follow information security practices in their 
everyday tasks as this deeper understanding will modify the shared tacit assumptions of 
employees.  Eventually, once employees have gained sufficient Experience in the 
information security practices, they will move to Stage 4 or Unconscious Competence.  
Further, as more and more employees become Unconsciously Competent, the corporate 
culture will evolve into one that tends to be Information Security Obedient.  
 
If a corporate culture has become Information Security Obedient, it follows that 
employees and management, through their attitudes and correct behaviour, are working 
towards the information security vision of senior management, as outlined in the 
Corporate Information Security Policy.  At the espoused values level, the Corporate 
Information Security Policy, and related procedures, establishes the actions and 
behaviour required from employees.  This behaviour is reflected at the artifacts level, 
which in turn results from the collective beliefs at the shared tacit assumptions level.  
Therefore, the artifacts, espoused values and shared tacit assumptions levels of corporate 
culture are in alignment with one another.  Further, if all Three Levels of Corporate 
Culture are aligned it indicates that Goal Consensus, as seen in Chapter 5, has been 
achieved in an organisation. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
The primary focus of any employee in an organisation is getting the job done.  Therefore, 
if seemingly irrelevant tasks and responsibilities appear to be hindering employees as 
they conduct their daily tasks, they could very well look for ways to circumvent these 
‘irrelevant’ tasks.  Too often employees believe that firewalls, and other technical 
controls, are handling the protection of information and that they do not have a role to 
play or their role is negligible.  Employees must be made to fully appreciate and 
understand the complexities involved in protecting information assets, as physical and 
technical controls alone are not enough.   
 
This appreciation and understanding should be achieved through Information Security 
Awareness, Training and Education Programs in an organisation.  All employees need 
the foundation of an Information Security Awareness Program, but learning must go 
beyond that.  Employees should receive Information Security Training that is relevant to 
their particular jobs.  The information security skills learned must be incorporated into 
the everyday tasks of employees over time.  One of the most effective ways to ensure that 
this can be achieved is for all employees to go through an Information Security Education 
program to gain a comprehensive understanding of their information security 
responsibilities. 
 
Over time, as the employees become accustomed to and experienced in the skills learned 
through Information Security Training and Education, these skills will become the norm 
and part of daily activities.  These skills and the behaviour of employees should be in line 
with the information security vision of senior management.  As such, Corporate 
Information Security Obedience will most probably have been achieved in an 
organisation. 
 
The following chapter will merge the Three Levels of Corporate Culture, discussed in 
Chapter 2, Corporate Information Security Obedience, discussed in Chapter 5, the Modes 
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of Knowledge Creation, discussed in Chapter 6, and the Information Security 
Competence Maturity Model, discussed in this chapter, into the Model for Information 
Security Shared Tacit Espoused Values (MISSTEV). 
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CHAPTER 8 
 
THE MODEL FOR INFORMATION SECURITY 
SHARED TACIT ESPOUSED VALUES (MISSTEV) 
 
8.1 Introduction 
As highlighted in previous chapters, one of the prevalent problems facing the success of 
information security practices in organisations is the incorrect behaviour and apathy of 
employees towards information security.  In a Coercive Environment, employees’ 
behaviour can be modified through consequences and in a Utilitarian Environment 
through incentives.  In other words, incorrect behaviour is punished and correct 
behaviour is rewarded in the respective Environments.  However, rewards and 
consequences alone will only change the overt behaviour of employees and, if these 
incentives and consequences are withheld, employees will more than likely regress.   
 
In order to have a lasting impact on the behaviour of employees, it is vital that the root 
cause of the incorrect behaviour is identified and modified.  As observed in the Three 
Levels of Corporate Culture, it is the underlying beliefs and values of employees at the 
shared tacit assumptions level that indirectly impacts on the behaviour of employees.  
Therefore, it is necessary that the tacit knowledge found at this level is addressed and 
modified to reflect the behaviour outlined in the resultant procedures of the Corporate 
Information Security Policy.  In this way, the correct information security behaviour will 
become part of an Information Security Conscious Corporate Culture.   
 
As emphasised in previous chapters, however, changing tacit knowledge at the shared 
tacit assumptions level and, ultimately, the corporate culture, is often an extremely 
complex task.  This is because changing the corporate culture requires unlearning beliefs 
and assumptions and learning new ones.  Corporate culture is one of the most stable 
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aspects of an organisation and employees must be fully motivated and understand the 
need for change in the organisation.   
 
This chapter will outline the four essential building blocks necessary in the creation of an 
Information Security Conscious Corporate Culture.  These building blocks will be 
integrated to create the Model for Information Security Shared Tacit Espoused Values or 
MISSTEV.  These building blocks include the Three Levels of Corporate Culture, the 
Information Security Competence Maturity Model, the Modes of Knowledge Creation 
and Corporate Information Security Obedience, all of which have been discussed in 
previous chapters.  These four building blocks will be merged together into MISSTEV 
which will illustrate the evolution of a corporate culture where information security 
practices and procedures are evident. 
 
8.2  First Component of MISSTEV: Three Levels of Corporate   
Culture 
As detailed in Chapter 2, the Three Levels of artifacts, espoused values and shared tacit 
assumptions are intertwined to form the basis of corporate culture.  Corporate culture is, 
to a large extent, the essence of an organisation and not something that an organisation 
can own.  Corporate culture exists in every organisation, regardless of whether the 
management and employees are aware of it.  In the cases where management is not aware 
of the influence of the corporate culture in its organisation and does nothing to shape it, 
the corporate culture, and resultant behaviour of employees, is often working against the 
best interests of an organisation. 
 
Also described in Chapter 2 were the classifications of corporate culture, namely; 
Creative, Quality, Supportive and Productive, as well as the likelihood of sub- and 
counter-cultures existing within an organisation.  Once again, it must be emphasised that 
regardless of the culture classification in an organisation, or whether sub- or counter-
cultures do exist, all corporate cultures consist of the artifacts, espoused values and 
shared tacit assumptions level.  Corporate culture is interwoven throughout an 
organisation and many of the essential components of culture are, in effect, hidden.  In an 
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attempt to comprehend this multifaceted discipline it is imperative that the Three Levels 
of Corporate Culture are understood.  The deepest, and most intricate, level of the Three 
Levels is shared tacit assumptions.  It is at this level that the beliefs, morals and values of 
employees, in relation to work, exist.  These beliefs have been cultivated over time and 
have become generally accepted by all employees.  Very often these beliefs are simply 
accepted as ‘the way things are done around here’ and are not challenged by employees 
who are comfortable in their working environment.  New employees will, most often, 
follow the observed behaviour of their co-workers and will gradually adopt the shared 
tacit assumptions of the group as their own.  For that reason, when change is attempted 
that questions the correctness or validity of the widely held beliefs and values of 
employees; it is often met with resistance.   
 
The shared tacit assumptions level indirectly influences the artifacts level of corporate 
culture.  Of all the levels, the artifacts level is the most straightforward as it consists of 
the observed behaviour and actions of the people in an organisation.  The behaviour 
observed at this level is a result of the entrenched beliefs and values that guide the 
thinking, and consequent actions, of employees.  Although the actions of employees at 
this level may be clear, the reasons behind them are not, unless the shared tacit 
assumptions level of corporate culture is understood.  Therefore, in order to change the 
actions and behaviour of employees, the shared tacit assumptions level of corporate 
culture must be addressed. 
 
Finally, the espoused values level of corporate culture is expressed, to a large extent, 
through the policies of an organisation.  These are the values that an organisation is said 
to be supporting.  A Corporate Information Security Policy, and the related procedures, 
can be found at this level and the policy would outline the behaviour expected from 
employees in terms of information security.  Frequently, however, there are discrepancies 
between what is expressed at the espoused values level and what is seen in practice.  If 
the beliefs and attitude of employees towards information security are not in agreement 
with the espoused information security values of the Corporate Information Security 
 108
Policy, then the observed actions and behaviour of employees towards information assets 
will not be in coherence with the wishes of senior management. 
 
When it comes to organisational learning, as described in Chapter 6, there are two 
concepts relevant to the Three Levels of Corporate Culture.  These are theory-in-use and 
theory-of-action.  Theory-in-use is developed by observing organisational behaviour and 
correlates with the shared tacit assumptions level.  Theory-of-action, however, is 
reflected in corporate policies and correlates with the espoused values level.   
 
Every employee in an organisation develops his or her own representation of the theory-
in-use, or tacit knowledge.  This representation is a private image unique to that 
employee.  However, more important to the organisation are the public representations of 
the theory-in-use common to all employees.  These public representations are known as 
organisational maps.  As seen in Chapter 6, these organisational maps help to guide the 
actions and behaviour of employees.  Further, just as with the conflict that often exists 
between the espoused values and shared tacit assumptions level, so too is there often 
conflict between the public organisational maps of employees and the theory-of-action.   
 
As seen by the potential discrepancies between the espoused values level and the shared 
tacit assumptions level and the discrepancies between organisational theory-in-use and 
theory-of-action, the behaviour and actions of employees at the artifacts level very often 
do not support the espoused values found in corporate policies.  Further, this is one of the 
prevalent problems in the protection of information assets.  Very frequently the correct 
behaviour, actions and practices espoused in the Corporate Information Security Policy, 
and associated procedures, are not displayed at the artifacts level of corporate culture.  
This indicates that the beliefs of employees towards information security are not in line 
with the vision of information security that senior management is promoting through the 
Corporate Information Security Policy. 
 
The private images of individual employees and the public organisational maps of the 
group are constantly adapting to changes in the working environment.  Changes in the 
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private images and public maps of employees lead to a change in the theory-in-use or 
tacit knowledge in an organisation.  A change in the theory-in-use is known as 
organisational learning.  Organisational learning can be compared to the internalization 
and combination processes of knowledge creation.  The Three Corporate Culture Levels 
are absolutely essential in addressing the changing of a corporate culture and, therefore, 
an essential building block in MISSTEV.   
 
8.3 Second Component of MISSTEV: Corporate Information 
Security Obedience 
There are many issues facing the successful implementation of information security into 
an organisation.  Information security is often treated as an overhead or afterthought 
rather than an investment in the protection of one of the organisation’s most important 
assets.  An additional, and arguably the most complex, problem facing the successful 
implementation of information security in organisations is the behaviour and actions of 
employees.  Even if the best technical and physical controls are in place in an 
organisation to protect the technology, and the information it houses, careless or 
uneducated employee behaviour can seriously undermine information security.  The 
corporate culture, to a large extent, is responsible for the behaviour and actions of 
employees.  Therefore, the corporate culture of an organisation should be altered to 
positively influence the behaviour of employees towards information assets.   
 
The power to change the corporate culture in an organisation lies largely with its senior 
management.  One of the main corporate governance duties of senior management is that 
it must be accountable and responsible for the protection of the assets of an organisation.  
Further, senior management should set a clear vision for its organisation and lead through 
direction-giving.  The direction-giving should be achieved through the implementation of 
corporate policies.  Further, the corporate policies of an organisation, and the consequent 
procedures, should outline the desired behaviour required from all employees in an 
organisation for the protection of assets.   
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More specifically, the Corporate Information Security Policy should describe the vision 
that senior management has for information security in its organisation.  Related 
procedures should outline the behaviour required from employees for the successful 
protection of information assets.  The main aim of any policy, whether for information 
security or not, is to influence and determine decisions and actions by specifying what 
behaviour is acceptable and what behaviour is unacceptable.  Policies and procedures are, 
therefore, organisational laws that determine acceptable and unacceptable conduct within 
the context of the corporate culture 
 
The vision of senior management, as outlined in the corporate policies, may imply that 
the existing corporate culture is sufficient and will not require change, as the normal 
development of the culture will achieve the vision of management.  Or else, the vision 
may imply that minor, or widespread, change is necessary to fulfill the vision of senior 
management.  The desired corporate culture would be one where the vision expressed at 
the espoused values level of culture by senior management is supported by the actions 
and behaviour of employees determined by the shared tacit assumptions level of 
corporate culture.   
   
To achieve the information security vision of senior management it is often necessary 
that the behaviour of employees will have to change to comply with this vision.  In order 
for this vision to be achieved it is important that this correct behaviour desired by senior 
management becomes de facto or second-nature to employees and part of their daily 
activities.  If the desired information security behaviour and actions become second-
nature to employees and part of the corporate culture, then Corporate Information 
Security Obedience will be evident in an organisation. 
 
For Corporate Information Security Obedience to be apparent in an organisation, it is 
required that the shared tacit assumptions level of corporate culture, or the beliefs and 
values of employees, is in line with the espoused values level of senior management.  
This indicates that a Goal Consensus Environment has been achieved in an organisation, 
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where both management and employees are working towards the vision of senior 
management. 
 
8.4 Third Component of MISSTEV: Modes of Knowledge Creation 
“The beginning of knowledge is the discovery of something we do not understand”.  This 
quote by Frank Herbert highlights that for knowledge creation to begin, it must first be 
discovered what knowledge is lacking (The Quotations Page, 2006, online).  To maintain 
a competitive edge it is necessary for organisations to create and disseminate new 
knowledge on a daily basis.  In most organisations, for information security practices to 
become part of the daily routine, it is required that this new information security 
knowledge is created.  This new knowledge, pertinent to information security, will 
impact several levels of corporate culture as will be seen in this section. 
 
The new knowledge created is either tacit or explicit knowledge.  Tacit knowledge is 
difficult to communicate and includes beliefs, attitudes and values.  Explicit knowledge, 
on the other hand, can be communicated effectively.  The four processes of interaction 
between tacit and explicit knowledge are represented in the Modes of Knowledge 
Creation.  These processes are externalization, socialization, combination and 
internalization.   
 
Through externalization tacit knowledge is made explicit.  Tacit knowledge is found at 
the shared tacit assumptions level of corporate culture and this tacit knowledge 
determines the actions and behaviour of employees.  Therefore, through externalization, 
the beliefs and values that drive behaviour should be made known.  Externalization can 
be achieved through the expression of beliefs and values in discussion and dialogues. 
 
Socialization enables the tacit knowledge of an individual to be transferred to the tacit 
knowledge of another.  Knowledge is captured through direct interaction and a good deal 
of knowledge can be created through observation.  Socialization impacts the shared tacit 
assumptions level only as it creates tacit knowledge from tacit knowledge.  Socialization 
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depends on the shared experiences of individuals to build the shared tacit assumptions 
level of corporate culture.   
 
Combination is used for the transfer of explicit knowledge to the explicit knowledge of a 
group.  Explicit knowledge can be disseminated through, for example, documents, 
policies and e-mails, as well as through meetings.  Combination impacts only the 
espoused values level of corporate culture and deals with explicit knowledge.  The 
collection of explicit knowledge and the way that knowledge is distributed throughout an 
organisation is of utmost importance for the success of combination. 
 
Internalization is the process individuals use to absorb explicit knowledge into their own 
tacit knowledge.  The explicit knowledge is found at the espoused values level of 
corporate culture and defines the desired behaviour required from employees.  For 
internalization to be successful it is necessary for an individual to practice the skills, 
tasks or behaviour learnt through the explicit knowledge from the combination process.  
Gradually, explicit knowledge, and the related skills and tasks, will become tacit. 
 
The Modes of Knowledge Creation are extremely significant to the learning process of an 
organisation and goes beyond the concept of organisational learning.  Organisational 
learning entails the detection and correction of error in an organisation.  Organisational 
learning can be compared to the internalization and combination processes of the Modes 
of Knowledge Creation as it deals chiefly with the conversion of explicit knowledge into 
organisational theory-in-use, or tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge to explicit 
knowledge and, therefore, has limited implications.  The Modes of Knowledge Creation 
deal with both tacit and explicit knowledge and the exchange between these types of 
knowledge.   
 
In order to set the Modes of Knowledge Creation into motion, a degree of commitment is 
necessary from employees.  As mentioned in Chapter 6, employees’ commitment to an 
organisation plays an important role in encouraging the creation of new knowledge.  
Therefore, in order to change the way things are done in an organisation and to create 
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new knowledge requires that employees are committed to that change.  It is vital, 
therefore, to encourage employees to be committed to information security in their 
organisation.  One way to ensure this commitment is for employees to fully understand 
the significance of information security for the organisation. 
 
Figure 8.1 represents the relationship between the first component of MISSTEV, the 
Three Levels of Corporate Culture, and the third component, the Modes of Knowledge 
Creation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Three levels of corporate culture and modes of knowledge creation 
 
 
As can be seen in Figure 8.1, the knowledge creation process of combination affects only 
the espoused values level of corporate culture as it deals only with explicit knowledge.  
The processes of internalization and externalization affect both the espoused values and 
shared tacit assumptions level of corporate culture as they deal with both explicit and 
tacit knowledge.  The process of socialization affects the shared tacit assumptions level 
of corporate culture only as it deals with tacit knowledge alone.   
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8.5 Fourth Component of MISSTEV: Information Security 
Competence Maturity Model 
In a quote by Abigail Adams she says, “Learning is not attained by chance; it must be 
sought for with ardor and attended to with diligence” (The Quotations Page, 2006, 
online).  Employees in an organisation must be committed to change in order to learn 
new skills and behaviour.  As they step through the Information Security Competence 
Maturity Model, employees should be motivated to reach the pinnacle of the Maturity 
Model.  As detailed in Chapter 7, for employees to learn new skills and behaviour, they 
must move through four stages of learning, Unconscious Incompetence, Conscious 
Incompetence, Conscious Competence, and Unconscious Competence.   
 
At Stage 1, Unconscious Incompetence, employees are unaware of the tasks, skills and 
behaviour necessary for the protection of information assets.  Through an Information 
Security Awareness Program employees should be made conscious of the roles they 
should be playing in information security.  At Stage 2, Conscious Incompetence, 
employees are aware of their role in information security, but as yet do not know how to 
go about protecting information assets.  In order to progress to Stage 3 of the Maturity 
Model, employees must attend an Information Security Training Program.  Through this 
Program employees will learn the skills and behaviour required of them to protect 
information assets. 
 
At Stage 3, Conscious Competence, employees now have the skills to be competent in the 
protection of information assets.  Employees have the necessary proficiency to complete 
any information security task.  However, the completion of these tasks still requires a 
great deal of concentration.  Therefore, even though employees are competent in 
information security skills, it is possible that they may still be careless or forgetful in the 
protection of information assets.  This is as a result of the fact that information security 
has not, as yet, become part of the corporate culture.  In order for this to happen and for 
information security to become part of the daily routine, employees must progress to 
Stage 4 of the Information Security Competence Maturity Model, Unconscious 
Competence.    
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An Information Security Education Program can be used to assist in the progression of 
employees from Stage 3 to Stage 4 of the Information Security Competence Maturity 
Model.  The skills learnt in the Information Security Training Program and reinforced by 
the Education Program should, by this stage, have become second-nature to employees.  
In addition to the Information Security Education Program, Experience will contribute to 
making employees comfortable with the new information security practices.  The more 
experienced employees become in the information security practices, the more rapidly 
these practices and skills will form part of the corporate culture of an organisation.  
Experience will, over time, ensure that Corporate Information Security Obedience 
becomes evident in an organisation.  
 
Figure 8.2 represents the relationship between the second component of MISSTEV, 
Corporate Information Security Obedience, and the fourth component, the Information 
Security Competence Maturity Model. 
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Figure 8.2: Information security competence maturity model 
 
As can be seen from Figure 8.2, Corporate Information Security Obedience is the 
ultimate goal that should be strived for in an organisation in terms of information 
security.  Through Information Security Awareness, Training and Education Programs, 
employees should progress from being Unconsciously Incompetent to Unconsciously 
Competent in information security procedures and practices.  Over time, through 
Experience, the information security skills and practices that have become second-nature 
to employees will evolve and become part of the everyday activities of employees.  
Information security has, therefore, become part of the corporate culture of the 
organisation.  This behaviour should reflect the desired behaviour outlined in the 
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Corporate Information Security Policy, and related procedures, and will indicate that 
Corporate Information Security Obedience has been achieved.  
 
8.6 The Model for Information Security Shared Tacit Espoused 
Values or MISSTEV 
The senior management of an organisation, through its corporate governance duties, is 
responsible and accountable for the protection of an organisation’s assets.  Information is 
one of the most important assets that an organisation possesses.  Therefore, it follows that 
senior management is responsible and accountable for the protection of the information 
assets in its organisation. 
 
A common grievance of information security professionals is that senior management 
does not give the protection of information the priority it deserves.  Information security 
is most often thought of, by senior management, as the IT department’s problem and not 
one for senior management.  Management’s focus is often limited to a small set of acute 
threats to information assets rather than a comprehensive information security solution.   
 
A further obstacle in accomplishing the protection of information assets is the often 
indifferent attitude and corresponding apathetic behaviour of employees.  Employees 
frequently do not fully appreciate the role that they should be playing in the protection of 
information assets and see information security as an ‘add-on’ that is not vital to 
completing their tasks.  As a result, employees will regularly use any ‘workaround’ they 
can to avoid information security related tasks.  However, if employees were to 
comprehend the importance of information security, how it relates to their job and the 
sustainability of the organisation, they will be more inclined to adhere to the information 
security practices prescribed by senior management.  Over time, as these practices are 
used more often, information security should become embedded in the corporate culture 
of an organisation.  This section will detail the construction and development of 
MISSTEV which tracks the progression of employees from the awareness of information 
security practices to an Information Security Conscious Corporate Culture.  The Model 
 118
for Information Security Shared Tacit Espoused Values or MISSTEV is shown in Figure 
8.3. 
 
 
  
                      
 
 
Figure 8.3: Model for information security shared tacit espoused values or MISSTEV 
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the Corporate Information Security Policy.  The Corporate Information Security Policy, 
and the related procedures, describes the actions and behaviour that is required from 
employees for the protection of information assets.  Through the creation of the policy, 
senior management is converting its tacit knowledge, concerning information security, 
into explicit knowledge.  This is done through the externalization process of the Modes 
of Knowledge Creation.  This process allows the tacit knowledge of the shared tacit 
assumptions level of senior management to be expressed as espoused values of the 
organisation.   
 
As seen in the Model, once the externalization process is complete, and the Corporate 
Information Security Policy has been created, the competence of employees in terms of 
information security can now be addressed.  For the purposes of the Model, all employees 
begin the spiral process at the Unconscious Incompetence stage.   
 
At this stage, employees are unaware of the skills necessary to adequately protect the 
information assets of an organisation and they do not know the role they should play in 
information security as yet.  At this stage, the employees’ beliefs and values regarding 
information security, found at the shared tacit assumptions level of corporate culture, is 
not in alignment with the vision of senior management at the espoused values level.  In 
other words, the tacit knowledge of employees is different to the explicit knowledge of 
the organisation. 
 
In order for employees to become aware of the role they should play in information 
security all employees, as seen in Figure 8.3, must participate in an Information Security 
Awareness Program.  The purpose of the program is to make employees conscious of the 
importance of information assets and the reason why it must be protected for the well-
being of the organisation.  The explicit information security knowledge included in the 
Information Security Awareness Program should develop into the explicit knowledge of 
employees through the process of combination.   
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Through combination, the vision of senior management, expressed in the Corporate 
Information Security Policy and found at the espoused values level of corporate culture, 
will be made known to employees and become their explicit knowledge.  The vision is 
now known to employees, but as yet is not part of their shared tacit assumptions.  As 
employees are now aware of the importance of information and the skills they lack, they 
progress to the Conscious Incompetence stage of MISSTEV. 
 
At this stage employees know what they should be doing to protect information assets, 
but, as yet, do not know how this can be accomplished.  Through the Information 
Security Awareness Program, employees have been made fully conscious of exactly what 
is required of them to achieve the information security vision of senior management.  
Further, employees must now learn the skills and practices necessary to support the 
Corporate Information Security Policy.  This can be achieved, as seen in the Model, 
through an Information Security Training Program.  This Training Program should be 
tailored according to the job descriptions of employees and their information security 
responsibilities.  As seen in Figure 8.3, through the Training Program, employees will 
undergo skills development necessary for the implementation of information security in 
the organisation. 
 
Employees will now be competent in the information security skills, procedures and 
practices necessary for the protection of information assets.  As such, employees will 
progress to the Conscious Competence level of MISSTEV.  However, even though 
employees are now competent, this does not mean that employees will necessarily 
implement the skills they have learned.  The skills gained through the Information 
Security Training Program will only be effective if employees are continuously 
encouraged, monitored and motivated to use them.  These information security skills and 
practices still require a good deal of concentration and thought to be implemented 
correctly.  Therefore, even though the correct information security practices and 
procedures might be in place in an organisation, the underlying beliefs and values 
associated with the behaviour of employees are not, as yet, necessarily aligned with the 
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vision of senior management.  This means that the information security vision, found at 
the espoused values level, is not in line with the shared tacit assumptions level.    
 
In order to align the espoused values and shared tacit assumptions levels of corporate 
culture, it is necessary for employees, as seen in Figure 8.3, to attend an Information 
Security Education Program.  This Program will give employees a deeper understanding 
of the information security vision of senior management and encourage employees to 
adopt this vision as their own.  In conjunction with this, over time, as employees are 
constantly using the information security skills and practices they have learnt, these skills 
and practices will become intrinsic or second-nature to the employees.  The protection of 
information assets will, therefore, become part of the daily activities of employees.  The 
process of employees adopting the values espoused through the Corporate Information 
Security Policy, and actively using information security practices, is achieved through the 
process of internalization.   
 
Through internalization, the explicit knowledge of employees becomes tacit knowledge.  
In other words, the information security vision espoused by senior management has 
become part of the shared tacit assumptions of employees.  As both senior management 
and employees are now working towards the same information security vision and goals, 
employee behaviour at the artifacts level of corporate culture will support the Corporate 
Information Security Policy. 
 
Once the internalization process is complete, employees will have progressed to the 
Unconscious Competence stage of MISSTEV.  At this stage, information security 
practices and procedures, displayed at the artifacts level, are as a result of the modified 
beliefs and values found at the shared tacit assumptions level.  The shared tacit 
assumptions level, in turn, is aligned with the espoused values level of corporate culture.  
Further, the Corporate Information Security Policy is found at the espoused values level.  
This indicates that the Three Levels of Corporate Culture are aligned with one another 
and aligned with the information security vision of senior management.  
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As seen in Figure 8.3, over time and through Experience, employees at the Unconscious 
Competence stage of MISSTEV will ultimately reach Corporate Information Security 
Obedience.  For this to occur, socialization is necessary.  The socialization process is 
needed to ensure that the tacit information security knowledge, learnt as they progressed 
through MISSTEV and through Experience, is shared among employees.  This process 
becomes particularly significant for employees who are new to an organisation as it 
assists them in determining what is expected of them in terms of information security.  
The socialization process is, therefore, necessary for the sustainability of the corporate 
culture.   
 
Once all employees have achieved Unconscious Competence in information security, the 
socialization process will allow, ultimately, for the evolution of the corporate culture into 
one where Corporate Information Security Obedience is evident in the organisation.  This 
means that the everyday or de facto employee behaviour complies with the information 
security vision as outlined in the Corporate Information Security Policy.  Once Corporate 
Information Security Obedience has evolved in an organisation, success has been 
achieved.  The ultimate vision of senior management for information security has been 
realised in the organisation. 
    
8.7 Conclusion 
The corporate culture of any organisation is complex and multifaceted and greatly 
influences the behaviour and attitude of employees.  The senior management of an 
organisation has the responsibility to shape the corporate culture into one that will 
support the vision senior management has for the future of the organisation.  Senior 
management must outline its vision for the organisation through its corporate policies. 
 
A general grievance of security professionals is the lack of support from senior 
management for information security as it is often seen as the responsibility of the 
Information Technology department.  The development and creation of a Corporate 
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Information Security Policy should demonstrate the commitment of senior management 
to the protection of information assets. 
 
The Corporate Information Security Policy, and the related procedures, will outline the 
behaviour necessary for achieving the successful protection of information assets.  The 
challenge, however, is ensuring that the behaviour outlined by the information security 
procedures becomes the de facto behaviour of employees and part of an organisation’s 
corporate culture.  In order for this to occur, the tacit knowledge of employees, found at 
the shared tacit assumptions level of corporate culture, must be modified.  The shared 
tacit assumptions level of corporate culture should be aligned with the vision outlined in 
the Corporate Information Security Policy found at the espoused values level.  
Employees must learn the behaviour and skills necessary for the protection of 
information as described in the policy.    
 
The learning process of employees is outlined in the Model for Information Security 
Shared Tacit Espoused Values or MISSTEV.  The building blocks for this Model were 
outlined in this chapter, namely; the Three Levels of Corporate Culture, Corporate 
Information Security Obedience, the Modes of Knowledge Creation and the Information 
Security Competence Maturity Model.  MISSTEV tracks the progression of employees 
from the Unconscious Incompetence stage to the Unconscious Competence stage.  
Through MISSTEV, employees should be informed about the information security vision 
of senior management and their roles and responsibilities to protect information.  Further, 
by following the spiral of the Model, employees should be made aware of and trained in 
the correct skills necessary to protect information assets, and these skills should become 
part of the de facto practices of the employees.  Ultimately, if all employees follow the 
spiral of MISSTEV, Corporate Information Security Obedience should become evident in 
an organisation and the vision of senior management will have been realised.   
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CHAPTER 9 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This thesis is a report of the research undertaken with regard to the integration of 
acceptable information security practices into the corporate culture of an organisation.  
To accomplish this, the following topics, inter alia, were examined; corporate culture and 
management’s role in corporate culture, information security and the impact of employee 
behaviour on the protection of information assets, and knowledge creation and the 
learning processes within an organisation.   
 
It was argued that in order to address the research problem the focus should be on the 
beliefs and values of employees regarding information security.  Only once employees 
believe in the importance of information assets for the sustainability of an organisation 
will they begin to integrate information security practices into their daily activities.  The 
greater part of this concluding chapter will evaluate whether the research objectives of 
this thesis were met.  Following this, areas for future research will be discussed. 
 
9.2 Evaluation of the Research Outcomes 
The primary objective of this research project was to develop a model that will assist in 
the integration of information security practices into an organisation.  To achieve this 
primary objective, a number of secondary objectives were defined.  This remainder of 
this section will address the secondary objectives, which were identified in Chapter 1, 
Section 1.4. 
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Research Objective: An investigation into the role that management should play 
in the integration of information security into an organisation. 
 
This objective helped clarify the accountability and responsibility senior 
management should have towards the information assets in its organisation.  
Further, the role that senior management should play in the integration of 
information security practices into the corporate culture of an organisation was 
explained.  
 
Senior management has many corporate governance responsibilities in its 
organisation.  One of the main duties of the managing director, together with 
senior management, is to set the vision and strategic direction for the organisation 
in a responsible manner.  Senior management is accountable to stakeholders and 
must ensure the reputation of its organisation and the protection of the 
organisation’s assets.  One such asset that must be protected is information. 
 
Senior management should demonstrate its commitment to the protection of 
information assets by developing a Corporate Information Security Policy.  
However, it is not enough for the policy to just be created.  Through the policy, 
employees must begin to understand their roles and responsibilities towards the 
protection of information.  It is through understanding that employees will begin 
to incorporate the correct information security practices into their daily behaviour.     
 
Therefore, this objective was achieved in Chapters 3 and 4 by detailing that 
management’s role in integrating information security practices into an 
organisation should be part of its corporate governance duties in the protection of 
the organisation’s assets. 
 
 
 
 126
Research Objective: An examination of the impact that employee behaviour 
could have on the successful implementation of information security practices in 
to an organisation. 
 
It was highlighted how the apathetic or incorrect behaviour of employees can be 
an obstacle to the successful implementation of information security practices into 
an organisation. 
 
The human element of information security is one of the most, if not the most, 
essential.  This is because almost all information security practices rely on the 
human element to a large degree.  However, employees continue to be the most 
severe threat to information security.   
 
An organisation could have the best physical and technical controls in order to 
protect its information assets, but an employee, either inadvertently or 
maliciously, could circumvent these controls and information is placed at risk.  
For the majority of employees, their main concern at work is to complete the task 
at hand.  As a result of the pressure related to an employee’s job, any tasks that 
are not deemed essential to ‘getting things done’ are often overlooked or regarded 
as obstacles.  Therefore, if employees consider security to be something that is a 
hindrance to completing their tasks, they might not take proper preventative 
measures, and worse, might find a ‘workaround’ to any security measure they do 
not consider necessary.  In order for employee behaviour to positively impact the 
implementation of information security practices into an organisation, the beliefs 
and attitudes of employees must be addressed. 
 
Therefore, as seen in Chapter 4, incorrect employee behaviour can severely, and 
negatively, impact the success of the implementation of information security 
practices into an organisation. 
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Research Objective: A study of the theories and concepts underlying corporate 
culture and determining how corporate culture could influence the employees in 
an organisation. 
 
This study of the theories and concepts underlying corporate culture helped 
clarify the complex concept of corporate culture and why it is such an important 
consideration when attempting to change the behaviour and attitudes of 
employees. 
 
Corporate culture is an underlying, but often misconstrued, force within all 
organisations that influences the behaviour and attitudes of its employees.  In 
order to gain a better insight into corporate culture, it was established that the 
Three Levels of Corporate Culture, namely; artifacts, espoused values, and 
shared tacit assumptions, must be examined and understood in an organisation.  
The espoused values level represents the goals and strategy of an organisation.  
However, the values identified at the espoused values level is not always apparent 
at the artifacts level, which denotes the actions and behaviour of employees.  This 
is because it is the beliefs and values of employees, found at the shared tacit 
assumptions level of corporate culture, that influence the behaviour of employees 
observable at the artifacts level. 
 
Therefore, the concept of corporate culture was explored in Chapter 2 and the 
influence that the corporate culture has on the behaviour of employees, as a result 
of their beliefs and values, was detailed. 
    
Research Objective: An investigation into management’s role in corporate 
culture and the influence of management policies in shaping the corporate 
culture. 
 
The investigation addressed and assisted in clarifying the significant role that 
senior management should be playing in the protection of information assets.  It is 
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vital that senior management understands, and is involved in, the shaping of the 
corporate culture, as it is the corporate culture that assists in giving the 
organisation its meaning and direction.  However, shaping and transforming the 
corporate culture takes time and determination.  In order to change the corporate 
culture, employees’ beliefs and values at the shared tacit assumptions level 
should be changed.  Unlearning beliefs and changing the attitudes of employees 
can be a painful process.  Further, it should be senior management’s task to lead 
this transformation of the corporate culture by setting an example, so that the 
change can saturate the organisation.  If management demonstrates the need for 
changing the current beliefs and values is imperative to the sustainability of the 
organisation, it will emphasise and encourage the change in corporate culture. 
 
To assist in shaping the corporate culture, an organisational vision should be 
expressed by management in its policies.  Management policies, and the related 
procedures, determine what behaviour and actions are acceptable and which are 
unacceptable.  These policies should be enforced to assist management in curbing 
incorrect behaviour in its organisation and, ultimately, change the corporate 
culture.   
 
Therefore, as detailed in Chapter 3, senior management has a significant role to 
play in shaping the corporate culture in its organisation.  Senior management 
should be involved in the development and communication of management 
policies to employees, as the role of policies should be to influence and determine 
the behaviour and actions of employees.  Consequently, senior management 
should shape the corporate culture through policies and through leading by 
example. 
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Research Objective: Determining the role of the Corporate Information Security 
Policy in aligning management’s information security vision with the behaviour 
of employees. 
 
This objective established the purpose of the Corporate Information Security 
Policy and why it is crucial in the alignment of the information security vision and 
the behaviour of employees.  To demonstrate its commitment to information 
security, senior management should be involved in the development of a 
Corporate Information Security Policy.  This policy should outline senior 
management’s vision for information security in the organisation.  In addition, the 
policy, and the related procedures, should provide guidance for employees as to 
what behaviour is acceptable and what behaviour is unacceptable in the protection 
of information assets. 
 
The communication of the Corporate Information Security Policy is just as 
important as the policy itself.  It is crucially important that the policy is 
effectively disseminated to all employees in the organisation for the employees to 
know what is expected of them.  However, even though employees know what is 
expected of them, it is possible that they will not adhere to the behavioural 
guidelines in the policy if they do not believe them to be of any consequence.  
Therefore, senior management must emphasise the importance of the policy, and 
related procedures, to influence employees into paying attention to the policy and 
treating the policy with respect. 
 
Therefore, as discussed in Chapter 4, the Corporate Information Security Policy 
should outline the information security vision of senior management.  As the 
policy should influence the behaviour and actions of employees in an 
organisation, it should be used as the foundation for aligning the vision of senior 
management and the behaviour of employees by specifying what is expected of 
employees. 
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Research Objective: A study of the knowledge creation process in an 
organisation and the learning process of employees. 
 
The study of the knowledge creation process highlighted the fact that knowledge 
creation is an essential part of any organisation.  Without the creation and 
effective use of new knowledge, organisations would, in all probability, lose their 
competitive edge.  Essential to change in an organisation is the development of 
both tacit and explicit knowledge, and the interaction between the two.  Explicit 
knowledge refers to knowledge that is transmittable in formal, organised 
language.  Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, has a personal quality, which 
makes it difficult to formalise and communicate.  Tacit knowledge drives action, 
commitment, and involvement in an organisation.  The four Modes of Knowledge 
Creation proposed by Nonaka, namely; socialization, combination, internalization 
and externalization, are the processes used by organisations to create fresh 
knowledge through the interaction of explicit and tacit knowledge.  It must be 
emphasised that knowledge creation is a spiral process that leads to a deeper 
understanding of the knowledge that has been created or shared. 
 
Whenever employees need to learn new skills and, possibly, develop new beliefs, 
there are four stages that they will progress through, namely; Unconscious 
Incompetence, Conscious Incompetence, Conscious Competence and Unconscious 
Competence.  In terms of information security, it is important that employees 
understand the role they should play in the protection of information assets.  This 
awareness and understanding should be achieved through Information Security 
Awareness, Training and Education.   
 
Therefore, this objective was achieved through an extensive study of the Modes 
of Knowledge Creation in Chapter 6 and through detailing the learning process of 
employees in Chapter 7. 
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Research Objective: An investigation into the relationship that should exist 
between information security, corporate culture and corporate governance. 
 
This objective was met through the definition of the term Corporate Information 
Security Obedience which can be used to describe the relationship between 
corporate culture, corporate governance and information security.   
 
Through this relationship, senior management is both accountable and responsible 
for the information assets in its organisation.  A Corporate Information Security 
Policy should be developed to outline the vision that senior management has for 
information security in its organisation.  Furthermore, the Corporate Information 
Security Policy should influence the actions and behaviour, and ultimately the 
fundamental beliefs and values, of employees in the protection of information 
assets.  As the beliefs and values of employees begin to change and become 
aligned with the Corporate Information Security Policy, so too will the corporate 
culture of an organisation change into one that is more information security 
conscious.  
 
Therefore, as detailed in Chapter 5, the disciplines of corporate culture, corporate 
governance and information security should be inextricably linked, through 
Corporate Information Security Obedience, to ensure the satisfactory protection of 
information assets in an organisation. 
 
In addition to these secondary objectives, the primary objective of developing a model to 
assist with the integration of information security practices into an organisation was met 
through the development of MISSTEV constructed in Chapter 8.  MISSTEV should 
communicate the information security vision of management to employees, as well as the 
roles, responsibilities and skills needed by employees to protect information assets.  
Through the spiral process of MISSTEV the protection of information assets should 
become de facto behaviour for employees.   
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Therefore, one can assertively state that the primary objective of this thesis, the 
development of MISSTEV, as well as the secondary objectives of this thesis have been 
discussed and met. 
 
9.3 Directions for Future Research 
This research project proposed the Model for Information Security Shared Tacit 
Espoused Values or MISSTEV.  This model was constructed from various components 
which were detailed in this thesis.  There remain, however, certain aspects of the model 
that can be refined and investigated further.  This section will outline these aspects and 
the areas for future research. 
 
The externalization process of senior management’s information security vision and the 
translation of this vision into the Corporate Information Security Policy can be 
investigated further.   
 
Further, it was established that in order for employees to progress from the Unconscious 
Incompetence to the Conscious Incompetence stage of MISSTEV employees will have to 
take part in an Information Security Awareness Program.  This study, however, did not 
detail the elements that should be included in the Awareness Program.  Future research 
should investigate how an Information Security Awareness Program should be structured 
to be most beneficial for an organisation.  Similar investigations should be undertaken to 
establish the structure and components that should be included in an Information Security 
Training and Education Programs. 
 
An Information Security Training Program is necessary for employees to progress from 
the Conscious Incompetence to the Conscious Competence stage of MISSTEV.  Future 
research should include an investigation into the skills that will be necessary for 
employees to adequately protect information assets in an organisation.  In addition, 
ideally, an Information Security Training Program should be tailored to fit the roles and 
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responsibilities of employees.  Future research may be able to establish how this can be 
achieved. 
 
An Information Security Education Program is necessary for employees to progress from 
the Conscious Competence to the Unconscious Competence stage of MISSTEV.  The 
details of what should be included in the Education Program should form part of future 
research.   
 
Therefore, future research should attempt to refine aspects of MISSTEV.  This should 
provide added depth to the model and further detail to the learning process of employees 
as they progress through MISSTEV.  
 
9.4 Epilogue 
The most important asset of many organisations is information.  It is crucial that this 
significant asset is protected through adequate information security practices.  One of the 
major stumbling blocks, however, to the successful implementation of information 
security practices is the incorrect and apathetic behaviour of employees.  Incorrect 
employee behaviour could have an enormously detrimental impact on the protection of 
information.     
 
Therefore, the issue of employee behaviour must be addressed in an organisation to assist 
in ensuring the protection of information assets.  Employees could adhere to the correct 
behaviour because of rewards they might receive or because of the consequences they 
will face if they do not.  Rewards and consequences, however, should not be the reason 
for employees adhering to the correct behaviour and practices.  Further, rewards and 
consequences are not the ideal in an organisation, as both rewards and consequences 
require strict management to ensure their effectiveness.  Ideally, the corporate culture of 
an organisation should be shaped to include correct information security practices into the 
everyday tasks and behaviour of employees.  In order to address the behaviour of 
employees it is imperative that the beliefs and values of employees are addressed. 
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As the beliefs of employees regarding information security change to reflect the 
importance of information security to an organisation, so the behaviour of employees 
should also change.  Over time, and through experience, the correct information security 
practices and behaviour should become part of the corporate culture of the organisation.     
 
Thereby, the shared tacit assumptions of employees and the espoused values of 
management, regarding information security, should be aligned to create a corporate 
culture that is information security competent. 
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Abstract: All organisations possess a corporate culture, whether they are aware of it or not.  This culture 
determines, to a large extent, the effectiveness of an organisation and the behaviour of employees within 
an organisation.  As part of its corporate governance duties, senior management is responsible for the 
protection of the assets of its organisation.  And as information is a vital asset to most organisations, 
senior management is ultimately responsible for the protection of information assets.  An ideal corporate 
culture, in terms of information security, would be one where the second-nature behaviour of employees, 
determined by the culture, is to protect information assets.  This paper will provide initial guidelines as to 
how to establish this culture by examining Schein’s model and by investigating how to start 
implementing Corporate Information Security Obedience. 
 
Key words: Information Security; Corporate Governance; Corporate Culture; Goal Consensus; Corporate Information 
Security Obedience. 
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1. Introduction 
Information is a vital asset and it is often described as the lifeblood of organisations 
(Gordon, 2002, online).  It is, however, difficult to measure the exact value of the 
information that an organisation possesses.  Still, it is evident that any breach in the 
confidentiality, integrity or availability of information could result in devastating 
consequences for an organisation (Gordon and Glickson LLC, 2001, online).  Information 
security practices, together with other physical and technological means, therefore, need 
to be implemented and managed within the organisation to ensure that the information is 
kept safe and secure (Krige, 1999, p 7). 
 
As information is a fundamental organisational asset, its security must be integrated into 
the organisation’s overall management plan (Lane, 1985, pp 2-3; Smith, 1989, p 193).  
This plan should be guided by good corporate governance practices.  Corporate 
governance is one of the significant issues in business at present.  Corporate governance 
is there to endorse the competent use of resources and to involve accountability for the 
management of those resources (Gaines, 2002, online; World Bank Group, 1999, online). 
 
Senior management, as part of its corporate governance duties, should encourage 
employees to adhere to the behaviour specified by senior management to contribute 
towards a successful organisation.  Senior management should preferably not 
autocratically enforce this behaviour, but encourage it as naturally as possible, resulting 
in the correct behaviour becoming part of the corporate culture.  Corporate culture is the 
outcome of all the collective, taken-for-granted assumptions that a group has learned 
throughout history.  It is the residue of success (Schein, 1999, p 29). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to detail the ideal corporate culture that should exist for it to 
be effective in protecting information.  The paper initially investigates the role senior 
management should play in protecting information assets and how the creation and 
execution of the Corporate Information Security Policy could play a part in cultivating an 
information security conscious culture.  The emphasis of this paper is to start 
investigating how to implement Corporate Information Security Obedience through 
expanding Schein’s model of corporate culture into a two-dimensional model 
representing both management and employee dimensions.     
2. Managing an organisation 
Corporate governance is extremely important for managing the operation of 
organisations.  Senior management, through effective corporate governance practices, 
must lead its organisation through ‘direction giving’ and strategy implementation 
(Planting, 2001, online).  In order to implement this management strategy, the King 
Report recommends that four central pillars of corporate governance are visible in an  
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organisation, namely; accountability, responsibility, fairness and transparency (2001, p 
17). 
 
Accountability provides assurance that individuals and groups in an organisation are 
accountable for the decisions and actions that they take (King Report, 2001, p 14).  The 
pillar of responsibility indicates that corrective action should be taken against negligence 
and misconduct (King Report, 2001, p 14).  The third pillar, fairness, attempts to ensure 
that there is a balance in an organisation, in terms of the recognition various parties 
should receive.  The final pillar, transparency, is the measure of how effective 
management is at making necessary information available in an open, precise and timely 
manner (King Report, 2001, pp. 13-14).  These four pillars contribute to the overall goal 
of proper corporate governance.   
 
Through effective corporate governance, senior management is accountable and 
responsible for the wellbeing of its organisation and must ensure that the assets of its 
organisation are well protected.  One such asset is information, and, therefore, it is the 
responsibility of senior management to protect the information assets of its organisation 
(King Report, 2001, p 17; Deloitte & Touche, 2002, online).  Another responsibility of 
senior management is to cultivate and shape the corporate culture of its organisation.      
3. Corporate culture 
Organisations develop cultures whether they want to or not.  The culture of an 
organisation operates at both a conscious and unconscious level and if management does 
not understand the culture in its organisation, it could prove to be fatal in today’s business 
world (Hagberg Consulting Group, 2002, online).  Edgar H. Schein defines three levels 
of culture.  
The three levels of corporate culture 
One of the problems when trying to understand culture is to oversimplify this complex 
field.  Culture exists at several levels, which range from the very visible to the tacit and 
invisible.  Furthermore, it is imperative that these levels are managed and understood 
(Schein, 1999, p 15).   
 
The first level of corporate culture is the Artifacts Level.  This is probably the easiest 
level to observe as it consists of the visible behaviour of individuals (Hagberg Consulting 
Group, 2002, online; Schein, 1999, p 15).  At this level, it is still not clear as to why 
employees of an organisation behave in this way and why each organisation is 
constructed as it is (Schein, 1999, p 16).  This leads to an investigation of the second 
level of culture.  The Espoused Values Level of corporate culture is the level where the 
values an organisation is promoting are outlined in the organisation’s policies (Schein, 
1999, p 17).   
 
 145
Appendix A 
 
There could be a few noticeable inconsistencies between some of the Espoused Values or 
goals of an organisation and the visible behaviour of individuals as seen at the Artifacts 
Level.  These inconsistencies indicate that a deeper level of thought is driving the obvious 
behaviour of the employees (Schein, 1999, p 18).  To truly understand the visible 
behaviour and culture of an organisation, the Shared Tacit Assumptions Level of culture 
must be understood (Schein, 1999, pp 18-19). 
 
This Shared Tacit Assumptions Level represents the core of corporate culture.  This core 
is the mutually learned beliefs and assumptions that become taken for granted as the 
organisation continues to be successful.  The beliefs and values found at this level are 
second-nature to employees and influence the decisions and actions that they take 
(Schein, 1999, p 21).  The corporate culture of an organisation should assist senior 
management in enforcing and ensuring good information security practices.  Together 
with corporate culture, good corporate governance practices are essential for successful 
information security. 
4. Information security and corporate governance 
Information security transcends many facets of an organisation and is one of the most 
significant policy and structure decisions in an organisation (Spafford, 1998, online).  It is 
becoming progressively more obvious that access to correct information at the right time 
is imperative to gaining competitive advantage or simply remaining in business 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2002, p 1).  Policies and procedures are the responsibility of 
senior management as part of their corporate governance duties.  Therefore, it follows 
that senior management should be responsible for setting strategic direction regarding the 
protection of information.  One of the ways for management to express its commitment to 
information security in its organisation is to provide support towards a documented 
Corporate Information Security Policy, as it is one of the controls considered common 
best practice in terms of information security (BS 7799-1, 1999, p 4).     
5. Corporate information security policy 
The Corporate Information Security Policy is a direction-giving document and should 
define the objectives and boundaries of the information security program.  The main aim 
of any policy is to influence and determine decisions, actions and other issues, by 
specifying what behaviour is acceptable and what behaviour is unacceptable.  The 
behaviour and actions of employees often represents the weakest link in the information 
security process (Martins & Eloff, 2002, p 203).  Policies and procedures are, therefore, 
organisational laws that determine acceptable and unacceptable conduct within the 
context of corporate culture (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p 194).  Additionally, it should 
indicate management’s commitment and support for information security and should 
describe the role that the policy plays in reaching the organisation’s vision (Höne, 2003, 
CD-ROM; BS 7799-1, 1999, p 5).  The correct behaviour, as envisioned in the Corporate  
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Information Security Policy, should become second-nature to employees and the 
corporate culture should adapt to reflect this. 
6. The need to change the corporate culture 
The acceptable actions and behaviour of employees towards information as outlined in 
the Corporate Information Security Policy should become the behaviour that employees 
demonstrate in their daily activities.  Physical and technical controls are tangible controls 
that attempt to enforce compliance with information security practices and procedures in 
an organisation, but it is really operational controls and the resulting behaviour and 
actions of the employees and the processes they use that can sustain information security 
practices (Deloitte & Touche, 2002, online).  As seen previously, the corporate culture of 
an organisation largely determines the behaviour of employees.  Therefore, for the 
acceptable behaviour to become the de facto behaviour of employees, the corporate 
culture must be changed. 
 
Apprehension arises when there is the prospect of a big change in the environment that 
employees know so well (Drennan, 1992, p 9).  The power to change corporate culture 
lies principally in the hands of senior management and transforming the culture takes 
vision, commitment and determination.  Without this combination it will not happen, and 
it certainly will not last (Drennan, 1992, p 3-4).  Employees of an organisation may be 
coerced into changing their obvious behaviour, but this behavioural change will not 
become established until the deepest level of culture, the Shared Tacit Assumptions Level, 
experiences a transformation (Schein, 1999, p 26).   
 
A new corporate culture cannot simply be ‘created’.  Senior management can demand or 
encourage a new way of working and thinking, management can monitor the changes to 
make sure that they are done, but employees of the organisation will not internalise the 
changes and make it part of the new culture unless they understand the benefit of these 
changes.  It is senior management’s responsibility to highlight that the changes needed in 
the current culture are worthwhile and important (Schein, 1999, p 187).  Senior 
management, through effective corporate governance practices, must ensure that the 
policies of the organisation are in line with the vision for the organisation.  Senior 
management should then enforce these policies so that they become part of the way 
things are done in the organisation and ensure that employees understand the benefits to 
their organisation.  However, it is not enough for senior management to only enforce its 
policies - it is important for the attitudes of senior management to encourage this change 
in the corporate culture.  If nothing changes in the procedures of the organisation or the 
attitudes of its management, employee attitudes will not change either (Drennan, 1992, p 
3). 
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7. Organisational environments 
There are three key environments that could exist in organisations.  These environments 
dictate how the organisation is run and how employees react in certain circumstances.  
These environments are Coercive, Utilitarian and Goal Consensus (Schein, 1992, online).   
  
The Coercive Environment is one where employees feel alienated in their environment 
and seek to leave this environment if possible.  Peer relationships in this environment 
develop in defence of the authority in the organisation, in other words, senior 
management.  These employees perform tasks because they must, rather than because 
they agree with the actions and decisions of senior management (Schein, 1992, online).  
The Utilitarian Environment is one where employees participate in their organisation by 
evolving workgroups based on an incentive system.  In this environment employees will 
do as senior management wishes because of the rewards that they will receive.  They still 
do not necessarily agree with senior management (Schein, 1992, online). 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the Coercive and Utilitarian Environments mapped onto Schein’s 
model of corporate culture.  It shows that, in the Coercive and Utilitarian Environments, 
the Artifacts Level of both management and employees are in concurrence with one 
another.  In the Coercive Environment this indicates that there is stringent management 
control and employees adhere to the behaviour specified by management, or else harsh 
corrective action will be taken against them.  In the Utilitarian Environment this 
concurrence indicates that employees will do as management wishes in return for a 
reward.  As indicated in the Figure, the Shared Tacit Assumptions Level in both 
environments is not in line at all – the beliefs and values of management and employees 
are not the same.  Without either strict management or incentives, the correct behaviour 
of employees would fade.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The coercive and utilitarian environments and Schein's model 
Artifacts 
Espoused Values 
Shared Tacit Assumptions 
Management Employees 
Information 
Security Policy 
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In Figure 1 the Information Security Policy is found at the Espoused Values Level of 
Schein’s model and found on the Management side.  This indicates that the contents of 
the policy are in agreement with what management wishes, but not at all in line with the 
beliefs and values of the employees.  It is vital that employees are in agreement with their 
work policies, as it is indicated that productivity and performance will increase by 30% to 
40% if employees are satisfied with the policies (Schafer, 2003, online).  Consequently, 
employees should be satisfied with the Corporate Information Security Policy.  If the 
Information Security Policy is not discussed, supported and evaluated by management 
and employees, the Policy may remain a ‘piece of paper’ (Canadian Labour Program, 
2003, online). 
 
The third organisational environment, the Goal Consensus Environment, is one where 
employees are morally involved with the organisation.  They identify with the 
organisation and share the same beliefs and values of senior management and they are 
striving towards the vision of senior management.  In this environment, employees’ 
actions are not as a result of being forced to do so or because of a reward, but because 
they are in agreement with the way things are done in the organisation (Schein, 1992, 
online).  This Goal Consensus Environment could be seen as a corporate culture which is 
in line with the vision of senior management.  This would mean that ‘right’ decisions and 
actions of employees become second-nature and part of their culture (Schein, 1999, p 15-
17). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The goal consensus environment and Schein's model 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that in the Goal Consensus Environment, all three levels of corporate 
culture in Schein’s model are in agreement.  This is an ideal corporate culture, in terms of 
information security, as the information security vision expressed at the Espoused Values  
Management Employee  
Artifacts 
Espoused Values 
Shared Tacit Assumptions 
Information 
Security Policy 
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Level by senior management is supported by the actions and behaviour of employees at 
the Artifacts Level.  This level is determined by the Shared Tacit Assumptions Level of 
corporate culture.  In the Figure, the Corporate Information Security Policy is found at 
the intersection of management and employees.  This indicates that the beliefs and values 
of the employees are in agreement with senior management’s vision for information 
security.  This would indicate that Corporate Information Security Obedience has been 
implemented in this organisational environment (Thomson & von Solms, 2003, p 107).    
8. Implementing corporate information security obedience 
As seen previously, corporate culture is the residue of success.  In other words, it is the 
set of procedures that senior management and employees of an organisation follow in 
order to be successful.  For information security practices to be successful, it is important 
for Corporate Information Security Obedience to be implemented in an organisation. 
 
By implementing Information Security Obedience, the de facto behaviour of employees 
towards information security should be the correct behaviour outlined in the Information 
Security Policy.  In order to do this, the Espoused Values and Shared Tacit Assumptions 
Level of Schein’s model must be addressed.  Senior management must have a very clear 
vision as to what correct behaviour is in terms of information security.  Management 
should then analyse its current corporate culture and identify the cultural elements that 
need to change (Spotlight, 2002, online).  The Espoused Values Level is where the 
organisational policies, including the Corporate Information Security Policy, of an 
organisation are created by senior management.  In order for Information Security 
Obedience to be implemented, the Information Security Policy contents must be drafted 
and communicated in a way that is acceptable in terms of the employees’ beliefs and 
values.  One way to do this is to involve employees in decision-making processes, taking 
into account employee welfare.  If employees do not agree with the Corporate 
Information Security Policy or do not understand the benefits of the change in behaviour 
they will not adhere to the correct behaviour (Goal/QPC, 2003, online).   
 
Correct behaviour should be encouraged and displayed by senior management, which 
will, to a large extent, shape the corporate culture (Hagberg Consulting Group, 2002, 
online).  If this new, correct behaviour is an improvement on the current behaviour it 
should begin to influence the beliefs and values of employees found at the Shared Tacit 
Assumptions Level.  This in turn should begin to shape the corporate culture (Schein, 
1999, p 23).  This would mean that the Espoused Values Level and the associated 
Information Security Policy is in line with the Shared Tacit Assumptions Level of 
employees and Corporate Information Security Obedience has been achieved.    
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9. Conclusion 
Information is a vital asset in most organisations and as such should be well protected 
through effective information security practices.  One of the problems facing the 
protection of information is the actions and behaviour of the employees in an 
organisation.  If correct information security practices could become second-nature to 
employees and part of the way they conduct their daily activities, it would, to a large 
extent, eliminate this problem.  This would assist in the creation of an environment of 
Corporate Information Security Obedience, where the information security procedures 
outlined by senior management in the Corporate Information Security Policy is the 
behaviour displayed by employees.  
 
In order to implement Information Security Obedience the beliefs and values of 
employees, in terms of information security, must be addressed at the root level of Shared 
Tacit Assumptions.  This level must be aligned with the contents of the Corporate 
Information Security Policy found at the Espoused Values Level.  If these two levels are 
in concurrence with one another, it will mean that the information security practices 
employed by employees is the same as the correct information security practices outlined 
at the Espoused Values Level.  This paper has outlined the reason that Corporate 
Information Security Obedience is necessary for employees to fully understand the role 
they must play in information security in their organisation.  This should, to a large 
extent, eradicate the incorrect information security practices performed by employees and 
further research will continue to investigate the action that should be taken to firmly 
entrench correct information security practices in an organisation through Corporate 
Information Security Obedience. 
 
At present, the concept of implementing Corporate Information Security Obedience is 
being researched.  Therefore, there are no further recommendations on how to 
accomplish this implementation included in this paper.  These recommendations will 
form part of further research. 
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ABSTRACT 
One of the most prevalent problems with regard to protecting information assets is the 
behaviour of employees.  Moreover, the behaviour of employees is, to a large extent, 
determined by the corporate culture of an organisation.  Senior management, as part of its 
corporate governance responsibilities, must define a vision for information security in its 
organisation.  An ideal corporate culture, in terms of information security, would be one 
where the de facto behaviour of employees is to satisfactorily protect information assets.  
This paper will expand Schein’s corporate culture model into two dimensions, detailing 
both management and employee’s behaviour in terms of information security and the 
three levels of corporate culture.  A diagram detailing the Driving and Restraining Forces 
involved in the process of culture change will be detailed and the paper will conclude by 
investigating the Force Field Analysis process. 
 
KEY WORDS 
Corporate Information Security Obedience; Information Security; Corporate Culture; 
Force Field Analysis 
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CULTIVATING CORPORATE INFORMATION SECURITY 
OBEDIENCE 
1. Introduction 
In order to adequately protect the information assets of an organisation it is vital for 
Corporate Information Security Obedience to be implemented in the organisation.  As 
part of Information Security Obedience, senior management must define the vision for 
information security in their organisation.  In addition, the de facto, or second-nature, 
behaviour of employees must adhere to the behaviour necessary to adequately protect the 
information assets of an organisation.     
This paper will outline the importance of corporate culture and the Corporate 
Information Security Policy, which should influence it.  Edgar Schein’s corporate culture 
model will be examined and it will be investigated how to expand this into a two-
dimensional model to create an environment in which Information Security Obedience 
can be implemented.  The paper will conclude by investigating Force Field Analysis and 
the Force Field Diagram, in an attempt to begin the transformation of the corporate 
culture.   
 
2. Corporate culture 
Every organisation has a corporate culture which, to a large extent, determines the 
behaviour of employees.  Employees’ behaviour is affected by culture as it defines what 
behaviour is acceptable and what is unacceptable (Beach, 1993, p 17).  And, very often, 
the behaviour and actions of employees and the information security processes they use 
in their daily work represents the weakest link in the information security process.  A 
disturbing fact, though, is that it is estimated that only 5% of organisations have a 
definable culture, where the senior management takes an active role in the shaping of the 
corporate culture (Atkinson, 1997, p 17).  Therefore, only in a minority of organisations 
is senior management active in positively influencing the behaviour of employees. 
Corporate culture effects organisations in two crucial ways.  The first is through 
legislation and, second, through its own decision making.  The effects of legislation on an 
organisation are direct and can be identified.  Legislation represents the culture of a 
country, by defining what can and what cannot be done.  Consequently, an organisation 
must adhere to the legislation that affects it; otherwise legal action could be taken against 
it.  Not adhering to this legislation would have a direct and visible consequence for the 
organisation.  However, the effects of corporate culture on an organisation’s decision 
making are indirect and invisible and can be difficult to assess.  Matters of culture are 
elusive and difficult to pin down, but no less important than legislation issues (Policy 
Studies Institute, 1999, online).   
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Edgar Schein defines three levels of culture to describe this complex field and it is 
vital for these levels to be managed and understood by senior management (1999, p 15).  
The first level of corporate culture is the Artifacts level and consists of the visible and 
obvious behaviour of individuals (Hagberg Consulting Group, 2002, online; Schein, 
1999, p 15).  At this level, it is still not clear as to why employees of an organisation 
behave in this way.  Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the second level of culture; 
the Espoused Values level (Schein, 1999, p 16).  The Espoused Values level of corporate 
culture is the level where the vision and values an organisation is promoting are found.  
The vision and values and the resulting necessary behaviour of employees to achieve this 
vision, are outlined in management’s policies at this level (Schein, 1999, p 17).   
Therefore, the first two levels of culture describe what can be seen through the 
visible behaviour and actions of employees, described at the Artifacts level, and what 
should be seen as a result of the behaviour and actions outlined at the Espoused Values 
level.  There could, however, be a few obvious discrepancies between some of the 
Espoused Values or goals of an organisation and the visible behaviour of individuals as 
seen at the Artifacts level.  Therefore, in many cases, it is not the contents of management 
policies that dictate employee behaviour, but it is a deeper level of thought that is driving 
the obvious behaviour of the employees.  To fully understand what is driving the visible 
behaviour of employees, the Shared Tacit Assumptions level of culture must be 
understood and appreciated (Schein, 1999, pp 18-19). 
This third level of culture, the Shared Tacit Assumptions level, is the heart of 
corporate culture as it represents the commonly learned values and assumptions of 
employees that become taken for granted in an organisation.  The beliefs and values 
found at this level are innate to employees and their behaviour in their work environment 
is directly influenced by these beliefs (Schein, 1999, p 21).   
Therefore, in order to change corporate culture, the beliefs found at the Shared 
Tacit Assumptions level needs to be changed, as these beliefs influence the actions and 
behaviour of employees.  These beliefs would include those that influence employees 
with regard to information security.  One of the key components of an organisation, with 
regard to information security, is a Corporate Information Security Policy. 
 
3. Corporate information security policy 
According to its corporate governance duties, senior management must lead its 
organisation through ‘direction-giving’ and strategy implementation.  This ‘direction-
giving’ is achieved through the creation and implementation of management policies 
(Planting, 2001, online; King Report, 2001, p 46).  In addition, senior management, as 
part of their corporate governance duties, is both accountable and responsible for the 
protection of the assets and reputation of its organisation (King Report, 2001, pp. 45-47).  
Therefore, one of the main functions of senior management in terms of good corporate 
governance is to guarantee that policies and procedures are in place in the organisation to  
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protect its assets.  And, as one of the most important assets of any organisation is 
information, it follows that senior management should be accountable and responsible for 
information security practices in its organisation. 
One of the ways to implement good information security practices in an 
organisation is to ensure that a detailed Corporate Information Security Policy is in place.  
The content of the Corporate Information Security Policy is particularly significant as it 
should outline the behaviour employees should adhere to in order to adequately protect 
information assets.  However, it is extremely important for senior management to realise 
that the culture of an organisation is not formed by what it, as senior management, 
preaches or publishes in policies, but what it accepts in practice (Drennan, 1992, p 3).  
Therefore, if the behaviour of employees is not in line with the behaviour outlined in 
management policies, but is not corrected by senior management, the ‘incorrect’ 
behaviour will continue.   
A Corporate Information Security Policy must outline the vision senior 
management has for the organisation in terms of information security.  The Information 
Security Policy would be found at the Espoused Values level of culture, as it is at this 
level that the vision and goals are expressed.  The Corporate Information Security Policy 
must work within the organisation where this culture exists and must address the security 
needs of the specific organisation (Deloitte & Touche, 2002, online).  Therefore, each 
policy must be tailored for each organisation and, although no organisation can guard 
against all the possible risks related to protecting information, a carefully constructed 
Information Security Policy can establish the foundation of a corporate culture that is 
able to lessen many of the threats to information (Gordon and Glickson LLC, 1997, 
online).   
Therefore, the Information Security Policy assists in the creation of an information 
security conscious corporate culture by specifying what behaviour is acceptable and what 
behaviour is unacceptable in terms of information security.  If the policy is implemented 
properly in an organisation, it should begin to change the behaviour of employees and 
consequently the culture and would lead to a state of Corporate Information Security 
Obedience.  However, changing the corporate culture is not an easy task.  
 
4. Changing corporate culture 
A new corporate culture cannot be created overnight.  Corporate culture is one of the 
most stable aspects of an organisation as many of the most important facets of culture are 
essentially invisible, which makes transforming culture very difficult (Schein, 1999, pp. 
21-26).  Any prospective change in an environment in which employees are comfortable 
could lead to massive amounts of anxiety and resistance to change.  For an organisation’s 
corporate culture to change, it involves the unlearning of beliefs, values and assumptions 
and a change in attitude (Schein, 1999, p 26).  Employees prefer stability in their 
environment and the traditions that are inherent in this environment are difficult to 
change.  These traditions play a large part in shaping the corporate culture of an 
organisation (Drennan, 1992, p 9). 
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Senior management can demand a new way of working and can monitor these 
coerced modifications to make sure that they are done.  However, the power behind any 
successful culture change is the degree to which the people who have to implement the 
changes are engaged in the change process (Maset, 2001, online).  In an organisation, the 
people who must implement the changes are both senior management and employees.   
Therefore, it is vitally important for both management and employees to be 
involved with the change process from the beginning.  All parties should have input as 
employees of an organisation will not internalise the changes and make it part of the new 
culture unless they understand the benefit of these changes, hence the need for them to be 
involved in creating the change process.  It is senior management’s responsibility to 
highlight that the changes needed in the current culture are worthwhile and important and 
needed to obtain the vision for information security in the organisation (Schein, 1999, p 
187).   
Vision defines the ideal future.  This vision might imply that the current culture be 
kept the way it is or it might imply the need for change in the organisation.  This means 
that the vision might need nothing more than the natural evolution of the present culture, 
or it may require drastic changes in what the organisation is doing – and perhaps, 
therefore, in the organisation’s culture (Beach, 1993, p 17).  As seen previously, the 
vision for information security is found at the Espoused Values level of culture.   
The behaviour of employees towards information security is influenced by their 
beliefs and values regarding information, which is found at the Shared Tacit Assumptions 
level of culture.  Employees of an organisation may be coerced into changing their 
obvious behaviour, but this behavioural change will not become established until this 
deepest level of culture, the Shared Tacit Assumptions level, experiences a 
transformation (Schein, 1999, p 26).  Therefore, to achieve the vision for information 
security, the Espoused Values level and the Shared Tacit Assumptions level of culture 
should be aligned, so that the employees’ behaviour at the Artifacts level will support the 
vision for information security.  The following section will show this graphically by 
expanding Schein’s culture model into two dimensions.   
 
5. Expanding Schein’s model 
There are three types of environments that could be found in organisations.  These 
environments are Coercive, Utilitarian and Goal Consensus.  These environments 
determine how the organisation operates and how employees will react in certain 
circumstances (Schein, 1992, online).   
The Coercive Environment is one where employees perform tasks because they 
must, rather than because they agree with the actions and decisions of senior 
management.  Peer relationships in this environment develop to protect the employees 
from the authority in the organisation, namely; senior management (Schein, 1992, 
online).  In the Utilitarian Environment employees will do as senior management wishes  
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because of an incentive system and not because they necessarily agree with senior 
management (Schein, 1992, online). 
In the Goal Consensus Environment employees identify with the organisation and 
share the same beliefs and values of senior management and they are willingly striving 
towards the vision senior management has for information security in the organisation.  
The employees’ actions are not as a result of being forced to do so or because of 
remuneration, but because they are in agreement with the way things are done in the 
organisation and their behaviour is second-nature to them (Schein, 1992, online).   
Figure 1 illustrates the progression from a Coercive or Utilitarian Environment in 
‘Culture 1’ to a Goal Consensus Environment in ‘Culture 3’.  The Corporate Information 
Security Policy is represented by ‘A’.   
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Schein’s model expanded into employee and management dimensions 
 
‘Culture 1’ illustrates that the beliefs and values of employees and management, at 
the Shared Tacit Assumptions level, are widely varied and not in line with one another.  
This means that the information security beliefs of employees are not those shared by 
senior management.  However, in ‘Culture 1’, the information security practices used by 
employees, visible at the Artifacts level, are in line with the information security  
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practices used and approved by senior management.  This is as a result of the fact that, in 
both the Coercive and Utilitarian Environments, the Artifacts level of employees and 
senior management is in line, not as a result of employees agreeing with the policies of 
senior management, but rather because they are being forced to do so.   
In addition, the Information Security Policy in ‘Culture 1’ is found completely in 
management’s dimension of the culture.  This illustrates that the information security 
beliefs and values of employees are not the same as the information security vision of 
senior management, as expressed in the Information Security Policy.  The alignment of 
the behaviour of employees and management, with regard to information security 
practices, would not be possible in the Coercive Environment without stringent 
management control, or an incentive system in the Utilitarian Environment.  Therefore, in 
order for senior management to ensure that the Artifacts level remains in line with their 
policies, they must stringently enforce these policies on their reluctant employees.  This 
leads to increasing tension in an organisation. 
‘Culture 2’ illustrates that, as the Corporate Information Security Policy is shifted 
towards the employee dimension, the ‘arms’ of the employee and management 
dimensions move closer together.  This represents the fact that the beliefs of employees 
and management, with regard to information security, are beginning to correlate.  In order 
to shift the Information Security Policy, it is necessary for employees to start 
understanding the vision senior management has for information security.  Employees 
should now begin to realise the advantage of adequately protecting information security 
assets and, as a result, their actions do not have to be enforced to such a large extent.  
This would decrease the tension in the organisation, as employees are beginning to 
understand the benefit that good information security practices would have for their 
organisation. 
In ‘Culture 3’ an ideal culture has been achieved.  This is where all three levels of 
Schein’s model are in line with one another.  The Corporate Information Security Policy 
has successfully been shifted to be part of both the employee and management dimension 
in the diagram.  In this culture, employees do not need incentives, or are not under threat 
of severe consequences, to implement correct information security practices.   Employees 
are in agreement with the way things are done in the organisation and acceptable 
information security practices are second-nature to them (Schein, 1992, online).  This is 
referred to by Schein as a Goal Consensus Environment, as the environment represents a 
corporate culture where senior management’s vision for information security is shared by 
everyone in the organisation.  Everyone is striving towards the same goals.  The de facto 
behaviour of employees is, consequently, the behaviour necessary for the organisation to 
be successful (Schein, 1999, p 15-17).   
When all the levels of corporate culture are in line with one another, with regard to 
information security, as in ‘Culture 3’, it indicates that Corporate Information Security 
Obedience has been implemented in this organisational environment (Thomson & von 
Solms, 2003, p 107).  This section described the ideal corporate culture that should exist 
to adequately protect information assets.  A method to begin transformation of the  
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corporate culture into this ideal culture, adhering to Corporate Information Security 
Obedience, is described in the subsequent section.   
 
6. Force field analysis 
Organisations frequently are unsuccessful in the implementation of change.  This 
implementation is most often hindered by the fact that change initiatives are treated as 
‘top-down’ processes.  Senior management attempts to impose change on employees, 
instead of taking their actions and attitudes into consideration.  This ‘top-down’ approach 
lacks understanding and the motivation of the employees (Maset, 2001, online).  As seen 
previously, employees will not internalise culture change unless they understand the 
benefit of this change to their organisation.  Therefore, it is extremely important, when 
implementing culture change, that employees are involved in and understand the process. 
One method of change, the Force Field Analysis approach, developed by Kurt 
Lewin in 1947, would ensure that employees are involved in the implementation of 
culture change.  According to Lewin, any change (whether cultural or not) can be viewed 
as the effect of Driving and Restraining Forces.  In terms of culture, the current corporate 
culture is the status quo in an organisation.  The Driving Forces seek to upset the status 
quo, while Restraining Forces attempt to preserve the status quo (Pojasek, 2001, p 74).   
Senior management must be held accountable for developing and communicating a 
clear vision of the future.  This vision is the reason for change, or the Driving Forces.  At 
the same time, senior management must be aware of the current reality, or Restraining 
Forces, that inhibits the realisation of the vision (Charlton, 2000, p 42).  The Driving 
Forces are moving the organisation towards change and the Restraining Forces are 
pushing against change.  The actual, resulting change is a consequence of the interaction 
of these two sets of forces.  A Force Field Analysis should result in a Force Field 
Diagram illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Template for a Force Field Diagram 
Current Culture Ideal Culture 
Driving Forces Restraining Forces 
Opportunities 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Risks 
a b 
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A Force Field Diagram represents Driving Forces on one side of the diagram, 
pushing towards the ‘Ideal Culture’ and the Restraining Forces pushing towards the 
‘Current Culture’.  Each Driving or Restraining Force is represented by a vector or arrow 
and the length of the vector is equivalent to the strength of the force.  Therefore, if two 
opposing vectors are of equal length, there will be no change.  If the Driving Force vector 
is stronger than the Restraining Force vector, the culture will shift towards the ideal.  
However, if the Restraining Force vector is stronger than the Driving Force vector, the 
culture will not change and achieving a culture change will be very difficult.  Therefore, 
by referring to Figure 2, we can conclude the following: 
 
If a = b : Status quo maintained  
If a > b : Change towards ideal culture 
If a < b : Status quo maintained 
 
Increasing one set of vectors without decreasing the other will, as in physics, 
increase the tension and conflict in an organisation.  It is, therefore, preferable to decrease 
the Restraining Forces instead of applying greater pressure to the Driving Forces when 
attempting to change culture in an organisation (Pojasek, 2001, p 75).    
 
a. The process of force field analysis 
Force Field Analysis for culture change should begin by describing the current 
 culture, followed by a detailed description of the ideal culture for that 
organisation.  The ‘gap’ that is identified should be breached by the process of Force 
Field Analysis.  It should also be identified what the impact will be for an organisation if 
their current culture is not changed (Saferpak, 2000, online).    
The next step is for the Restraining Forces, represented diagrammatically by 
vectors, to be identified and placed on one side of the diagram.  Each Restraining Force 
should then be considered and possible solutions to overcome the effect of the force must 
be developed.  These are the Driving Forces, also represented by vectors, and must be 
placed on other side of the Force Field Diagram (ACIG,  2000, p 1; Pojasek, 2001, p 
75).  A numerical value should be assigned to each vector according to its strength.   
A Force Field Diagram is a very simple, but powerful, tool that could be used to 
simplify the complex problem of culture change.  In terms of information security, the 
‘Ideal Culture’ to represent in a Force Field Diagram would be one where Corporate 
Information Security Obedience has been achieved.  Those Restraining Forces acting as a 
barrier to Corporate Information Security Obedience must be identified and the Driving 
Forces necessary for change must also be identified.   
If a Driving Force is imposed on employees by senior management without 
decreasing or eliminating the opposing Restraining Force, a great deal of tension will  
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exist between employees and senior management.  This could result in a Coercive 
Environment where it is necessary to compel employees to behave in accordance with 
correct information security practices, instead of these information security practices 
becoming part of their intrinsic behaviour.  Therefore, the Restraining Forces must be 
decreased through awareness and understanding to bring about a change that is not forced 
on employees, which should bring about an environment that would facilitate the change 
to the ‘Ideal Culture’. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Protecting information assets is crucial for the successful operation of most organisations.  
However, one of the major problems facing the protection of information assets, through 
information security, is the behaviour and actions of employees.  Often it is the lack of 
understanding the importance of the information security processes that lead to 
‘incorrect’ behaviour and actions of employees. 
The corporate culture of an organisation largely influences the behaviour of 
employees within the organisation by defining what behaviour is ‘acceptable’ and 
‘unacceptable’.  The behaviour of employees, visible at the Artifacts level of culture, is 
directly influenced by the Shared Tacit Assumptions level of culture.  The vision for 
information security and the resulting ‘correct’ behaviour necessary to protect 
information assets should be expressed at the Espoused Values level of culture in the 
contents of the Corporate Information Security Policy. 
If the ‘correct’ behaviour, outlined in the Information Security Policy, and the 
actual behaviour of employees does not match, it indicates that the corporate culture of 
the organisation will have to be changed.  To change the corporate culture into one that 
incorporates Corporate Information Security Obedience, the beliefs and values, found at 
the Shared Tacit Assumptions level, must be adapted to be in line with the principles 
found in the Information Security Policy at the Espoused Values level.  
One of the methods currently being researched for culture change is Force Field 
Analysis, resulting in a Force Field Diagram.  This diagram simplifies complex change 
problems into sets of vectors representing Driving and Restraining Forces.  By 
identifying Restraining Forces, and the associated Driving Forces, it clarifies what the 
exact barriers are for culture change.  At present, there is no technique to assign specific 
values to the vectors in the Force Field Diagram.  This, and the adaptation of the Force 
Field Diagram into one that can be used to facilitate the implementation of Corporate 
Information Security Obedience, will form part of future research. 
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Abstract 
Information is a fundamental asset within any organisation and the protection of this 
asset, through a process of information security, is of equal importance.  This paper 
examines the relationships that exist between the fields of corporate governance, 
information security and corporate culture.  It highlights the role that senior management 
should play in cultivating an information security conscious culture in their organisation, 
for the benefit of the organisation, senior management and the users of information. 
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Corporate Governance, Information Security, Corporate Culture, Information Security 
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INFORMATION SECURITY OBEDIENCE: A DEFINITION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Information is important.  It is often depicted as the lifeblood of the growing electronic 
economy (Gordon, 2002, online).  Commercial organisations and governments rely 
heavily on information to conduct their daily activities.  Therefore, the security of 
information needs to be managed and controlled properly (Lane, 1985, pp 2-3; Smith, 
1989, p 193).  No matter what the information involves; whether it is customer records or 
confidential documentation, there are many threats that make information vulnerable 
(Gordon, 2002, online).  Information security, therefore, needs to be implemented and 
managed within the organisation to ensure that the information is kept safe and secure 
(Krige, 1999, p 7). 
 
Information is an organisational asset, and consequently the security thereof needs to be 
integrated into the organisation’s overall management plan (Lane, 1985, pp 2-3; Smith, 
1989, p 193).  Effective corporate governance should dictate this overall management 
plan.  Sir Adrian Cadbury, in the foreword of Corporate Governance: A Framework for 
Implementation has the following description of corporate governance.  He states that 
corporate governance deals with establishing a balance between economic and social 
goals and between individual and mutual goals.  The framework for governance is there 
to promote the competent use of resources and, in the same way, to involve 
accountability for the stewardship of those resources (World Bank Group, 1999, online).   
 
It is inevitable that these organisations that should deploy effective corporate governance 
develop a corporate culture.  Cultural assumptions in organisations develop around how 
people in the organisation relate to one another, but that is only a tiny portion of what 
culture covers (Schein, 1999, p 28).  Corporate culture is generally defined as values that 
are shared by everyone in an organisation, including fundamental beliefs, principles and 
practices (Beveridge, 1997, online).  These fundamental beliefs, principles and practices 
have a direct influence on the behaviour patterns of employees as far as information 
security is concerned. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate to what extent the senior management of an 
organisation should be involved in changing the beliefs, principles and practices of their 
employees towards information security, thereby influencing their behaviour favourably 
towards the protection of information.  The paper will initially investigate the field of 
corporate governance, followed by the challenges facing corporate governance and 
information security.  Corporate culture and its importance to an organisation will then be 
explored and the paper will conclude by investigating the relationships between corporate 
governance, corporate culture and information security.  Based on this investigation, the 
term ‘Information Security Obedience’ will be defined. 
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2.     CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
Corporate governance is a contemporary term for an issue which has been challenging 
organisations for decades – that of ‘accountability’.  Corporate governance is defined as 
the exercise of power over and responsibility for corporate entities (Blackwell Publishers, 
2000, online).  At its most fundamental level, corporate governance provides assurance 
that an organisation has the necessary corporate structures to support accountability 
(Brooks, 1997, online). 
 
Accountability, however, is only one of the four pillars of corporate governance.  The 
remaining pillars are responsibility, fairness and transparency (King Report, 2001, p 17; 
World Bank Group, 1999, online).  The pillar of accountability ensures that individuals 
or groups in an organisation are accountable for their decisions and actions (King Report, 
2001, p 14).  The second pillar, responsibility, indicates that corrective action can be 
taken against mismanagement and misconduct (King Report, 2001, p 14).  Fairness, the 
third pillar of corporate governance, attempts to ensure that there is a balance in an 
organisation.  The rights of various groups should be recognised and valued (King 
Report, 2001, p 14).  The final pillar, transparency, is the ease with which outsiders can 
see what is transpiring inside an organisation (King Report, 2001, p 13). 
 
Through these corporate governance pillars, the Board of Directors is both accountable 
and responsible to their organisation and their shareholders for the wellbeing of their 
organisation (King Report, 2001, p 17).  Information is a vital asset to most organisations, 
and because the Board of Directors is both accountable and responsible for the welfare of 
their organisation they should ensure that the organisational asset of information is 
protected to ensure the well-being of the organisation (Deloitte & Touche, 2002, online).   
 
3.     CHALLENGES FACING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND                                   
        INFORMATION SECURITY 
 
There are many challenges facing the convergence of corporate governance and 
information security – one of which is to convince the senior management of an 
organisation that they should be ultimately accountable and responsible for the protection 
of their organisation’s information.  PriceWaterhouseCoopers highlights the lack of 
support there is for information security, in their 2002 Information Security Breaches 
Survey, by stating that “The root cause is that security is treated as an overhead rather 
than an investment” (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2002, p 3). 
 
Furthermore, according to PriceWaterhouseCoopers, only 27% of organisations in the 
United Kingdom spend more than 1% of their Information Technology budget on 
protecting their information and only 5% of organisations spend more than 10% of their 
IT budget on information security (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2002, p 3).  This lack of 
attention to information security could be as a result of the fact that managers can 
normally only allocate a limited amount of time and consideration to information  
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security.  As a consequence, management’s attention is often limited to a small group of 
acute threats and countermeasures that happen to relate to the issues of the day (Buren, 
van der Meer, Shahim, Barnhoorn & Roos Lindgreen, 1999, p 76).   
 
However, the successful operation of organisations today relies on information, and the 
exchange of information.  Further, the protection of information, through information 
security, is important for the impact it can have on business (Deloitte & Touche, 2002, 
online).  Therefore, management should be concerned with information security as 
information is vital for the success of the organisation.  In fact, they are accountable and 
responsible for the well-being of the organisation that depends heavily on information, as 
highlighted earlier. 
 
One of the ways for management to demonstrate their dedication to information security 
in their organisation is to provide their support and commitment towards a formally 
agreed upon and documented corporate information security policy, as it is one of the 
controls that is considered common best practice in terms of information security (BS 
7799-1, 1999, p 4).   
 
Quality information security begins and ends with quality corporate policies (Whitman & 
Mattord, 2003, p 194).  An overriding duty of the Board of Directors is to ensure the 
long-term feasibility of an organisation.  To do this, it is essential that the assets of an 
organisation are protected (World Bank Group, 1999, online).   
 
Therefore, it follows that the Board of Directors should be involved in the protection of 
information, an important organisational asset.  The level of information security that the 
Board of an organisation is prepared to propose and put into operation, and the level of 
information security that is acceptable to the shareholders should be consolidated and 
result in the corporate information security policy (King Report, 2001, p 96).  The 
information security policy should be based on the approved corporate security objectives 
and strategy and is there to provide management direction and support for information 
security (British Standards Institute, 1993, p 17).   
 
The main aim of any policy, whether for information security or not, is to influence and 
determine decisions, actions and other issues, by specifying what behaviour is acceptable 
and what behaviour is unacceptable.  Policies and procedures are, therefore, 
organisational laws that determine acceptable and unacceptable conduct within the 
context of corporate culture (Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p 194). 
 
 
4.     CORPORATE CULTURE 
 
Every organisation has a culture and this culture exists at both a conscious and 
unconscious level (Hagberg Consulting Group, 2002, online).  This culture could be 
operating with authoritative principles and driven by top management.  However, many  
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organisations have a culture that exists by default.  This culture changes by accident and 
is influenced by a few key people in the organisation (Atkinson, 1997, p 16).  A 
disturbing fact is that it is estimated that only 5% of organisations have a definable 
culture, where the senior management takes an active role in the shaping of the culture 
(Atkinson, 1997, p 17).  If management does not understand the culture in their 
organisation, it could prove to be fatal in today’s business world (Hagberg Consulting 
Group, 2002, online).  
 
Culture is the overall, taken-for-granted assumptions that a group has learned throughout 
history (Schein, 1999, p 29).  Corporate culture is an extensive issue and because the 
shared beliefs of an organisation include values about what is desirable and undesirable – 
how things should and should not be – these beliefs dictate the kinds of activities that are 
‘legal’ and the kinds that are ‘illegal’ for the employees in an organisation (Beyer, 1981, 
p 21).  
 
Since corporate culture plays a major role in the actions of employees in an organisation, 
it is an important aspect in an organisation, as it is central to restraining or enhancing the 
performance of an organisation (Atkinson, 1997, pp 16-17).  Culture is imperative 
because it is a powerful, underlying and often unconscious set of forces that establishes 
individual and group behaviour.  Corporate culture is especially important because 
cultural elements determine the strategy and goals of an organisation (Schein, 1999, p 
14).   
 
One of the difficulties in trying to understand culture is that it is a very complex 
discipline, which should not be oversimplified.  It is very simple to say that culture “is the 
way things are done around here”, but a much better way of thinking is to appreciate that 
culture exists at numerous levels.  These levels range from the visible to the tacit and 
invisible.  Furthermore, it is imperative that these levels are managed and understood 
(Schein, 1999, p 15).  
 
Levels of Corporate Culture 
The corporate culture and behaviour of people in organisations has been extensively 
researched by Edgar H. Schein.  Schein states that, “A better way to think of culture is to 
realise that it exists at several ‘levels’, and that we must understand and manage the 
deeper levels” (1999, p 15). 
 
The first level of corporate culture and probably the simplest level to examine in an 
organisation is that of artifacts.  Some of the most visible expressions of culture are these 
artifacts (Hagberg Consulting Group, 2002, online).  Artifacts can be described as what 
an individual can see, hear and feel when they walk into an organisation.  Examples of 
artifacts could range from the design and décor of the organisation to how people behave 
towards each other and customers (Schein, 1999, p 16).   
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Espoused values are the second level of culture in an organisation.  These are the values 
expressed and published in an organisation’s policies and are those values that an 
organisation is said to be promoting.  Examples of espoused values are teamwork and 
good communication (Schein, 1999, p 17). 
 
When it comes to the first two levels of corporate culture, there could be a few obvious 
contradictions between some of the espoused values or goals of an organisation and the 
visible behaviour of an organisation as seen at the artifacts level.  What these 
contradictions between the two levels indicate is that a deeper level of thought and insight 
is driving the evident behaviour of the employees (Schein, 1999, p 18).  What an 
organisation strives to do and the values it wishes to endorse may be different from the 
values, beliefs, and norms expressed in the actual practices and behaviour of the 
organisation (Hagberg Consulting Group, 2002, online).  Therefore, the deeper level that 
drives the visible behaviour may or may not be consistent with the values and principles 
that are espoused by the organisation.  So, to truly understand the culture of an 
organisation the deepest level of corporate culture must be understood (Schein, 1999, pp 
18-19). 
 
Schein refers to this deepest level as the shared tacit assumptions level.  The heart of 
corporate culture is the mutually learned values, beliefs and assumptions that have 
become taken for granted as the organisation continues to be successful.  These tacit 
assumptions involve the nature of the organisation’s environment and how to succeed in 
it.  Examples of shared tacit assumptions are unique to a particular organisation, but 
generally are decisions and actions that are second-nature to an employee (Schein, 1999, 
p 19). 
 
Therefore, the decision and actions of employees are determined through the three levels 
of corporate culture.  And these three levels emphasise that culture is extremely stable, as 
it represents the accumulated learning of a group (Schein, 1999, p 21).   
 
As has been highlighted earlier, the Board of Directors should be both accountable and 
responsible for the well-being of an organisation which depends on information and 
information resources.  To protect this information, the behaviour patterns of employees 
must assist in ensuring information security.  Since, the corporate culture of an 
organisation determines the behaviour of employees in an organisation; it should be used 
to influence these behaviour patterns of employees towards the protection of information 
as envisioned by the Board of Directors.   
 
5.     RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE THREE FIELDS 
 
The three fields of information security, corporate governance and corporate culture have 
been highlighted individually in the earlier part of the paper.  The following section will 
investigate the relationships that should exist between these three fields.  The 
relationships between the fields can be depicted diagrammatically, as shown in Figure 1.   
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Figure 1. The relationships between information security, corporate governance and 
corporate culture 
 
The relationship that should exist between information security and corporate 
governance, represented by ‘A’ in the diagram, is highlighted with the following quote 
from Michael Cangemi, President and COO of the Etienne Aigner Group Inc.  He states 
that, “The information possessed by an organisation is among its most valuable assets and 
is critical to its success. The Board of Directors, which is ultimately accountable for the 
organisation's success, is therefore responsible for the protection of its information. The 
protection of this information can be achieved only through effective management and 
assured only through effective board oversight” (IIA, AICPA, ISACA, NACD, March 
2000, online).  This highlights the fact that there is a very strong relationship between the 
fields of information security and corporate governance.     
 
As seen in previous sections of the paper, information security is currently being seen as 
an overhead, rather than as an investment.  The senior management of organisations tends 
to view information security as a technical problem that the IT department should be 
concerned with.  However, the information that resides on an organisation’s systems is 
owned by the business as a whole, not the IT manager.  Information and information 
systems play critical roles in business processes.  Therefore, it is the senior management 
of organisations that needs to direct the approach to protecting their information (Deloitte  
Information 
Security 
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Corporate 
Culture 
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C 
D 
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& Touche, 2002, online).  Proactively addressing an organisation’s information security 
issues in the digital era is not only good business practice; it is a necessity (Gordon and 
Glickson, 2001, online).  One of the ways to enhance the relationship between 
information security and corporate governance is for senior management to support and 
direct the creation and implementation of a corporate information security policy.  
Therefore, the corporate information security policy should play a critical role in the way 
that senior management governs the security of information.   
 
The relationship, represented by ‘B’ in the diagram, represents the relationship between 
information security and corporate culture.  When investigating information security, it is 
often seen that the procedures employees use in their daily work and their behaviour 
could symbolise the weakest link in information security (Martins and Eloff, 2002, p 
203).  In addition, it has been pointed out that the corporate culture of an organisation, to 
a large extent, determines the decisions and actions of employees (Schein, 1999, p 17).  
Therefore, the corporate culture in an organisation should be used to influence the 
behaviour of the employees towards information security in a positive way.  In order to 
do this, the shared tacit assumptions level of corporate culture must be addressed.  The 
collective beliefs and values of employees are found at this level of corporate culture.  
This shared tacit assumptions level directly influences the artifacts level of culture, 
which displays the visible behaviour of employees.  Therefore, for employee behaviour to 
change; their beliefs must be altered positively towards information security.    
Understanding the corporate culture around information security is crucial, and assessing 
employees’ awareness, competence and commitment determines the best method for the 
implementation and distribution of the corporate information security policy so that it 
will be effective (Deloitte & Touche, 2002, online).  An encompassing information 
security policy should assist in cultivating a corporate culture that takes advantage of the 
benefits of information security practices (Gordon and Glickson, 1997, online).  
Therefore, as information security is highly dependent on the behaviour of the users of 
information, the behaviour should preferably be instilled through corporate culture to 
ensure that acceptable behaviour becomes the de facto behaviour. 
      
The relationship between corporate governance and corporate culture is represented by 
‘C’ in the diagram.  The behaviour of employees is, to a large extent, shaped by the 
beliefs and values the employees have at the shared tacit assumptions level of corporate 
culture.  Therefore, senior management should make a resolute attempt to shape the 
shared tacit assumptions level, and, consequently, the corporate culture into one that will 
help in the achievement of the organisation’s goals.   
 
As part of good corporate governance practices, one of the responsibilities of senior 
management is that they must outline the goals and vision for their organisation.  These 
goals and vision of an organisation should be what is expressed by senior management at 
the espoused values level of corporate culture.  It is also senior management’s 
responsibility to guide their organisation in achieving these goals.  Therefore, senior 
management, as part of their corporate governance duties, should ensure that the  
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necessary elements of corporate culture are in place to support the organisation in 
achieving its goals.   
 
The desired corporate culture would be one where the vision expressed at the espoused 
values level of culture by senior management is supported by the actions and behaviour 
of employees determined by the shared tacit assumptions level of corporate culture.   
 
The behaviour displayed by senior management, in terms of information security 
practices, helps shape the attitude of employees towards information security.  In 
addition, it is also the behaviour senior management accepts from their employees that 
influences the corporate culture.  Management policies describe what behaviour is 
acceptable and unacceptable.  Senior management must ensure that the policies are 
implemented in their organisation in such a way that the behaviour of the employees 
change, which would ultimately lead to a change in the corporate culture.  Therefore, as 
information security is a management responsibility, the information security policy 
should guide employees to function in a manner that adds to the protection of information 
(Whitman & Mattord, 2003, p 194).  As detailed previously, for senior management to 
transform the corporate culture in their organisation they must address the beliefs and 
values found at the shared tacit assumptions level of corporate culture.  Senior 
management must ensure that their employees’ beliefs will support all espoused values of 
their organisation, including their vision for information security. 
 
The relationship represented by ‘D’ in the diagram is the relationship between the three 
fields of information security, corporate governance and corporate culture.  To be 
genuinely valuable, information security needs to become part of the way everyone 
conducts their daily tasks, from senior management, throughout the entire organisation 
(Deloitte & Touche, 2002, online).  Therefore, information security should become an 
intricate part of the corporate culture of the organisation, as it is the culture that 
determines how employees conduct their daily tasks (Beach, 1993, p 11).  This 
relationship should represent the situation whereby senior management’s vision for the 
protection of information in the organisation is conveyed through the corporate 
information security policy.  This policy should be drafted, advocated and implemented 
in such a way that it positively influences the corporate culture with regard to information 
security.  Further, as information security is highly dependent on the behaviour of users, 
the corporate culture should contribute towards the fact that the de facto behaviour of 
users is indeed what senior management envisaged as acceptable behaviour.  This 
relationship can be encompassed by the term ‘Information Security Obedience’.  
Obedience is defined as “compliance with that which is required by authority” 
(Dictionary.com, 2003, online).  The authority in this case is the senior management of 
organisations, striving towards effective corporate governance.  Another definition is, 
“words or actions denoting submission to authority” (Dictionary.com, 2003, online).  As 
has been said, the words or actions of employees are, to a large extent, determined by the 
corporate culture in an organisation.   
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Therefore, by using the term Information Security Obedience, it binds together all three 
fields of information security, corporate governance and corporate culture.  The term 
does this by stating that the actions of the employees must comply with that which is 
required by senior management in terms of information security.  Therefore, ‘Information 
Security Obedience’ is defined, for the purposes of this paper, as ‘de facto user behaviour 
complying with the vision of senior management as defined in the corporate information 
security policy’.  
 
6.     CONCLUSION 
 
Information is important to any organisation.  However, the protection of this information 
through information security still forms a very small part in the overall corporate 
governance strategy.  Senior management must be made aware that the protection of 
information should be their responsibility and they should create the policy necessary to 
ensure information security in their organisation.  One of the problems facing information 
security is the behaviour of employees.  Most employees do not understand the 
importance of protecting information, and this lack of understanding is reflected in their 
negligent information security practices.  The corporate information security policy 
should describe the vision and goals of senior management in relation to information 
security.  This policy should then be implemented in the organisation in such a way that it 
affects the behaviour of the users.  To ensure the behaviour of employees change 
favourably towards information security practices, it should become second-nature 
behaviour in the daily activities.  Information Security Obedience is the solution to 
ensuring proper information security behaviour.  
 
This paper defined the term ‘Information Security Obedience’.  It explored the 
relationships between the three fields of corporate governance, corporate culture and 
information security, and highlighted the importance of binding these fields together.  
Further research will be conducted to investigate how current information security 
practices should be modified to have an effect on corporate culture.  The manner in which 
the corporate information security policy is drafted and implemented in an organisation 
will be investigated.  A further paper will highlight how ‘Information Security 
Obedience’ can be used to integrate the three fields and what actions must be taken to do 
so.  
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1. Introduction 
 
“If you think technology can solve your security problems, then you don’t understand the 
problems and you don’t understand the technology.”  This quote by Bruce Schneier 
highlights that technical controls alone will not ensure the safety of the information assets 
of an organisation and will not solve information security related problems.  Just as 
important to the protection of information, if not more so, are the operational controls 
necessary to ensure the success of information security practices, as information security 
is people-based (Shorten, 2004, p 1374).     
 
It is important for the senior management in organisations to realise that information 
security is not solely concerned with technical and physical controls.  Most technical and 
physical controls have operational issues associated with them, dependent on human 
behaviour.  In addition, employee behaviour, to a large extent is dependent on the 
corporate culture in an organisation.  Therefore, any attempt in an organisation to 
implement technical and physical controls without considering the culture in the 
organisation could have disastrous consequences (Shaurette, 2004, p 1080).  Corporate 
culture is a strong driving force in organisations which largely affects the behaviour of 
employees and, consequently, the success of the information security practices (Beach, 
1993, p 17).   
 
The vision of senior management with regard to information security must be outlined in 
the Corporate Information Security Policy of the organisation.  The Policy should be 
‘translated’ into procedures that will positively affect the attitude and behaviour of 
employees.  Eventually the de facto, or second-nature, behaviour of employees should  
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adhere to the behaviour necessary to adequately protect the information assets of an 
organisation, as outlined by the vision of senior management in the Corporate 
Information Security Policy.  Thomson and von Solms define this natural behaviour of 
employees, in line with the information security vision of senior management, as 
Information Security Obedience (2003, p 107).     
      
This paper will highlight the effect that employee behaviour has on the success of 
information security practices.  The paper will examine the Conscious Competence 
Learning Matrix and will introduce an Information Security Competence Maturity Model 
that could assist the senior management of an organisation in positively adapting the 
behaviour of the employees. 
 
2. The Significance of Corporate Culture 
 
Culture is generally defined as those beliefs, values and assumptions that a group has 
learned over time.  Corporate culture is the set of procedures and practices that both 
senior management and employees follow in order to be successful in their environment 
(Schein, 1999, p 29). 
 
This set of procedures and practices should be supported in the policies of an 
organisation.  Further, it is the responsibility of senior management to give effect to the 
policies in an organisation (Leveson, 1970, p 52).  It is essential that a Corporate 
Information Security Policy is created in an organisation, as it implies what behaviour is 
acceptable and what behaviour is unacceptable in terms of information security practices 
(Beach, 1993, p 17).  The Corporate Information Security Policy must work within the 
organisation, where the corporate culture exists, and must address the security needs of 
the specific organisation (Deloitte & Touche, 2002, online).   
   
Therefore, if the corporate culture is not taken into consideration when enforcing the 
Information Security Policy in an organisation, the behaviour of employees will not 
change to reflect the ‘wishes’ embedded in the Information Security Policy.  This results 
in the fact that employee behaviour is often the principal obstacle in ensuring that 
information assets are kept secure (Martins and Eloff, 2002, p 203). 
 
However, diligent and well trained employees can become the strongest link in terms of 
information security in an organisation (Henry, 2004, p 1100).  It is, therefore, critical to 
understand how to get employees dedicated to and knowledgeable about their roles and 
responsibilities towards information security.  It is also of vital importance that 
employees commit to an information security program and adapt their behaviour 
positively towards information security.  The information security program should be 
created, enforced and encouraged by the senior management of an organisation through 
the Corporate Information Security Policy (Henry, 2004, p 1100).   
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3. Conscious Competence Learning Matrix 
 
The Conscious Competence Learning Matrix explains the process and stages that people 
must move through to learn a new skill, behaviour or technique.  This Matrix is generic 
and could cover a wide variety of skills.  It is clear, however, that people only respond to 
training when they are aware of their need for it (Chapman, 2001, online). 
 
The first stage of the Conscious Competence Learning Matrix is Unconscious 
Incompetence.  At this stage the employee is not aware of the tasks that must be 
performed and the employee is not aware that there is a deficiency in the skills needed to 
perform the particular task.  The employee does not understand the relevance and 
significance of the new task and must become conscious of his/her incompetence before 
learning can begin (Chapman, 2001, online).  Employees do not know what is ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ and their behaviour is consequently out of line.    
   
At stage two of the Matrix, Conscious Incompetence, the employee becomes aware of the 
existence and relevance of the task to be performed.  The employee now becomes aware 
of his/her role in this task and that by learning the skills required for this task, he/she 
improves his/her ability and effectiveness in the organisation.  Employees at this stage 
know what actions and behaviour are ‘right’ and which are ‘wrong’, and the relevant 
tasks that must be performed.  However, they still do not know exactly how to perform 
these tasks.  Ideally at this stage, the employee has a measure of his/her level of 
deficiency in the particular task and a measure of the stage of skill that is needed to 
perform the task (Chapman, 2001, online).  
 
The third stage of the Conscious Competence Learning Matrix is Conscious Competence.  
At this stage, the employee will need to concentrate and think to be able to perform the 
task.  The employee will not be able to perform the task unless thinking about it and 
making a mental effort, as the task has not become ‘second nature’ or part of the culture. 
 
The most effective means of progressing to the fourth stage in the Learning Matrix is 
practice.  The employees must practice the new task and commit to becoming 
Unconsciously Competent at the task (Chapman, 2001, online). 
 
At the Unconscious Competent stage, the task becomes so practiced that it enters the 
subconscious thinking of the employee and becomes ‘second nature’ or part of the 
culture.  The Unconsciously Competent employee may even have difficulty in explaining 
how a task is done as the task has become mostly instinctual (Chapman, 2001, online).   
 
The progression through the various stages of the Conscious Competence Learning 
Matrix can be demonstrated through an everyday example.  When a person first begins 
typing on a keyboard it is usually with one or two fingers (Stage 1).  As the need to type 
faster increases, more fingers will be used and the person may wish to take a typing  
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course to improve his/her skill (Stage 2).  Initially, when the person achieves typing using 
both hands the typing is a conscious effort, with the person frequently looking at his/her 
hands to check that the correct keys are being hit (Stage 3).  Eventually, the typing 
becomes an unconscious process, where the person is able to look at the computer 
monitor while typing (Stage 4).  However, if the standard QWERTY keyboard were to be 
replaced with a new keyboard that has a completely different layout, the learning would 
have to begin again and the person would once again have to progress through the 
Conscious Competence Learning Matrix.   
 
Senior management would like employees in its organisation to be at stage four of the 
Conscious Competence Learning Matrix for the daily tasks that employees should 
perform.  This would signify that the correct practices would be part of the natural 
behaviour of employees.  In the following section, the Conscious Competence Learning 
Matrix will be used to define the Information Security Competence Maturity Model as a 
way for employees to become skilled in information security practices. 
 
4. Information Security Competence Maturity Model 
 
Employees of an organisation are very often unconsciously incompetent when it comes to 
information security practices.  They are not aware that they are unskilled in terms of 
information security.  Therefore, they are at Stage 1 of the Information Security 
Competence Maturity Model.  At Stage 1, employees are at the Unconscious Incompetent 
stage and unaware of the role they should be playing in terms of information security.  At 
this stage employees are not aware of their ineffectiveness in information security 
practices.  Any attempt to change behaviour at this stage will not be advisable, as 
employees of an organisation will not internalise the changes and make it part of their 
new culture unless they understand the benefit of these changes (Schein, 1999, p 187).  
Therefore, if employees view information security as a hindrance to their work and do 
not fully understand the benefit, they will not accept the appropriate responsibility for 
their role in information security, and may go out of their way to find a “work-around” to 
any information security measure they do not consider necessary (Shorten, 2004, p 1381).   
 
In order for employees to progress form Stage 1 to Stage 2 an effective Information 
Security Awareness Program should be run in the organisation.  The purpose of the 
Information Security Awareness Program is to focus attention on information security.  
Employees taking part in the program are recipients of information and do not take an 
active role in the program (National Institute of Science and Technology Special 
Publication 800-16, 1998, p 15).  An effective Information Security Awareness Program 
should help employees understand why they must take information security seriously and 
what they will gain from its proper implementation (Peltier, 2004, p 1494).  Ideally, an 
Information Security Awareness Program should prepare employees for Information 
Security Training by encouraging a change in employee attitude towards information 
security.  Examples of Information Security Awareness components are awareness  
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presentations, videos, posters and inspirational information security slogans (National 
Institute of Science and Technology Special Publication 800-16, 1998, p 15).  Once 
employees have participated in the Information Security Awareness Program, and they 
have been made aware of all the potential threats to information assets, they progress to 
Stage 2.     
  
Stage 2 is Conscious Incompetence.  At this stage employees are already aware of their 
information security roles and responsibilities.  Employees at this stage understand the 
benefit of protecting information assets and the responsibilities that they have with regard 
to information security.  Employees realise that protecting information assets not only 
protects themselves, but their organisation as well and employees realise what action is 
required from them to progress to Stage 3.   
 
For employees to move from Stage 2 to Stage 3, they must participate in Information 
Security Training.  Through Information Security Training, employees will learn “how” 
information assets must be protected and employees will learn vital skills enabling them 
to perform information security practices (National Institute of Science and Technology 
Special Publication 800-16, 1998, p 18).  The Information Security Training program 
should reinforce all the terms and concepts introduced in the Information Security 
Awareness Program and employees should apply their learning through hands-on 
activities.  One of the main aims of Information Security Training is to promote personal 
responsibility for information security amongst employees and to achieve positive 
behavioural change in terms of information security practices (National Institute of 
Science and Technology Special Publication 800-16, 1998, p 25).  Once employees have 
participated in the Information Security Training program, and gained the required skills, 
they are ready to progress to Stage 3.     
      
At Stage 3 of the Information Security Competence Maturity Model, Conscious 
Competence, employees need to consciously focus on the information security practices 
they need to perform.  These practices are performed correctly, but are neither second-
nature nor part of the employees’ corporate culture.  
 
For employees to progress from Stage 3 to Stage 4, a combination of techniques can be 
used.  Firstly, a mixture of education and experience should be used.  For employees to 
fully appreciate the complexity of information security they should progress from 
Information Security Awareness to Information Security Training to Information Security 
Education.  Information Security Education provides insight to employees and a deeper 
understanding of information security practices.  Information Security Education 
provides long-term learning through seminars and in-depth discussion (National Institute 
of Science and Technology Special Publication 800-16, 1998, p 18).   
        
However, Information Security Education is not enough.  A Chinese proverb says “I hear 
and I forget, I see and I remember, I do and I understand.”  This proverb loosely tracks 
the progression of employees through the Information Security Competence Maturity  
 182
Appendix D 
 
Model.  Employees will only be able to legitimately progress to Stage 4 when they apply 
the skills they have learnt through Information Security Awareness, Training and 
Education and have gained Experience by performing the information security practices 
incessantly and become accustomed to the newly learnt practices.  Once employees 
become experienced in information security practices they will progress to a point where 
these practices become second-nature and they will advance to Stage 4 through the 
experience they have gained.   
 
Secondly, positive reinforcement will help promote employees from Stage 3 to Stage 4.  
Reinforcement should be used as confirmation that the employees are performing the 
correct information security practices and to solidify the benefit of information security 
practices to the employees.  These reinforcements or incentives do not have to be 
monetary, as positive reinforcement is widely used in behaviour modification in 
organisations, and it has been found that praise and social reinforcers are more common 
and effective than monetary reinforcers (Arnold et al, 1998, p 232).  
 
The ultimate goal of the Information Security Competence Maturity Model is for the 
employees of an organisation to reach Stage 4, through awareness, training and 
experience, and become Unconsciously Competent in the critical information security 
practices which support the information security vision of senior management.  These 
practices should adhere to the information security vision of senior management and 
become part of the de facto employee behaviour and, therefore, part of the corporate 
culture.  If this is achieved, then Information Security Obedience, as described by 
Thomson and von Solms, has been realised.  The progression of employees from 
Unconscious Incompetence to Information Security Obedience is depicted in the 
Information Security Competence Maturity Model in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Information Security Competence Maturity Model 
 
Employees progress from Stage 1 of the Information Security Competence Model 
(Unconscious Incompetence) to Stage 2 (Conscious Incompetence) through an 
Information Security Awareness Program.   
 
Employees at Stage 2 progress to Stage 3 (Conscious Competence) once they have 
undergone Information Security Training and are, not only aware, but skilled in the 
various information security tasks. 
 
For employees to move from Stage 3 to Stage 4 (Unconscious Competence) the 
employees must gain sufficient experience in the information security practices.  
Employees at Stage 4 perform information security practices correctly as they fully 
understand and are in agreement with the way things are done in the organisation and 
their behaviour is second-nature to them (Schein, 1992, online).  Information Security 
Obedience could then be observed in those organisations where employees have reached 
Stage 4.    
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5. Conclusion 
 
One of the principal problems facing information security is the behaviour and actions of 
employees towards the information assets.  Consequently, employees who understand the 
benefit of protecting the information assets and their roles and responsibilities, and 
adhere to the correct behaviour, could be the strongest link in the information security 
infrastructure.  Therefore, senior management of organisations would ideally like its 
employees to become Unconsciously Competent in information security practices.    
 
This paper focused on how employees should advance from Unconscious Competence 
through various stages to reach Stage 4 of the Information Security Competence Maturity 
Model.  Initially, the Conscious Competence Learning Matrix was investigated and used 
to define the Information Security Competence Maturity Model.  This model could assist 
organisations in determining at which Stage employees are currently, and advising the 
best way to promote employees to Information Security Obedience.  
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Abstract 
An information security solution should be a fundamental component in any organisation.  
One of the major difficulties in achieving the assimilation of information into an 
organisation is the actions and behaviour of employees.  To ensure the integration of 
information security into the corporate culture of an organisation, the protection of 
information should be part of the daily activities and second-nature behaviour of the 
employees.  
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1. Introduction 
 
“Despite our intellect, we humans – you, me and everyone else – remain the most severe 
threat to each other’s security.”  This quote from Kevin J. Mitnick (2002, p 8) highlights 
the issue facing the protection of information that is often overlooked – the human factor.  
One of the biggest threats to the success of information security in an organisation is the 
erroneous actions and behaviour of employees when handling information.    
 
In order to guard against this, it is vital that employees learn about, and integrate, 
acceptable information security practices into their everyday behaviour.  This paper will 
address how employees should learn, develop and integrate the correct information 
security skills into their daily behaviour and, ultimately, facilitate the protection of 
information assets.    
 
2. An Information Secure Corporate Culture 
 
Corporate culture is the total of all the shared, taken-for-granted assumptions that a group 
has learned over time (Schein, 1999, pp 28-29).  Every organisation has a corporate 
culture, whether it is aware of the culture or not, and this culture exists at both a 
conscious and unconscious level (Hagberg Consulting Group, 2002, online).  A balanced 
corporate culture is essential in an organisation as it is a powerful, underlying and often 
unconscious set of forces that establishes individual and group behaviour (Schein, 1999, 
p 14).  In terms of information security, employee actions and behaviour are particularly 
important as almost all information security solutions rely on the human element to a 
large degree (Berti and Rogers, 2004, p 150-151).  Therefore, as the corporate culture of 
an organisation establishes and influences employee behaviour, it should be used to 
mould the information security behaviour of employees.  
   
Information security is far more than simply applying an assortment of physical and 
technical controls (Berti and Rogers, 2004, p 147).  Information security solutions have 
been meticulously developed to attempt to protect the information assets of organisations.  
However, as mentioned earlier, the most significant vulnerability – the human factor – is 
often left unaddressed.  Organisations may not be able to protect the integrity, 
confidentiality, and availability of information if they do not ensure that all employees 
involved understand their roles and responsibilities.  It is also vital that these same 
employees are adequately trained to protect the information assets in their organisation 
(National Institute of Science and Technology Special Publication 800-16, 1998, p 12).  
Properly trained and diligent employees can become the strongest link in an 
organisation’s security infrastructure (Henry, 2004, p 664).  The understanding of 
employees, with regard to information security, and the resulting behaviour and actions 
should become second-nature to employees and part of their daily activities.  For that  
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reason, information security practices should become part of the corporate culture of an 
organisation.  
 
Corporate culture not only places constraints upon the activities and behaviour of 
employees, it also prescribes what the organisation and its employees must do.  
Consequently, the corporate culture guides the activities of the organisation and its 
employees (Beach, 1993, p 11). 
 
However, the question remains – how can information security be incorporated into a 
corporate culture?  Any prospective change in the current corporate culture requires, in 
essence, the unlearning of beliefs on the part of the employees and could result in a huge 
amount of anxiety and resistance to change from employees (Schein, 1999, p 25).  To 
change the culture, employees’ values, norms and attitudes must change.  This is to 
ensure they make the ‘right’ contribution to the healthy corporate culture despite any 
conflict of individual and group interest (Meek, 1988, p 454).  The environment that has 
the most influence on employees’ beliefs and attitudes is the environment within the 
organisation.  Therefore, the power to change the culture of an organisation lies largely 
with senior management (Drennan, 1992, pp 3-4).   
 
As part of its corporate governance duties, it is the duty of senior management to define 
and express the vision it has for the organisation.  Vision defines the ideal future for an 
organisation.  This could imply preserving the current culture, or the vision could imply 
change.  That is, the vision may require no more than the natural evolution of the present 
culture, or it may require radical changes in what the organisation is doing and the 
resulting culture (Beach, 1993, pp 49-50).  It is vital for senior management to outline its 
vision for the organisation in terms of information security as well.  One of the ways to 
do this is for management to articulate its vision in a policy.  Senior management should 
demonstrate its dedication to information security by providing its support and 
commitment towards a formally agreed upon and documented Corporate Information 
Security Policy, as it is one of the controls that is regarded as best practice in terms of 
information security (BS 7799-1, 1999, p 4).  The core objective of any policy is to 
influence and determine the decisions, actions and behaviour of employees by specifying 
what behaviour is acceptable and what behaviour is unacceptable (Whitman & Mattord, 
2003, p 194).  Therefore, by creating the policy through its governance duties, senior 
management is initiating the shaping of the corporate culture to include information 
security.    
 
This results in the amalgamation of corporate culture, information security and corporate 
governance and is termed Information Security Obedience.  In previous work, Thomson 
and von Solms defined Information Security Obedience as ‘de facto user behaviour 
complying with the vision of senior management as defined in the Corporate Information 
Security Policy’ (Thomson and von Solms, 2005, p 74). 
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The rest of the paper will detail the Model for Information Security Shared Tacit 
Espoused Values or the MISSTEV Model and its components that could assist 
organisations in achieving Information Security Obedience.  The two components, the 
Conscious Competence Learning Model and the Modes of Knowledge Creation, will be 
examined, followed by an explanation of the MISSTEV Model itself. 
 
3. Conscious Competence Learning Model 
 
The first component of the MISSTEV Model is the Conscious Competence Learning 
Model.  The model describes the process and stages of learning a new skill or behaviour 
and is partitioned into four stages, which progress from Unconscious Incompetence to 
Unconscious Competence.  These four stages will be detailed in the following section 
(Chapman, 2001, online). 
 
3.1 The first stage is Unconscious Incompetence.  People at this stage are not aware 
of the existence of the particular skills that are required from them.  In other 
words, they do not know that they lack particular skills or types of behaviour.  It 
is possible that they might deny the practicality and usefulness of the new skills.  
In order to learn new skills, it is vital that people become aware of the necessity to 
learn something new (Chapman, 2001, online).  For example, a person who has 
never attempted driving a car is not aware of all the skills, and knowledge of the 
road, required to be licensed driver. 
 
3.2 The second stage is Conscious Incompetence.  At this stage, people become aware 
of the existence of the relevant skills they should possess.  They have realised 
their inadequacies and should be able to assess the level of skills that is required 
for their own competence (Chapman, 2001, online).  For example, a person who 
has passed the learner drivers test is now aware of the skills and knowledge 
required to drive a car, but has not acquired those skills as yet. 
 
3.3 The third stage is Conscious Competence.  People at this stage have acquired the 
new, necessary skills.  However, people still have to concentrate on performing 
these skills and, therefore, the skills are not second-nature as yet.  In other words, 
people cannot perform these skills without having to think about them and the 
skills are not part of their behaviour (Chapman, 2001, online).  For example, a 
person who has recently obtained a driver’s license, has acquired the necessary 
skills to drive a car, but still has to concentrate on changing gears, using the clutch 
and remembering to look in the rearview mirror.    
 
3.4 The final stage is Unconscious Competence.  By this stage, the skills learned at 
the Conscious Competence stage have become so practiced that people no longer 
have to think about how to perform them.  The skills have become second-nature 
or part of the actions and behaviour of people at this stage and have become 
largely instinctual (Chapman, 2001, online).  For example, for a person who is an  
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experienced driver, the skills required to drive a car have become automatic to a 
large extent. 
 
Therefore, whenever a new skill or set of skills must be learnt, people will naturally 
progress through the four stages of the Conscious Competence Learning Model.   
 
4. Modes of Knowledge Creation 
 
The second component of the MISSTEV Model is Nonaka’s Modes of Knowledge 
Creation.  The Knowledge Creation process comprises tacit knowledge and explicit 
knowledge, as well as the knowledge conversion steps that must occur for one type of 
knowledge to be translated into the other. 
 
Tacit, or implicit, knowledge is subjective and experience based.  This knowledge is 
difficult to formalise and communicate and includes beliefs, attitudes and intuition, as 
well as technical skills.  Knowledge in the tacit form is actionable, or can be used, by the 
owner (Nonaka, 1994, p 16).  Explicit, or overt, knowledge, on the other hand, is 
objective and rational knowledge that can be communicated in words and sentences and 
includes theoretical approaches and problem solving (Nonaka, 1994, p 16).  The purpose 
of Nonaka’s Modes of Knowledge Creation is to identify existing knowledge and 
‘convert’ it to new knowledge.  This is done by classifying four processes of interaction 
between tacit and explicit knowledge.  These processes are classified as Socialization, 
Externalization, Combination and Internalization (Nonaka, 1994, p 18). 
 
4.1 Socialization is the process whereby one person’s tacit knowledge is transferred 
to tacit knowledge in another person.  Socialization involves capturing knowledge 
through direct interaction with individuals both inside and outside an 
organisation.  Socialization depends on having shared experience, and results in 
acquired skills and common mental models.  Socialization is primarily a process 
between individuals (Nonaka, 1994, p 19). 
 
4.2 Externalization is the process whereby tacit knowledge is made explicit.  One 
way to do this is through ‘articulation’ of tacit knowledge by expressing beliefs 
and values in words, metaphors or analogies.  A second way is through ‘eliciting 
and translating’ the tacit knowledge of others into an understandable form or 
explicit knowledge.  Dialogue and discussion are important means for both 
methods.  During such communication, people share beliefs and can learn how to 
better articulate their thinking.  Externalization is a process among individuals 
within a group (Nonaka, 1994, p 19). 
 
4.3 Once knowledge has become explicit, it can be transferred to explicit knowledge 
through a process Nonaka calls Combination.  Explicit knowledge can be 
conveyed in, for example, documents and email, as well as through meetings and  
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training.  The collection and dissemination of relevant information becomes very 
significant in this process.  Combination allows knowledge transfer among groups 
across organisations (Nonaka, 1994, pp 19-20). 
 
4.4 Internalization is the process of understanding and absorbing explicit knowledge 
into the tacit knowledge held by an individual.  Internalization is largely practical 
as explicit knowledge is transferred to tacit through the actual doing of a task or 
skill or through simulations.  The internalization process transfers organisation 
and group explicit knowledge to the individual (Nonaka, 1994, p 20). 
 
The four processes of interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge are represented in 
Figure 1.  It shows that the Socialization process transfers Tacit Knowledge to Tacit 
Knowledge.  The Externalization process transfers Tacit Knowledge to Explicit 
Knowledge.  The Internalization process transfers Explicit Knowledge to Tacit 
Knowledge.  And the Combination process transfers Explicit Knowledge to Explicit 
Knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Nonaka’s Modes of Knowledge Creation 
 
 
The interactions between tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge will tend to become 
larger in scale and faster as more individuals in the organisation become involved in the 
knowledge conversion or creation processes.  Therefore, organisational knowledge 
creation can be seen as an increasing spiral process, starting at the individual level 
moving up to the collective or group level, and then, ultimately, to the organisational 
level (Nonaka, 1994, p 20).  Therefore, through Nonaka’s Modes of Knowledge Creation, 
an organisation can create and disseminate new knowledge. 
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5. Model for Information Security Shared Tacit Espoused Values or 
MISSTEV Model 
 
As detailed previously, if the de facto employee behaviour complies with the vision of 
senior management, which should be detailed in the Corporate Information Security 
Policy, then Corporate Information Security Obedience is evident in the organisation.  
The following section integrates the Conscious Competence Maturity Model and the 
Modes of Knowledge Creation, both discussed in previous sections, into the Model for 
Information Security Shared Tacit Espoused Values or MISSTEV Model.  This 
MISSTEV Model details the progression from the development of the Corporate 
Information Security Policy to the realization of Corporate Information Security 
Obedience.  The MISSTEV Model is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: MISSTEV Model 
 
The foundation of the MISSTEV Model is the Corporate Information Security Policy.  As 
described previously, it is through this policy that senior management should illustrate its 
vision for information security within its organisation.      
 
The tacit knowledge, or vision, of senior management should be translated into explicit 
knowledge through the creation of the Corporate Information Security Policy and through 
the process of externalization. 
Unconscious 
Incompetence 
Conscious 
Incompetence 
Conscious 
Competence 
Unconscious 
Competence 
Corporate 
Information Security 
Obedience 
 194
 
Appendix E 
 
Once the vision of senior management has been externalized, the Corporate Information 
Security Policy must be introduced to the employees of the organisation.  In terms of 
information security, these employees are at the Unconscious Incompetence stage, as 
shown in Figure 2, as they are unaware of their information security roles and 
responsibilities. 
 
The information security vision of senior management should now be explicit knowledge 
through the Corporate Information Security Policy and should be transferred to 
employees through the process of combination.  As detailed previously, combination 
allows knowledge transfer among groups across organisations.  The explicit knowledge 
of senior management, or in other words, the Corporate Information Security Policy, 
should be transferred to the explicit knowledge of employees through an Information 
Security Awareness Program.  The purpose of an Information Security Awareness 
Program is merely to focus attention on security and make employees aware of the skills 
they need to adequately protect information assets (National Institute of Science and 
Technology Special Publication 800-16, 1998, p 15).  It is vital at this stage that 
employees realise what is required from them, and why the protection of information is 
so vital to the protection of an organisation.  Therefore, through the process of 
combination, employees should realise their inadequacies when it comes to the protection 
of information and should move to the Conscious Incompetence stage of the MISSTEV 
Model. 
 
Once at the Conscious Incompetence stage, and in order to progress to the next stage in 
the MISSTEV Model, employees must be trained in information security practices.  All 
employees need basic training in information security concepts and procedures.  The 
National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) recommends three levels of 
training: Beginning, Intermediate and Advanced, with each level linked to the roles and 
responsibilities of the employees (National Institute of Science and Technology Special 
Publication 800-16, 1998, p 5).  Once employees have been trained in their particular 
information security roles and responsibilities, and have acquired the necessary skills, 
they should progress to the Conscious Competence stage of the MISSTEV Model. 
 
Once the necessary information security skills have been transferred to employees 
through training, the process of internalization will facilitate the absorbing of this explicit 
knowledge into the tacit knowledge of employees.  The internalization process is, for the 
most part, practical as explicit information security knowledge is transferred to tacit 
through employees actually performing a task or skill.  However, employees will not 
internalize these skills and their responsibilities if they are not committed to and do not 
fully understand their role in the protection of information.     
 
Internalization guides employees to the Unconscious Competence stage of the MISSTEV 
Model.  Through internalization, employees should fully understand and support the 
information security vision of senior management and, by this stage, the information  
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security skills should have become so practiced that they are second-nature to the 
employees.  In order for employees to remain at the Unconscious Competence stage, the 
tacit information security knowledge that has been learnt and absorbed through the 
MISSTEV Model should be transferred to the tacit knowledge of other employees 
through the process of Socialization.  Over time, this should ensure the evolution of the 
Unconscious Competence stage into Corporate Information Security Obedience as shown 
in Figure 2.  Once Information Security Obedience has evolved in an organisation, 
success has been achieved.  The ultimate vision of senior management for information 
security has been realised in the organisation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
One of the biggest issues facing an organisation’s information is the lack of knowledge, 
skills and commitment by employees when it comes to the protection of information.  In 
order for employees to become more knowledgeable about and committed to the 
protection of information, knowledge creation and transferal is necessary.  This is 
possible through Nonaka’s Modes of Knowledge Creation between tacit and explicit 
knowledge as discussed in the paper.  In addition, as knowledge is created and 
disseminated, employees move through the stages of the Conscious Competence 
Learning Model.  In terms of information security, Nonaka’s Modes of Knowledge 
Creation and the Conscious Competence Learning Model have been integrated into the 
Model for Information Security Shared Tacit Espoused Values or MISSTEV.   
 
Through the MISSTEV Model, employees should be informed about the information 
security vision of senior management and their roles and responsibilities to protect 
information.  Further, by following the spiral of the Model, employees should be made 
aware of and trained in the correct skills necessary to protect information asset, and these 
skills should become part of the everyday practices of the employees.  Ultimately, if all 
employees follow the spiral of the MISSTEV Model, Corporate Information Security 
Obedience should become evident in an organisation and the vision of senior 
management has been realised.   
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